NATURAL THEOLOGY 



CONSIDERED 



WITH REFERENCE TO 



LORD BROUGHAM'S DISCOURSE 



ON THAT SUBJECT. 



By THOMAS TURTON, D.D., 

n 9 

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 

AND 

DEAN OF PETERBOROUGH. 



CAMBRIDGE : 

PRINTED AT THE PITT PRESS, BY JOHN SMITH, 
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY. 

LONDON: 
JOHN WILLIAM PARKER, WEST STRAND. 

J. & J. J. DEIGHTON; AND T. STEVENSON, CAMBRIDGE. 



MD.CCC.XXXVI. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

PREFACE 1 

INTRODUCTION. 

EXPLANATION OF TERMS — ARRANGEMENT 13 

SECTION I. 

PHYSICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 34 

SECTION II. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 65 

SECTION III. 

ETHICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 161 

SECTION IV. 

ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 197 

SECTION V. 

ARGUMENT A PRIORI 233 

SECTION VI. 

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 271 

SECTION VII. 
WARBURTON 297 



PREFACE. 



The Discourse of Natural Theology by Lord 
Brougham could not fail to attract very general 
attention; and on the publication of the work, 
I for my own part anxiously looked forward to a 
season of leisure — being confident that I should 
derive from the perusal of it both pleasure and 
advantage. Having, besides, heard the Noble 
Author's volume mentioned, even by some of his 
Lordship's friends, as " obscure*" and as " hard 
reading," I wished to ascertain how a Discourse on 
such a subject could have been composed, so as to 
be spoken of in that manner. On examining Lord 
Brougham's production, I found it, as might be 
expected from the great talents and attainments 
of the Author, abounding in enlarged and philo- 
sophical views of things ; but still there was an 
impression left upon my mind, by the entire work, 
that the complaints, respecting obscurity and hard 

A 



2 



PREFACE. 



reading, were by no means unwarranted. I was 
moreover astonished at the inaccuracies, which were 
presented without being sought for, in almost every 
part ; for of them I had received no intimation. 

With regard to the work now in the reader's 
hands, it was not till I had surveyed the brief 
remarks which had been put down during the 
perusal of the Discourse, that I thought of pre- 
paring any thing, upon the subject, for the press. 
It occurred to me that, however I might fail to 
elucidate what was " obscure" or to facilitate the 
reading of what was " hard, 11 I certainly should, 
in many instances, be enabled to correct what was 
erroneous. The endeavour to effect what I could, 
in these several ways, would at least require a 
statement of my own views of Natural Theology; 
and there probably was no disinclination to leave 
some permanent foot-marks, on ground over which 
I had been accustomed to wander from my earliest 
years. 

The Treatise, which suggested the observa- 
tions contained in the following pages, is in fact a 
Preliminary Discourse to Paley's Natural Theology, 



PREFACE. 



3 



illustrated by Lord Brougham and Sir Charles 
Bell; and we are informed, in the Dedication to 
Earl Spencer, that the plan of publishing the work, 
by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Know- 
ledge, was abandoned, from the apprehension 
u that the adoption of it might open the door to 
the introduction of religious controversy among the 
members of the Society, against their fundamental 
principles." There is something curious in the 
notion of a Society not unlikely to be drawn into 
religious controversy, by a work designed to prove 
the Being and Attributes of God ; but be that as it 
may, we cannot but rejoice that the plan has been 
carried into execution, by the individual exertions 
of the two eminent persons already named. In the 
remarks now offered to the world, I have no in- 
tention to " open the door to the introduction of 
religious controversy," among the members of any 
Society whatever. The remarks might have been 
made by one whose views of Natural Religion are 
not very different from those of Lord Brougham ; 
and they are addressed to such readers as are of 
opinion that what is written ought to be under- 

A 2 



4 



PREFACE. 



stood — and that what is understood ought to be in 
accordance with truth. 

It has long been deemed the glory of Socrates, 
that he brought philosophy from the schools of 
the learned to the habitations of men — by strip- 
ping it of its technicalities, and exhibiting it in 
the ordinary language of life. There is no one, 
\n modern times, who has possessed this talent to 
an equal extent with Paley; and we can scarcely 
conceive any one to have employed it with greater 
success. The transmutation of metals into gold 
was the supreme object of the Alchemist's aspi- 
rations. But Paley had acquired a more enviable 
power. Knowledge however abstruse, by passing 
through his mind, became plain common sense — 
stamped with the characters which ensured its 
currency in the world. At present, the tendency 
is in the opposite direction. The disposition is 
to dignify almost every thing with the semblance 
of science. Matters which have long been under- 
stood, sufficiently for all practical purposes, are 
worked up into a system ; and the most pliant of 
ancient languages is ransacked for combinations 



PREFACE. 



5 



of syllables, to be employed in the service of the 
new scheme of classification. To correspond with 
all this, the infant science is taught to speak in 
phrases of large import, and to use expressions 
familiar only to the Mathematical Philosophers. 
Now, it is undoubtedly possible to give, to many 
departments of knowledge, the formalities here 
described ; and so, by their aspect at least, to 
recommend them to men of science: and this ap- 
pears to have been Lord Brougham's intention 
with respect to Natural Theology ; for he informs 
us that "the composition of his Discourse was 
undertaken in consequence of an observation which 
he had often made, that scientific men were apt 
to regard the study of Natural Religion as little 
connected with philosophical pursuits. 1 ' The inten- 
tion, indeed, is manifest throughout the Discourse ; 
and if I do not mistake, the obscurity, which has 
been felt to pervade the work, arises from His 
Lordship's manner of communicating to Natural 
Theology a more scientific character than, in his 
opinion, had been previously assigned to it. . . . 
Beyond doubt, the truth of science may exist with 



6 



PREFACE, 



little or nothing of the form ; and in that state 
the great object of inquiry is, after all, the most 
accessible to inquirers of every order. Such being 
the case, whoever ventures to invest any portion 
of human knowledge with a more scientific ex- 
terior, ought to take especial care that it do not, 
from want of clearness or consistency, appear, to 
those for whom the change is designed, to have 
the form of science, with little or nothing of the 

truth The reader will bear in mind that these 

remarks are intended to direct his attention, and 
not to bias his opinion. His decision, in the 
matter under consideration, will depend upon the 
evidence to be adduced. 

It is difficult to speak of the inaccuracies pre- 
sented by the 'Discourse of Natural Theology . , 
Of their number, I will only observe, that those 
persons who would rather go wrong with Lord 
Brougham, than right with the author of the 
present volume, will have sufficient opportunities 
of showing that mark of respect for His Lordship's 
character. As to the origin of the inaccuracies, 
they seem to have arisen from the habit of taking 



PREFACE. 



7 



rapid glances at subjects: — from seeing a little, 
and so conjecturing the rest. If truth be sought 
in this manner, the probability is that it will not 
be found; and no proceeding can be imagined 
more fatal to the reputation for knowledge. 

But however obscure and inaccurate the Dis- 
course may be deemed, it contains many things 
well deserving the attention of those 44 scientific 
men, 1 "' for whom it appears to have been mainly 
designed: — some of whom are described as " men 
of religious habits of thinking others as 44 free 
from any disposition towards scepticism, rather 
because they have not much discussed the subject, 
than because they have formed fixed opinions 
upon it after inquiry while 44 the bulk of them rely 
little upon Natural Theology, which they seem 
to regard as a speculation built rather on fancy 
than on argument — or, at any rate, as a kind of 
knowledge quite different from either physical or 
moral science." Considering Lord Brougham's 
extensive acquaintance with men of science, this 
account of them cannot but be thought important. 
The whole of it is very remarkable ; and there is 



8 



PREFACE. 



something far from satisfactory in the information 
respecting the prevailing opinions on the subject 
of Natural Theology. In what way the men of 
science, within Lord Brougham's sphere of obser- 
vation, have become obnoxious to such a reproach, 
does not appear. At all events, it is in the highest 
degree creditable to His Lordship, to have taken 
so much trouble to effect its removal. 

As to the following pages, the object of them 
is not less to maintain what is conceived to be 
right in Lord Brougham's Discourse, than to cor- 
rect what is apprehended to be wrong. Moreover, 
in executing this latter purpose, the author will not 
in any instance be found to manifest the slightest 
disposition to make the most (as it is termed) of 
his own views of the matter under consideration ; 
for an attempt of that sort is very seldom much 
better than an endeavour to leave a false impression 
on the readers mind. On the contrary, his great 
aim will be to state facts and opinions as accurately 
as his power of language will enable him to state 
them ; at the same time taking the utmost care, that 
no inferences shall be drawn, without furnishing 



PREFACE. 



9 



the amplest means of determining their propriety 
or impropriety. 

That, in discussions like those to which the sub- 
sequent pages are devoted, the present writer is 
incapable of adding or altering a single word, for 
the sake of effect — Lord Brougham would, it is 
imagined, at any moment, readily avow his be- 
lief. The Noble Author would assuredly give the 
writer credit for the resolution to make truth the 
object of his researches, and for the intention to state 
things exactly as they are. His Lordship would 
probably number him among those who are entitled 
to express their admiration of the sentiment con- 
tained in the following passage : " I look upon the 
discovery of any thing which is true as a valuable 
acquisition to society ; which cannot possibly hurt 
or obstruct the good effect of any other truth what- 
soever : for they all partake of one common essence, 
and necessarily coincide with each other ; and like 
the drops of rain which fall separately into the 
river, mix themselves at once with the stream, 
and strengthen the general current*." 

* Middle ton's Works, Vol. I. p. viii. 8vo, 



At the head of each division of the pre- 
sent volume, I have specified those pages 
of the * Discourse of Natural Theology,' 
to which the division relates ; and previously 
to the perusal of any such division, I would 
recommend an attentive consideration of the 
corresponding portion of the ' Discourse.' 

It may he proper to add that the refer- 
ences are made to the second edition of Lord 
Brougham's work. 



INTRODUCTION. 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS ARRANGEMENT. 

(Discourse, Introduction, pp. 5 — 14.) 

Lord Brougham, in the outset of his Discourse, 
notices the frequent use of the words Theology 
and Religion as synonymous; and observes that 
" Natural Theology and Natural Religion are by 
many confounded together." His Lordship then 
proposes that Theology should be considered as 
the science^ and Religion as its subject. According 
to this distinction, if I rightly apprehend it, we, by 
means of Theology, investigate and establish the 
truths of which Religion consists. There is great 
reason to lament that Lord Brougham, having thus 
marked the difference between Theology and Reli- 
gion in general, did not at once present his views of 
Natural Theology and Natural Religion in par- 
ticular; and state exactly the objects of the study 
which he was anxious to recommend to general 
attention: — for, in the first place — as His Lord- 



INTRODUCTION. 



ship complains — each of the terms Natural The- 
ology and Natural Religion has had somewhat 
different significations attached to it by different 
writers ; and in the second place, as the opening of 
the work is now left, the reader speedily becomes 
sensible of a degree of obscurity, which could 
scarcely have existed had such illustrations of the 
subject been duly afforded. 

The noble and learned author next remarks 
that "there is, as regards Natural Theology, a 
more limited use of the word, which confines it 
to the knowledge and attributes of the Deity; 
and regards the speculation concerning his will, 
and our own hopes from and duties towards him, 
as another branch of the science, termed Natural 

Religion, in contradistinction to the former." 

Even here we begin to feel the want of those expla- 
nations of terms, the absence of which has already 
been alluded to. It is very difficult to perceive 
what is intended by " a more limited use" of the 
term Natural Theology — when nothing has been 
before mentioned of any use of it at all. Again, 
His Lordship probably meant to say that the term 
Natural Theology, in its " more limited use," had 
been employed to denote, not " the knowledge and 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



15 



attributes of the Deity," but " the knowledge of 
the existence and attributes of the Deity." 

It is also, I suppose, to be inferred that Natural 
Theology consists of two parts: — the first part, 
evincing the being and attributes of God; the 
second, His designs respecting our existence in 
another world, and our principles and conduct in 
the present: — but it would have added greatly to 
the clearness of the Introduction, if this had been 
specifically stated; instead of being left to be in- 
ferred or not inferred, according to the habits of 
the reader's mind. 

Lord Brougham, however, goes on to exemplify 
his remark, by referring to Dr Paley and Bishop 
Butler. 

Concerning Dr Paley, His Lordship thus writes: 

" Dr Paley hardly touches on this latter branch [the will 
of God, and our own hopes from and duties towards him] in his 
hook ; there being only about one-sixtieth part devoted to it, 
and that incidentally in treating of the attributes. Indeed, 
though in the dedication he uses the word Religion as syno- 
nymous with Theology, the title and the arrangement of his 
discourse show that he generally employed the term Natural 
Theology in its restricted sense." (pp. 5, 6.) 

There is ample scope for doubt whether Dr 
Paley held the distinction here attributed to him. 



16 



INTRODUCTION. 



So far, indeed, as I can judge, neither the title nor 
the execution of his work tends to prove that he did 
hold that distinction. When he entitled his Volume 
— Natural Theology ; or, Evidences of the existence 
and attributes of the Deity, collected from the ap- 
pearances of Nature — it is to be inferred that he 
assumed the term Natural Theology as a com- 
pendious and convenient indication of the contents 
immediately subjoined — rather than that he had 
any intention of assigning what he conceived to be 
proper limits to the province of Natural Theology 
as connected with Natural Religion : — a view of the 
subject, which his use of the term Natural Religion, 
as the equivalent of Natural Theology, seems to 
confirm. Moreover, since the work simply professed 
to contain Evidences of the existence and attributes 
of the Deity, collected from the appearances of 
Nature — any systematic and extended observations, 
on the " will of God, and our own hopes from and 
duties towards him," would have been entirely out 
of place. At the same time, the observations on 
those topics, which are found towards the close of 
the work, entitle the Author to greater honour 
than could have been derived from the most rigid 
adherence to a faultless plan. They afford an in- 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



17 



teresting proof of his reluctance to take leave of 
an important study, which had long engaged his 
thoughts; and of his anxiety to impress upon the 
reader's mind those moral and religious consider- 
ations, which were so familiar t«o himself, and so 
suited to the subject under discussion. 

In what manner Dr Paley disposed of "the 
speculation concerning the will of God, and our 
own hopes from and duties towards him," may 
perhaps appear from a few remarks, which I shall 
venture to offer, on Dr Paley 's works, when re- 
garded as parts of a system. A little attention 
to them, in that point of view, will render it as 
certain, as any thing of the kind can be, that 
the author had no purpose of nicely marking the 
boundaries between Natural Religion, and the de- 
partments of knowledge the most nearly related 
to it ; and indeed may be the means of preventing 
some not quite trifling mistakes, in estimating 

the literary labours of that extraordinary man 

Dr Paley's great object, then, appears to have 
been — to place every portion of that knowledge, 
which to responsible agents is of deeper moment 
than any other, upon what he deemed its firmest 
foundations. His intention was, that the student 

B 



18 



INTRODUCTION. 



should begin with his Natural Theology ; in which 
are to be found, "collected from the appearances 
of nature," evidences of that fact which supports 
all the rest; viz. the existence of a Creator and 
Preserver of all things ; a Being of boundless 
power and wisdom—whose providential arrange- 
ments are obviously formed to promote the hap- 
piness of his sensitive creation. Taking this fact 
as established, Dr Paley's next step — in the first 
few pages of his Evidences of Christianity — is 
to show that there are circumstances which appear 
to give countenance to the supposition, that the 
Supreme Being may vouchsafe to his rational crea- 
tures an express revelation of his will. There are 
moreover, in the present condition of human life, 
various indications of a future state of existence. 
Yet, in Dr Paley's view of the case, these matters 
need not be strenuously insisted upon. In the 
Preparatory Considerations to his Evidences of 
Christianity^ after stating these two propositions — 
namely, 1. that a future state of existence may 
be destined by God for his human creation; and 
2. that, being so destined, he may acquaint them 
with it — the author thus proceeds :— 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



19 



"It is not necessary for our purpose that these propo- 
sitions he capable of proof ; or even that, by arguments 
drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to 
be probable. It is enough that we are able to say con- 
cerning them, that they are not so violently improbable, 
so contradictory to what we already believe of the Divine 
power and character, that either the propositions them- 
selves, or facts strictly connected with the propositions 
(and therefore no farther improbable than they are im- 
probable), ought to be rejected at first sight, and to be 
rejected by whatever strength or complication of evidence 
they be attested." 

Let us now see by what steps the argument 
advances : — It is not impossible — say, not utterly 
improbable — that a Divine Revelation may be 
afforded to the human race ; but if there ever has 
been a Revelation, the only method, by which 
we can conceive its reality to have been evinced, 
is by Miracles : have then miracles ever been 
professedly wrought for such a purpose? It is 
the object of The Evidences of Christianity to 
prove that on Miracles really wrought was founded 
the Christian dispensation — a dispensation which, 
by its internal excellence, recommends itself to 
our best judgment and feelings, as worthy of the 
previously - ascertained attributes of God. The 
truth of Christianity being so established, a new 
b 2 



20 



INTRODUCTION. 



importance is given to the present state of existence, 
by the certainty of its connexion with another : 
in this way "life and immortality are brought to 
light." . . . . Dr Paley thus determines that great 
truth, the probabilities of which, as manifested 
by the condition of the human race in this world, 
have been collected by various writers, and made 
to form part of their systems of Natural Theology. 
And what is the practical bearing of all the in- 
formation, natural and revealed, which has been 
thus afforded? The answer to this question is 
to be found in Dr Paley's Moral Philosophy; in 
which he shows that there are grounds for con- 
sidering the deductions of reason as combining 
with the precepts of Christianity, in pointing out 
the principles and conduct which become us, as 
probationers for eternity. With such intentions, 
Dr Paley laid before the world, to adopt his own 
language, "the evidences of Natural Religion, the 
evidences of Revealed Religion, and an account of 
the duties that result from both If his entire object 
be kept in view, there will be no difficulty in under- 
standing why he dwelt but little on several parti- 

* Dedication of Natural Theology to Bishop Barrington, 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c, 



21 



culars, which many will deem — -and rightly deem — 
of real consequence in inquiries of this kind ; which 
indeed he might, under other circumstances, have 
himself enlarged upon, as deserving the most serious 
attention. For instance, it is not, I am persuaded, 
to be inferred, from Dr Paley's language, that he 
cared not for " the presumptive proofs of a future 
retribution from the light of nature*; 1 ' but that 
he held his own system to be strong and complete 
without them. In confirmation of this account 
of Dr Paley's purposes, I refer the reader to a 
passage near the close of his Evidences of' Chris- 
tianity ; from which it appears that he considered 
" the argument drawn from the light of nature" 
as quite sufficient to show the probability of a 
future state — that " one truth"" which " gives order 
to confusion," and " makes the moral world of a 
piece with the natural." To the same end, I 
extract the following passage from the concluding 
chapter of his Natural Theology. 

" The existence and character of the Deity is, in every 
view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In 
none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief 
of the fundamental articles of Revelation. It is a step to 

* See Moral Philosophy, Book 11. chap. 3. end. 



INTRODUCTION, 



have it proved that there must be something in the world 
more than what we see. It is a farther step to know that, 
amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an 
intelligent mind, concerned in its production, order and 
support. These points being assured to us by Natural 
Theology, we may well leave to Revelation the disclosure 
of many particulars which our researches cannot reach, 
as respecting either the nature of this Being as the original 
cause of all things, or his character and designs as a moral 
governor ; and not only so, but the more full confirmation of 
other particulars, of which, although they do not lie alto- 
gether beyond our reasonings and our probabilities, the 
certainty is by no means equal to the importance." 

Having thus endeavoured to elucidate the re- 
spective bearings of these popular productions upon 
each other, let me also state that there are several 
portions of one of them at the least, I mean his 
Moral Philosophy, of which I should be very sorry 
to express any approbation. My notion is that, 
jealous of the simplicity of his whole plan, Dr Paley 
rejected much that would have added to the beauty 
as well as the stability of his structure ; and yet, 
which is singular, he admitted, in various parts, that 
which was not wanted — the main effect of such ad- 
mission being to encumber his ground with objects 
of weakness and deformity. I may have another 
occasion to discuss more fully the subject thus inci- 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



dentally noticed From the preceding estimate of 

Dr Paley's views, we shall, at least, be warranted 
in concluding, that he did not draw the distinction, 
attributed to him by Lord Brougham, between 
Natural Theology and Natural Religion.* 

But to proceed — Lord Brougham animadverts 
on the term Natural Religion, as used by Bishop 
Butler, in the following manner : — 

" Bishop Butler seems to have used Natural Religion 
in a sense equally restricted, but certainly little warranted by 
custom ; for that portion of his work which treats of Natural 
Religion is confined to a future state and the moral govern- 
ment of God, as if he either held Natural Religion and 
Natural Theology to be two branches of one subject, or 
Natural Religion to be a branch of Natural Theology." (p. 6.) 

* In the account of the principal productions of Dr Paley, I 
have not mentioned the Hora Paulina ; which admirable work must 
be considered as intended to strengthen the Evidences of Christianity. 
It has been called the most original of the author's productions ; and 
in its execution it appears to have been so. It was suggested how- 
ever, if I mistake not, by the following remarks, at the conclusion of 
Dr Doddridge's Introduction to his Paraphrase and Notes on the 
first Epistle to the Thessalonians. — " Whoever reads over St Paul's 
Epistles with attention will discern such intrinsic characters in their 
genuineness, and the Divine authority of the doctrines they contain, 
as will perhaps produce in him a stronger conviction than all the 
external evidence with which they are attended. To which we may 
add, that the exact coincidence observable, between the many allu- 
sions to particular facts in this as well as in other Epistles, and the 
account of the facts themselves as they are recorded in the history 
of the Acts, is a remarkable confirmation of the truth of each." 



24 



INTRODUCTION. 



Whoever will examine The Analogy of Reli- 
gion, Natural and Revealed, to the constitution and 
course of Nature, will find that the author under- 
took to arbitrate between the friends of Religion 
and the adversaries of Religion — meaning, by Reli- 
gion, a system of moral, practical truths, whether 
deduced by the faculties of the mind or promul- 
gated by Revelation : — in other words, between the 
friends and the adversaries of Religion, Natural 
and Revealed. Now, however widely persons may 
differ, there must be some principles in common, or 
the matter in dispute can never be decided. What, 
then, were the common principles in the case under 
review ? They were two : the being of a God — 
and the actual constitution and course of nature. 
And thus, Bishop Butler was led to trace the 
analogy existing between Religion, Natural and 
Revealed, on the one hand — and the course of 
nature, on the other; thereby endeavouring to 
prove the high probability of their having both 
proceeded from the same Divine Being, whose 
existence was admitted on all hands. The signi- 
fication, therefore, given to the term Natural Reli- 
gion, may be well accounted for, without supposing 
the author to have adopted either of the alleged 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, <fcc. 



25 



distinctions between Natural Religion and Natural 
Theology. In confirmation of this opinion,~it may 
be observed that, when Bishop Butler is not writing 
with reference to the Analogy, he assigns to Natural 
Religion a much wider range ; as will appear from 
the following extract from his Charge to the Clergy 
of the Diocese of Durham : " Now, the evidence of 
religion [meaning, both natural and revealed] may 
be laid before men without any air of controversy. 
The proof of the being of God, from final causes or 
the design and wisdom which appears in every part 
of nature, together with the law of virtue written 
upon our hearts ; the proof of Christianity from mi- 
racles, and the accomplishment of prophecies — .... 
these evidences of religion might properly be insisted 
on, in a way to affect and influence the heart, though 
there were no professed unbelievers in the world." 
From this extract it appears that, in Bishop Butler's 
judgment, " the proof of the being of God, from 
final causes or the design and wisdom which appears 
in every part of nature," belongs to Religion ; that 

is, undoubtedly, Natural Religion With respect 

to the Bishop's notions of Natural Theology, 
as distinguished from Natural Religion, it is not 
likely that they should be ascertained ; for I very 



26 



INTRODUCTION. 



much question whether the term Natural Theology 
is to be found in his writings. 

In support of the opinion, which I have virtually 
avowed, that any science may, when compared with 
the different departments of knowledge to which it 
is related, be not improperly held to comprise very 
different particulars — I take the liberty of adducing 
some remarks of Lord Brougham, in a note on the 
Classification of the Sciences (p. 218) : "In all such 
classifications,' 1 His Lordship writes, " we should 
be guided by views of convenience, rather than by 
any desire to attain perfect symmetry; and that 
arrangement may be best suited to a particular 
purpose, which plants the same things in one order, 
and separates them and unites them in one way, 
when an arrangement which should dispose those 
things differently might be preferable, if we had 
another purpose to serve." This is precisely the 
consideration by which I conceive Dr Paley and 
Bishop Butler to have been influenced, in the cases 
under review ; and by which they may be com- 
pletely justified in what they have done. 

To be fully aware of the propriety of Bishop 
Butler's great work, taking its nature from his own 
representation, it must be borne in mind that, 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



27 



during the eighteenth century, appeared certain 
eminent philosophers, who admitted the being and 
natural attributes [wisdom and power] of God, and 
a Divine Providence in the world around us ; but 
denied his moral attributes, and a future state of 
rewards and punishments for the human race. 
Amongst such philosophers Lord Bolingbroke is 

to be numbered This casual mention of Lord 

Bolingbroke brings to recollection that he was 
inclined to distinguish between Natural Theology 
and Natural Religion ; but in what manner, I 
believe he has not explained. 

The foregoing comments on the terms Natural 
Religion and Natural Theology would appear to 
render it needless to do more than quote Lord 
Brougham^ concluding observations upon them : — 

" The older writers, Clarke, Bentley, Derham, seem to 
have sometimes used the words indifferently, but never to 
have regarded Natural Religion in its restricted acceptation. 
The ancients generally used Religion in a qualified sense, 
either as connected with an obligation, or as synonymous 
with superstition." (p. 6.) 

It is, however, requisite to point out the pecu- 
liar infelicity with which it is stated that Clarke, 
Bentley and Derham " seem to have sometimes used 



28 



1NTB0DUCTI0N. 



the words indifferently, but never to have regarded 
Natural Religion in its restricted acceptation The 
facts of the cases are these : After Dr Clarke had 
published his Demonstration of the being and attri- 
butes of God, he published his Discourse on the un- 
changeable obligations of Natural Religion, and the 
truth and certainty of the Christian Revelation — 
more briefly denominated, The evidence of Natural 
and Revealed Religion* We shall therefore have 
an opportunity to ascertain what Dr Clarke here 
understood by the term Natural Religion. Nor 
have we far to seek for information. In the very 
outset of his latter work he observes — " I proceed, 
upon this foundation, of the being and attributes of 
God, to demonstrate in the next place the unalter- 
able obligations of Natural Religion. " Natural 
Religion therefore, as Dr Clarke at that time 
understood it, did not comprise the proof of the 
being and attributes of God ; and so it is unde- 
niably certain that he regarded Natural Religion 
in as restricted an acceptation as Bishop Butler has 
done. Nay, in a far more restricted acceptation ; 

• * Under this latter title it is referred to by Lord Brougham 
(Discourse, p. 201) in connexion with the Demonstration of the 
being and attributes of God. 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



29 



for Dr Clarke had demonstrated — or believed that 
he had demonstrated — even the moral attributes of 
God, in the first work, which was the foundation of 
the second. That he never used the term Natural 
Religion in a more extensive signification, I will 
not affirm; because I do not suppose that he at 
that time intended, any more than Bishop Butler in 
the case of the Analogy intended, formally to assign 
limits to Natural Religion. ... It is, at least, not 
unreasonable that, under circumstances so similar 
as those of Dr Clarke and Bishop Butler, their 
language should be interpreted on similar principles. 
. . . .With regard to Bentley — there appears not, 
in his CoTvfutation of Atheism, the slightest men- 
tion either of Natural Theology or Natural Reli- 
gion. Throughout his Sermons, the terms Religion 
and Atheism are opposed to each other .... And, 
finally, from what I have observed of Derham's 
style of writing, I should be much surprised to find 
the words Natural Theology and Natural Religion 
" used indifferently. 1 ' . . . The matter may not be 
thought important; but as it has been brought 
forward, let justice be done to all parties. 

Leaving the distinctions which have now been 
considered, Lord Brougham gives us a glimpse of 



30 



INTRODUCTION. 



Natural Theology, by means of the information, 
that it is " a science, the truths of which are dis- 
covered by induction, like the truths of Natural 
and Moral Philosophy and also that " it is a 
branch of science partaking of the nature of each of 
those great divisions of human knowledge, and not 
merely closely allied to them both." (p. 7.) Now, 
a science the truths of which are discovered by 
induction, " like" the truths of two other sciences — 
which partakes " of the nature of each" — and " is 
not merely closely allied to them both" — seems to 
be in some respects different from both; but as 
neither the points of connexion nor those of sepa- 
ration are hinted at, we are yet in uncertainty as to 
the real nature of Natural Theology. 

It may here be observed that, through the 
whole Discourse, Lord Brougham has laid great 
stress upon Induction, as a mode of arriving at 
truth. For the sake therefore of those who may 
not be very conversant with terms of this kind, 
I will venture upon a few words of explanation. 
When by long continued observation of particular 
facts, or by manifold experiments on particular 
substances, in any department of inquiry — certain 
laws or properties or truths are inferred, as uni- 



EXPLANATION OP TERMS, &c. 31 

versally belonging to the subjects of observation 
or experiment — which laws &c. may be employed 
as established principles from which, by means of 
reasoning, other laws &c. may be derived — the 
method of proceeding is called the method of in- 
duction. On this, the physical sciences very much 
depend; and Lord Brougham takes great pains, 
in various parts of his work, to show that the psy- 
chological and moral sciences equally rest upon 
induction. 

Subsequently to all this, His Lordship employs 
nearly three pages in discriminating between intel- 
lectual and moral science — the intellectual and 
active pow ers — Ontology and Deontology. He 
then determines — not on the ground of rigorous 
exactness, but that of great convenience — that all 
inductive science may be considered " as consist- 
ing of three compartments — Natural, Mental and 
Moral; or, taking the Greek terms — Physical, 
Psychological and Ethical." The first of these 
divisions, then, will be appropriated to matter ; the 
second, to mind; the third, to duty: with this un- 
derstanding however, that, from the very nature 
of things, the lines of demarcation between these 
divisions are but faintly drawn. Lord Brougham 



32 



INTRODUCTION. 



concludes by deciding that Natural Theology is 
co-extensive with inductive science; and in like 
manner, has its Physical, Psychological and Ethical 
branches. 

Here we at length find a tolerably distinct ac- 
count of the objects of Natural Theology; which 
are stated to be, 1. "the discovery of the existence 
and attributes of a Creator, by investigating the 
evidences of design in the works of the creation, 
material as well as spiritual ;" and 2. "the dis- 
covery of his will and probable intentions with 
regard to his creatures, their conduct and their 
duty." We are also informed that, with respect 
to the former of these objects, Natural Theology 
" resembles the physical and psychological sciences;" 
and that, with regard to the latter, it "resembles 
rather the department of moral science." Now 
resemblance, when thus spoken of, implies at the 
same time some distinction: implies, in other words, 
that the things which resemble each other are not 
identical. As, however, no distinction is pointed 
out, the uncertainty already alluded to (p. 30.) 
still remains. There is in fact — and I believe 
from this cause — a mist hanging over the whole 
subject. 



EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 



33 



The Introduction terminates with an analysis of 
the Discourse; which consists of two parts: — the first 
part treating " of the nature of the subject, and the 
kind of evidence on which Natural Theology rests 1 ' 
— the second, of " the advantages derived from the 
study of the science." . . . The three-fold distribution, 
into matters Physical, Psychological and Ethical, 
forms the ground-work of Lord Brougham's sub- 
divisions, in the first and most important part of 
his Discourse ; and upon that distribution will en- 
tirely depend the arrangement of the work now 
in the reader's hands. 



c 

x 



34 



SECTION I. 

PHYSICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

(Discourse, Section I. & II. pp. 15 — 51.) 

Experience is the school appointed for the human 
race. In infancy, the senses are impressed by 
external objects. Impressions are continually re- 
peated. Then, observation is awakened ; and with 
it a fondness for things new and strange. Soon 
after, another kind of feeling shows itself : — a new 
curiosity about things — an eagerness to know what 
they are — what they contain — what is their con- 
struction — what they are intended for. Mean- 
while, this lesson is thoroughly learned — that things 
are made — that they are contrived — that there are 
those by whom they are contrived and made. 
There has been going on, at the same time, a 
process of thinking and willing and acting — of 
which the individual becomes more and more con- 
scious to himself ; and those faculties — of thinking, 
willing and acting — of which he is himself con- 
scious, he is unavoidably led to attribute also to 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



35 



others. They are ultimately perceived to be the 
regular means by which effects are produced. In 
this manner arises a conviction never to be effaced 
— that whatever manifests arrangement for a pur- 
pose must have originated in thought — under- 
standing — mind. There is an irresistible feeling 
that — without skill to adapt means to ends, toge- 
ther with a disposition to second that skill, and 
power to carry designs into execution — the objects 
with which the individual is mainly conversant 
could not have been formed as they are. Hence 
the knowledge of the existence of agents possessing 

intelligence and will and effective power Nor, is 

it absolutely necessary to ascertain the ultimate 
purpose of an object, in order to be assured of 
its having had a contriver. To produce the final 
result, be it what it may, the subordinate parts 
of the machinery — so to call it — must be adjusted 
to each other; and thus the existence of a con- 
triving mind may be inferred, even from the work- 
ing of individual portions of the machinery. 

If any one should think that it elucidates the 
subject, to say that the knowledge thus acquired 
is the result of induction, he may justly say so. 
From the continual observation of particular in- 
c 2 



36 



SECTION I. 



stances, a general conclusion has been drawn. Ex- 
perience has led to the belief that wherever adapta- 
tion can be traced, it must have proceeded from 
design — there must have been an intelligent de- 
signer. 

In our earliest years, our attention is mainly 
directed to the effects consequent upon that degree 
of ingenuity and power which is possessed by our 
own species; but we are placed in the midst of 
objects in the formation of which, if they were 
formed, it is clearly impossible that human faculties 
can have had any concern. What account can be 
given of such things ? Do they attest their adapta- 
tion to certain ends? Do such parts of them, as 
come under our observation, indisputably display 
contrivance? If we are satisfied that there do 
exist marks of adaptation and contrivance, what 
inference is to be drawn from the fact ? Such are 
the questions suggested by what are called the 
appearances of nature. Now most undoubtedly, 
experience has so constantly proved to us that 
adaptation and contrivance have had their origin in 
intelligence, that it has become, as it were, an in- 
alienable part of our mental constitution, to believe 
that to intelligence only can contrivance and adapta- 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



37 



tion in any case be primarily ascribed. Moreover, 
we have no difficulty in imagining the existence of 
intelligence and power far superior to our own; 
such indeed as to produce results obviously im- 
possible to human forethought and agency. It is 
under the kind of circumstances now detailed that 
we engage in the contemplation and study of the 
material world. 

On an actual survey of external nature, we find 
things on all sides so related to each other, that the 
idea of adaptation and contrivance irresistibly forces 
itself upon the understanding. We feel that they 
could not exist in their present relations, unless it 
had been previously intended that they should so 
exist. Every object therefore, in the natural world, 
must have been foreseen, contrived, formed to be — 
exactly as it is. Moreover, it is contrary to all 
our experience that any thing should foresee and 
contrive, except mind — that is, an intelligent being, 
exercising volition and possessing power. In other 
words, we find ourselves surrounded by objects, none 
of which can we conceive to have begun to exist, 
otherwise than by the agency of some intelligent 
and powerful Being. And yet more, the various 
instances of adaptation and contrivance have such 



38 



SECTION I. 



a decided tendency to the completion of one grand 
plan, that we are led to the conclusion, that the 
entire scheme of nature must have originated with 
One supremely wise and powerful Being — whom 
we call God. 

Such are, in brief, the leading principles of the 
first, or physical branch of Natural Theology. 
The student is directed by it to evidences without 
number of the existence of a Deity; but the full 
and practical belief of that great truth will depend 
upon the fairness of mind and the diligence with 
which he conducts his inquiries. 

The science then, of which we are treating, 
rests upon observation; such observation, in the 
first instance, as any one, who is endowed with the 
ordinary powers of reason, is competent to under- 
take with success. Even the most obvious facts, 
in every department of Natural Knowledge, afford 
undeniable proofs of design and adaptation ; and 
thus may be collected, without the necessity of 
formal study, very striking evidences of the exist- 
ence of a Creator and Preserver of all things. But 
new and surprising instances of design and con- 
trivance await the more scientific inquirer at every 
step ; and it is to him, who is enabled to range 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



39 



through the vast expanse of Physical Knowledge, 
that the attestations to the Divine wisdom and 
power will come with the full force of demon- 
stration. It is indeed possible — there may be an 
understanding so dull and insensible to every thing 
that is not materially present — that the marks of 
adaptation may be unheeded from first to last ; and 
so, not a thought be directed to Him who formed 
the system which is the object of study, and com- 
missioned it to bear unceasing witness to himself. 
Of such a case I will only say that it is an anomaly 
in the intellectual world; which, however it is to 
be accounted for, may be considered as of at least 
some service, in reminding us, by its rare occur- 
rence, of the law by which the human mind is 
generally governed in such investigations. 

On the whole, Natural Theology — I mean, the 
present branch of it — is founded on the observation 
of nature; — on the study of nature, by whatever 
means — -mathematical or experimental — it may be 
conducted. It is, in fact, Natural Philosophy — 
Physical science in its utmost extent — studied with 
especial attention to the marks of design, which 
are in succession furnished by the objects of in- 
quiry. 



40 



SECTION L 



The first teachers and preachers of Christianity 
were of course aware that there must be some fact 
or principle, universally admitted, which should 
form the basis of their instructions and exhorta- 
tions ; and that which they required was furnished 
by the world around them. It is indeed interest- 
ing to observe in what manner they dwelt upon 
the natural evidences of a Divine Being, and a 
Providence ruling over all. St Paul, when writing 
to the Romans, avails himself of the " great argu- 
ment" arising from " the things that do appear," 
to prove that while the Gentiles thus knew God, 
or might have known him, they were 66 without 
excuse" in that u they glorified him not as God;" 
and when addressing the inhabitants of Lycaonia, 
he appeals to the bounties showered down upon 
them on every side, as indications of a God whose 
attribute is goodness. On leaving the Apostolic 
age, we find the argument, from contrivance and 
adjustment for beneficial purposes, much employed 
by the antient Apologists for Christianity; and 
at no subsequent period has the state of mankind, 
in a religious point of view, rendered the argument 
of little consequence. As we descend to ages 
nearer to our own, there is satisfaction in the 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



41 



thought that the argument sustained no injury from 
the lapse of time ; but that, on the contrary, every 
accession to human knowledge has constantly given 
it new stability. Modern science has thus abun- 
dantly ministered to the cause of Religion. It is 
indeed, comparatively speaking, but recently that 
the great discoveries in science have been made ; 
and he who has penetrated the farthest, into regions 
of knowledge previously unexplored, never fancied 
that, as he travelled onward, the marks of design 
were growing dim. It never, for a moment, oc- 
curred to him, that he was tending towards the 
boundary line of Intelligence — beyond which lie 
the domains of darkness and confusion. Into what- 
soever new region the adventurer may have ad- 
vanced, he always found himself, as he went along, 
surrounded by the manifestations of the Deity. 
We have, indeed, lately seen the most recondite 
departments of science attesting the attributes of 
God, in characters as vivid, to the eye of the 
Philosopher, as those in which the grand and 
obvious processes and appearances of nature attest 
the same attributes, to the common eye.* 

* It cannot but be understood that allusion is here made to the 
great variety of important information communicated to the world, by 
the Authors of the Bridgewater Treatises. 

Let 



42 



SECTION 1. 



Such are my views of this branch of Natural 
Theology ; which, I am inclined to believe, are not 
far from coinciding with those of Lord Brougham, 
although they are somewhat differently unfolded. 
The first section of His Lordship's Discourse, 
entitled Introductory view of the method of' investi- 
gation pursued in the physical and psychological 
Sciences,) appears to be occupied by the statement 
and refutation of an objection to the plan of de- 
ducing Theological knowledge of any kind, from 
the observation and study of natural phenomena. 
Now, it is very seldom that either an objection, 
or the reply to it, can be fairly estimated, till 
the matter objected to is tolerably well under- 
stood; and therefore, in addition to the preceding 
account of Natural Theology, I shall give an ab- 
stract of Lord Brougham's opinions on the same 
subject, before I advert to the contents of the first 
section. 

Let me here observe that, in imitation of Lord Brougham, I have 
directed attention solely to such material objects as, by their own 
manifest organisation, or by their indisputable relation to each other, 
prove contrivance. His Lordship has, in my opinion, done wisely in 
confining his remarks to such objects. Arguments indeed have been 
drawn, in proof of a Deity, from the very existence of the material 
world, independently of the contrivance which it displays; but argu- 
ments of that nature, whatever may be their validity, do not seem 
well adapted to Discourses like the present. 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



43 



The second section (pp. 28 — 51) purports to 
furnish a Comparison of the physical branch of 
Natural Theology with Physics It has already- 
been observed — not in so many words, but to the 
same effect — that nature may by possibility be 
observed and studied solely for the purpose of 
ascertaining facts : — and that it may also be studied 
with the additional purpose of tracing the marks 
of contrivance and adaptation which may be pre- 
sented. In the one case, it is simply Physical 
Knowledge or Science ; in the other, according to 
the degree of attention paid to the proofs of design, 
it partakes of the nature of Natural Theology — so 
called, because such indications of contrivance and 
adaptation are the natural evidences of the existence 
of a God all-wise and powerful. Lord Brougham 
states the matter thus:— 

" The two inquiries — that into the nature and consti- 
tution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design 
which it displays — .... are not only closely allied one to the 
other, but are to a very considerable extent identical. The 
two paths of investigation for a great part of the way com- 
pletely coincide." (p. 28.) 

Some notice has already been taken (pp. 30 
and 32) of Lord Brougham's account of the phy- 



44 



SECTION I. 



sical part of Natural Theology, namely, that it 
" partakes of the nature" of physical science, and 
" resembles" it ; the conclusion being, that there 
was some difference between Natural Theology and 
physical science, although they were very like each 
other. . . . We are now informed that they are " to 
a very considerable extent identical" and " for a 
great part of the way completely coincide ;" that is, 
are the same study. In all this there is an un- 
steadiness of view, which causes much embarrass- 
ment. If his Lordship had throughout the Dis- 
course maintained the doctrine which here appears 
to be laid down — that the results of physical science 
are themselves the facts which prove design and 
adaptation, and so become principles of Natural 
Theology — much of that obscurity would have 
been avoided which is now, I believe very gene- 
rally, felt to pervade the work. The purport of 
the following extract does not seem very clear: — 

" It is impossible to deny, that what induction thus 
teaches forms the great bulk of all Natural Theology. The 
question which the theologian always puts upon each dis- 
covery of a purpose manifestly accomplished is this : ' Sup- 
pose I had this operation to perform by mechanical means, 
and were acquainted with the laws regulating the action of 
matter, should I attempt it in any other way than I here see 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



4>5 



practised?' If the answer is in the negative, the con- 
sequence is irresistible, that some power capable of acting 
with design, and possessing the supposed knowledge, em- 
ployed the means which we see used. But this negative 
answer is the result of reasoning founded upon induction, 
and rests upon the same evidence whereon the doctrines of 
physical science are discovered and believed. And the in- 
ference to which that negative answer so inevitably leads is 
a truth in Natural Theology ; for it is only another way of 
asserting that design and knowledge are evinced in the 
works and functions of nature." (p. 32.) 

Whatever effect, produced by the constitution 
of nature, is under consideration, it seems as if 
" the theologian " might go a step farther than 
Lord Brougham has allowed him to go, and ask, 
< Is not the operation performed with far greater 
ease, and far more effectually, than it would before- 
hand be possible for me even to imagine?"' — and 
the answer would certainly lead to the acknowledg- 
ment of an agent wise and powerful in the highest 
degree. . . . From what cause it arises, I know not ; 
but the latter part of the quotation — beginning, 
6 But this negative answer, 1 &c. — seems to add 
nothing to the stability of the conclusion ; and in- 
deed, by multiplying words, tends rather to excite 
doubt. Physical knowledge, which is founded on 



46 



SECTION I. 



induction, furnishes results, which when duly ex- 
amined present evidences of design; it is also 
manifest from constant observation, or if you 
please from an induction of particulars, that con- 
trivance never exists except as the effect of an 
intelligent cause; and so the facts of physical 
knowledge become the principles of Natural The- 
ology. Hence, Natural Theology is an inductive 
science. This is probably what Lord Brougham 
intended to state. 

With the general views which are developed 
in this section, the noble and learned writer com- 
bines several appropriate instances of the manner 
in which, as knowledge of the subject is increased, 
the proofs of design and contrivance become more 
convincing. For example: Consider the relation 
between the eye and light. The effect is — distinct 
vision ; and at the very first thought, we cannot 
help feeling that in some way the medium and the 
organ of vision must have been designedly adjusted 
to each other. . . . Again, in order that any object 
may be distinctly seen, it is requisite that an exact 
image of it should be formed in the back part of the 
eye : — in other words, that the light proceeding 
from each point of the object should pass through 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



47 



the eye, and converge to a corresponding point on 
the retina. When the manner in which this takes 
place is understood, the impression, that there must 
have been an intentional adjustment, is exceedingly 
strengthened. Light is not only refracted, in pass- 
ing from one medium into another, but refracted 
unequally; and the consequence, unless counter- 
acted, would be, that objects would appear dis- 
coloured. Now the figure and constitution of the 
eye are such, that light, with all its different de- 
grees of refrangibility, is made to converge upon 
the retina, and form the image required for distinct 
vision. The difficulty overcome is extreme, as is 
well known to all who are conversant with optical 
instruments. Here then must have been intelli- 
gence; here must have been contrivance; here 
must have been creative power. Moreover, the 
mode in which, as the Anatomist demonstrates, 
the eye is enabled to perform its various functions, 
introduces an almost endless series of instances of 
design, all confirming the same truth. It is thus 
that, while every department of physical knowledge 
contributes its own proofs of adaptation, it also 
gives new force to the proofs derived from cor- 
relative sources. 



48 



SECTION I. 



After dwelling upon the wonderful power of 
contrivance manifested in the structure of the 
human eye, Lord Brougham touches on the re- 
markable variations in the organ of sight, by which 
it is in the most exquisite manner adapted to the 
use of different animals, according to their respect- 
ive conditions and habits of life. I should have 
great delight in describing, in my own language, 
these and several other instances of design adduced 
by the noble author; not from any hope of ren- 
dering them more striking than His Lordship has 
done — but because a person who takes his own 
point of view, and writes from the impression of 
his own mind, will generally hit on something, not 
generally noticed, which may be worthy of con- 
sideration. Believing, however, that neither Lord 
Brougham's interesting observations, nor Dr Paley's 
forcible arguments, on such subjects, will be unknown 
to any reader of these pages, I deem it needless 
to attempt to add strength to the conviction which 
their statements cannot fail to produce. If therefore 
I venture to offer a few remarks upon the example 
drawn from the Planetary System, it will be for the 
purpose of illustrating the mode of reasoning which 
leads to the truths of Natural Theology. 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



On the first intelligent survey of the heavens, 
we feel as if some Great Power had been in opera- 
tion. " The heavens declare the glory of God : 
and the firmament showeth his handy work. 1 ' Such 
is the first impression ; and the feeling, arising from 
the vastness and magnificence of the scene, is 
strengthened by the adaptations which are succes- 
sively presented to the attention. The obvious 
relation of the earth and moon to the sun — the 
general scheme of the solar system — the bodies of 
which it consists — their masses and distances from 
the common centre — their various revolutions, 
which are by degrees familiarized to our appre- 
hension — all these things fill the mind with ideas 
of* contrivance and power in combination — far 
exceeding any which had before been excited. 
But when, by the aid of principles derived from 
observation and experiment, and applied by means 
of the strictest mathematical processes — we trace 
the effects of the law by which the bodies " in 
their courses" gravitate towards each other; — 
when we prove that certain changes, which might 
be supposed to indicate an eventual derangement 
of the whole system, are the inevitable conse- 
quences of the bodies' mutual gravitation — and 

D 



50 



SECTION I. 



that although such changes may go on increasing 
for thousands of years, yet the time must arrive 
when they will begin to decrease by similar de- 
grees — and so on, by continual alternations of 
increase and decrease ; — when it thus appears that* 
as the system now exists, its stability is secure ; — 
and finally, when it is a matter of demonstration 
that, if the masses and distances and forms of the 
orbits of the bodies had been materially different 
from what they are, the disturbances arising from 
their mutual actions, instead of being periodical, 
would soon have thrown every thing into con- 
fusion ; — we are lost in astonishment at the wisdom 
with which the whole has been ordained. There 
is, in all this, what no man can account for, other- 
wise than by saying, that it was the Will of the 
Supreme Being, that so it should be. 

Here, then, we have observation, experiment, 
induction and the most refined processes of ma- 
thematical investigation — all conducing to the 
establishment of facts, which at once lead to the 
fundamental principle of Natural Religion. In 
what manner we learn to pass, as by necessary 
consequence, from facts displaying contrivance 
and adaptation, to the existence of some Great 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



5\ 



Intelligence from whom they originated, I have 
endeavoured to explain, in the beginning of the 
present section. It is by the constant observation 
of the connexion between a thinking agent and 
the appearances of design ; or, as Lord Brougham 
states the matter, by an induction of particulars. 
On this subject, His Lordship thus writes: 

"The position which we reach by a strict process of 
induction, is common to Natural Philosophy and Natural 
Theology — namely, that a given organ performs a given 
function, or a given arrangement possesses a certain sta- 
bility, by its adaptation to mechanical laws. We have said 
that the process of reasoning is short and easy, by which 
we arrive at the doctrine more peculiar to Natural The- 
ology namely, that some power acquainted with and acting 

Upon the knowledge of those laws, fashioned the organ 
with the intention of having the function performed, or 
constructed the system that it might endure. Is not this 
last process as much one of strict induction as the other? 
It is plainly only a generalization of many particular facts ; 
a reasoning from things known to things unknown; an 
inference of a new or unknown relation from other relations 
formerly observed and known When we see that a cer- 
tain effect, namely, distinct vision, is performed by an 
achromatic instrument, the eye, why do we infer that some 
one must have made it? Because we nowhere and at no 
time have had any experience of any one thing fashioning 
itself, and indeed cannot form to ourselves any distinct 
idea of what such a process as self-creation means; and 
D 2 



52 



SECTION I. 



further, because when we ourselves would produce a similar 
result, we have recourse to like means. Again, when we 
perceive the adaptation of natural objects and operations 
to a perceived end, and thence infer design in the maker 
of these objects, and superintender of these operations, why 
do we draw this conclusion ? Because we know by expe- 
rience that if we ourselves desired to accomplish a similar 
purpose, we should do so by the like adaptation ; we know 
by experience that this is design in us, and that our pro- 
ceedings are the result of such design ; we know that if 
some of our works were seen by others, who neither were 
aware of our having made them, nor of the intention with 
which we made them, they would be right should they, 
from seeing and examining them, both infer that we had 
made them, and conjecture why we had made them." 
(pp. 42—44.) 

In confirmation of these views of the subject, 
which for the most part appear to be correct, Lord 
Brougham adverts to the recent speculations on 
the remains of animals, the whole species of which 
are extinct ; dwelling upon the conclusions, respect- 
ing the forms, magnitudes and habits of the animals, 
which have been drawn from a careful examination 
of those remains. His Lordship considers the in- 
ference " from examining a few bones, or it may 
be a single fragment of a bone" — that, "in the 
wilds where it was found there lived and ranged, 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



55 



some thousands of years ago, an animal wholly 
different from any we ever saw, and from any of 
which any account, any tradition, written or oral, 
has reached us, nay, from any that ever was seen 
by any person of whose existence we ever heard" — 
as founded on a strict and rigorous induction ; and 
not less so the inference of the being of an un- 
seen God, from the consideration of the contri-* 
vances and adaptations which prevail throughout 
nature. Most assuredly, the facts of contrivance 
and adaptation in nature are as certain as the 
existence of the remains in question; and as cer- 
tainly does the observation of design refer the 
mind to a designer, as the view of the remains to 
an animal to which they belonged; but I have 
some doubt whether the illustration from the 
remains will render the reasoning from design 
more cogent. 

When we compare the grand operations of 
nature, as they are presented to us in the heavenly 
regions, with the minuter processes which prevail 
in the animal and vegetable kingdoms as existing 
on this earth, we find the latter remarkably dis- 
tinguished from the former, by the law of pro- 
duction and reproduction which belongs to them. 



54 



SECTION I. 



Now, the evidences of contrivance and adaptation 
are nowhere so immediately conspicuous as in the 
individual instances of organised existence; hence 
Dr Paley and some other philosophers draw, from 
this latter source, what they consider to be the 
most convincing proofs of a creating and preserving 
power. It is not for the purpose of disputing 
the justness of such an opinion that I mention the 
subject; for indeed an argument of this sort will 
leave different impressions on different minds, and 
even on the same mind at different times. My 
intention is rather to point out the peculiarity of 
each mode of argument; without the least wish 
to exalt either of them, at the expense of the 

other In the language of Scripture, " the earth 

bringeth forth fruit of herself ; first the blade, then 
the ear, after that the full corn in the ear*;" and 
thus, with regard to one great division of the 
natural world, there is a cause of existence to which 
reference is immediately made. Throughout the 
animal kingdom also there is an immediate cause 
of existence. Now Dr Paley has shown, in the 
most admirable manner, that, if the subject be 
well considered, these proximate causes of existence 

* Mark, iv. 28. 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



do not in the least impair the force of the argument 
for a First Cause, drawn from the appearances of 
contrivance and adaptation. Yet in some way or 
other — it may proceed from not duly considering 
the matter — but in some way or other, the proxi- 
mate cause does with some minds, as I have fre- 
quently had occasion to observe, raise a difficulty 
in the reasoning, which it requires time and atten- 
tion to surmount On the contrary, when we 

betake ourselves to the contemplation of the hea- 
venly bodies, and think that they are still, as for 
ages they have been, performing their various 
revolutions — we can conceive no material cause of 
their existence; and we ascend without inter- 
ruption to that Almighty Being, who "commanded, 
and they were created.'" Ever since the author 
of these pages has had the capacity to engage in 
speculations like the present, he has availed him- 
self of such opportunities as occurred to him, to 
ascertain, as far as might be, the effects of natural 
appearances, upon the minds of intelligent persons, 
without pretensions to learning or science. On 
occasions of that kind, he has remarked the depth 
of religious feeling, produced by a view of the 
heavens. More than once he has witnessed some 



56 



SECTION I. 



particular phenomenon pointed out, as a full proof 
of the being of a God; and more than once 
heard the simple but emphatic declaration — That 
is enough ! ... It appears, therefore, that the marks 
of design and adaptation are, in the one case, 
more obvious ; and that, in the other, the transi- 
tion is easier from the work to the Artificer. 
But the fact is that, whether we direct our atten- 
tion to the heavens or the earth, there is a voice 
which proclaims, in language not to be misunder- 
stood, the greatness of that power and wisdom, 
by which "all things consist.'" 

Having stated my own views of the physical 
branch of Natural Theology, in connexion with 
those of Lord Brougham, I now proceed to the 
objection — which was mentioned page 42 — to the 
mode of reasoning adopted in this section. The 
reader will bear in mind that the observations, 
which immediately follow, are intended to present, 
in a compressed form, what is contained in the 
'Discourse' from page 15 to page 27- 

The objects of contemplation and those of 
active pursuit — into which all that occupies the 
attention of mankind may be divided — have in- 
fluence upon each other. Physical science, even 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



51 



when studied for its own sake, is frequently made 
subservient to the ordinary concerns of life: and 
the mind, while engaged in practical matters, may 
hit upon an important scientific truth. In the 
same way, the study of the mind may suggest 
practical means of regulating its own operations; 
and what is followed from a mere desire of mental 
enjoyment may suggest a valuable truth in mental 
science. Moreover, the objects of contemplation in 
these sciences, so connected with each other, are 
made known to us either by our senses or by 
internal consciousness ; and it is of such objects, 
whether physical or mental, that we investigate the 
properties and relations. This is human science. 
But we may leave the study of individual objects ; 
and betake ourselves to the consideration of mind 
and matter in general — the first cause of their exist- 
ence — the purposes for which they exist — and their 
final destination. Hence, it is contended, arises 
another science, entirely distinct from the former, 
and resting upon evidence peculiarly its own. This 
is Divine Knowledge — Theology — Religion — or by 
whatever name the science may be called. 

This, if I mistake not, is the substance of the 
objection detailed in the 15th, 1 6th, 17th and 18th 



58 SECTION I. 

pages of the 6 Discourse.' It seems to be a vague 
reasoning beforehand—a mere theory — concerning 
that which is to be ascertained only by actual 
examination of the things themselves. Nothing, 
as it appears to me, can be more absurd, than thus 
to decide that the objects of contemplation, whether 
physical or mental, do not present indications of 
their having originated in creative power; and if, 
on inquiry, we find that they do present sufficient 
indications to that effect, it will become us to trace 
the consequences of such a fact, and see whether 
we have not the means of obtaining as much in- 
formation as ought to satisfy us — respecting both 
their present existence and their final destination. 

Lord Brougham answers the objection by put- 
ting the case of a 66 superficial reasoner," imagining 
that he had done a great thing when he had 
" divided the objects, with which philosophy, Na- 
tural and Mental, is conversant, into two classes — 
those objects of which we know the existence by 
our senses and our consciousness — and those objects 
of which we only know the existence by a process 
of reasoning, founded upon something originally 
presented by the senses or by consciousness." His 
Lordship then shows by examples that, however 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



59 



distinct these objects may appear to be — the dis- 
tinction cannot in point of fact be rigorously 
maintained ; and concludes, that " the evidence 
upon which our assent to both classes of truths 
reposes is of the same kind, namely, the inferences 
drawn by reasoning from sensations or ideas, origi- 
nally presented by the external senses, or by our 
inward consciousness." Hence, " there may he no 
better ground for admitting an essential difference" 
in the case previously stated, than in this of the 
"superficial reasoner." The result of the whole 
discussion is, that plausible as may appear the dis- 
tinction between human science and divine science, 
it is too precarious an assumption for any one to 
adopt, who is in quest of real knowledge; and 
that we must actually study the science of Natural 
Theology, before we venture to determine the 
nature of its evidence, or the validity of the rea- 
soning on which it depends. 

Lord Brougham having appropriated twelve 
pages of his Discourse to the consideration of an 
objection to Natural Theology, which he thought 
it requisite to remove before the main subject was 
entered upon, I could not but present, as I have 
now done, at least an outline of the argument 



60 SECTION I. 

on each side. That the matter is made very in- 
telligible, I cannot expect ; for — whether from His 
Lordship's [mode of treating it, or from some 
inherent difficulty — it is exceedingly obscure from 
first to last. Having, however, ventured to in- 
timate, that the objection, from its very nature 
and form, is of little or no weight, I need only 
say that, in my opinion, there is the less reason 
to be solicitous about the reply; the tendency of 
which is simply to furnish an answer, in the 
negative, to the Noble Lord's question — " If, then, 
the distinction which at first appeared solid, is 
found to be without any warrant in the different 
kinds of human science, has it any better grounds 
when we apply it to draw the line between 
that branch of philosophy itself, and the other 
which has been termed Divine, or Theology ?" — 
And thus, the student is sent to the science itself, 
to ascertain the validity of its claims to attention. 

To give a summary account of what has been 
laid before the reader, and so to bring this part 
of the subject to a close:— From a steady con- 
templation of the appearances of nature we deduce 
the being of a God, whose attributes are wisdom 
and power. Wisdom is knowledge manifesting 



PHYSICAL BRANCH. 



61 



itself in action. Knowledge, therefore, and power 
belong unto God. In treatises on Natural The- 
ology, it is usual to show the necessity of expanding 
our notions of these perfections to the uttermost, 
and of considering Omniscience and Omnipotence 
as the attributes of the Deity. These subjects 
are briefly discussed by Dr Paley; more fully 
by Dr Clarke; and at still greater length by 
Abernethy, in his Discourses on the Being" and 
Natural Perfections of God. The same authors 
have dwelt, more or less, upon the Eternity, the 
Spirituality and the Unity of the Divine Being. 
The Attributes now enumerated are generally 
called the Natural Attributes of the Deity. 

After all that has been observed with regard 
to the perfections of the Supreme, there is yet 
one point, connected with this branch of the sub- 
ject, which deserves especial notice. In our survey 
of the material world, we can scarcely avoid being 
bewildered by the numberless manifestations of 
the Divine power and wisdom, which force them- 
selves upon our attention. But what, it may be 
asked, are the general effects of the arrangements 
and operations we behold, upon the well-being 
and happiness of the myriads of sensitive creatures 



62 



SECTION I. 



which, in succession, live for a time on this earth ? 
In other words, what is the character of the Deity, 
in relation to animated nature? The Benevolence 
of the Deity, in this respect, has been repeatedly 
evinced. Abernethy, already referred to, has writ- 
ten ably and warmly upon the subject. Dr 
Balguy, in his Divine Benevolence asserted and 
vindicated, discusses the matter philosophically. 
But whoever would wish to know nearly the 
whole of what can be advanced upon the subject, 
may experience the gratification of having it pre- 
sented to him — with fairness and precision — with 
an imagination teeming with striking illustrations 
and in language which never loses its freshness — 
above all, with grateful piety towards God and 
kindliness of feeling towards every thing that 
breathes— by Dr Paley, in his chapter, On tlie 
Goodness of the Deity. 

It is no mean proof of the real value of an 
argument, that its force has been acknowledged, 
by the most enlightened of our race, from the 
first moment of recorded time to the present. 
The simple mention of the Old Testament will 
suggest numerous passages, in which the glories 
of the world, and its various adaptations to the 



PHYSICAL BRANCH, 



63 



well-being of mankind, are held forth, as clear 
manifestations of the greatness and power and 
wisdom and goodness of God. We find the 
obvious purposes and contrivances, prevailing on 
every side, mentioned by the most celebrated 
writers of Greece and Rome, as evidences of a 
Divine Creator and Natural Governor of the Uni- 
verse. Socrates, according to the narrative of 
Xenophon, discourses with great intelligence on 
the proofs of the Divine wisdom exhibited by the 
various adaptations of the parts of the human 
frame ; and, on a subsequent occasion, on the pro- 
vision so beneficently made for mankind, by the 
constitution of nature.* Plato, towards the con- 
clusion of his Timseus, discusses the same subjects, 
at considerable length. The greater part of the 
second book of Cicero's Treatise, On the Nature of 
the Gods, is occupied by a statement of the admira- 
ble arrangements of the visible world, in proof of 
an overruling Providence. It is not because the 
arguments employed, by these and other antient 
philosophers, are more convincing than those of 
modern writers, that the preceding references have 
been given ; but because it is of importance to know 

* Xen. Memorab. I. iv. 4—11, and IV. in, 3— 10. 



0'4 



SECTION I. 



and recollect, that the appearances of design, which 
every where abound, have really had the effect of 
raising the minds of men, whose means of acquiring 
knowledge differed most widely from our own — 
men, whom we cannot think^of without reverence — 
to the existence of an Intelligent Cause of all 
things. 

On bringing this section to a close, I would 
exhort the younger students to read Dr Paley's 
Treatise again and again ; not merely for the pur- 
pose of obtaining the information which it cannot 
fail to communicate, but also to learn from it, the 
art of observing nature for themselves. Let me 
also advise them, when in the midst of their philo- 
sophical speculations, to keep steadily in view the 
Theological bearings of the objects of their pursuits. 
Should they happily resolve to act upon this sug- 
gestion — whatever may be their future condition in 
life, they will be deeply sensible of the wisdom of 
their determination. 



65 



SECTION II. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

(Discourse, Section III. pp. 52—80.) 

The object of the preceding and the present branch 
of Natural Theology is the same — to trace the 
evidences of the being and attributes of God ; which 
is also effected in each case by the same means— 
by the consideration of facts, and by reasoning on 
their relations to each other. In this consists the 
difference between the two branches — namely, that 
in the preceding, the argument depends upon the 
constitution of external nature — in the present, 
upon that of the human mind. Now, things ma- 
terial address themselves to our senses in a manner 
not to be gainsaid ; many of their uses and adapta- 
tions are incontrovertible ; and thus the characters 
of design stamped upon them are, to rational crea- 
tures, as certain as the existence of the things 
themselves: — whereas the faculties of the mind, 
becoming known to us by internal consciousness 

E 



66 



SECTION II. 



and reflection, are — although, as facts, equally 
certain — yet of a more recondite nature ; and do 
not very distinctly unfold their mutual relations, 
except to those persons who have been trained to 
somewhat of a subtile mode of thinking. From 
this account, it is clear that the physical branch 
of Natural Theology will always be more popular 
than the psychological ; for the former well accords 
with the usual tendency to reason through the 
medium of sensible objects — while the latter, to 
adopt one of Lord Brougham's happy expressions, 
" requires a process of abstraction alien from the 
ordinary habits of most men. r> (p. 25.) What, 
however, is difficult, to the generality of people, 
is not on that ground dubious in itself. For 
any thing, therefore, that has here been stated, 
the truth may be that, to those who are able to 
pursue the inquiry, the result will prove as satis- 
factory in the psychological, as in the physical 
branch. 

Very seldom, even under favourable circum- 
stances, do the conformation and properties of 
any one's mental faculties begin to attract his 
own attention, till his understanding has been much 
exercised in the acquisition of knowledge; and 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



67 



amidst the various pursuits of after-life, very sel- 
dom does the human mind, although so wonder- 
ful in its operations, become an object of continued 
study. Some information indeed, respecting the 
intellectual frame, is occasionally derived from 
Metaphysical Writers ; and if, on a little reflection, 
that information appears to accord in a moderate 
degree with what people have experienced in them- 
selves, they are for the most part satisfied with 
the knowledge so obtained. Those persons how- 
ever, who are so disposed, have the means of making 
out a series of facts, concerning the various men- 
tal powers, their modes of operation, and their 
relations and adaptations to each other; which 
facts constitute the most valuable part of what is 
called psychological science, or the philosophy of 
the human mind. Moreover, as the conclusions, 
in the physical branch of Natural Theology, are 
drawn from the facts of physical science — so are 
the conclusions, in the psychological branch, from 
the facts of mental science. The adjustments dis- 
coverable in the intellectual system bear witness, 
no less than the marks of contrivance in the ma- 
terial world, to the existence and attributes of a 
Supreme Intelligence. From the foregoing ob- 

E 2 



68 



SECTION II. 



servations, some general notions may possibly be 
obtained, respecting the nature of that branch 
of science which forms the subject of the present 
section. 

That there are, on this earth, beings possessing 
the power of thought — is a fact which, the more it 
is considered, will of itself the more distinctly prove 
the existence of a Creator, from whom all power of 
thought is derived. Reason and understanding can 
be assigned to nothing less than " the inspiration 
of the Almighty*." If my purposes, in the course 
of the present section, did not require me to cite 
the opinions of several eminent writers, in rela- 
tion to this subject, I should here venture briefly 
to state my own. 

With regard to the various faculties of the 
human mind, Lord Brougham has shown, at some 
length, in what way they certify, by their adapta- 
tion to each other for the attainment of important 
ends, that they could have been formed only by 
that wisdom and power, to which we can assign no 
limits. On this subject, a few slight sketches, sug- 
gested by His Lordship^s drawings, (pp. 59 — 71.) 
may not be uninteresting. 

* Job xxxii. 8, 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



69 



First, It is manifest that ideas, derived from 
external things and from internal consciousness, 
form but the materials of knowledge. Knowledge 
arises from the comparison of ideas, by the power 
of reasoning. But without the power of attention, 
to fix the mind upon the ideas to be compared, 
reasoning would be of little avail. For the pro- 
duction, therefore, of any considerable results, these 
two powers ought to bear some proportion to each 
other; and accordingly, we find each of them by 
exercise becoming more effective. This fact belongs 
to a law which pervades our mental frame — that 
those of its powers, on which its energy mainly 
depends, are strengthened by habit. Here then is 
design — contrivance. Two powers of eminent 
utility co-exist in the mind, which by their co- 
operation render the understanding capable of 
accomplishing great works ; and they are strength- 
ened by use and habit, when either or both of them 
might in that way have been enfeebled. Moreover, 
to mention another remarkable and apparently in- 
tended advantage of a similar kind — the exertion 
of those powers becomes more easy and agreeable 
by repetition, when it might in consequence have 
been more difficult and distasteful. 



70 



SECTION II. 



Secondly, To incite us to the exercise of the 
reasoning power, which exercise is in every respect 
of importance to us, there is the principle of 
curiosity — a desire of knowing what, as yet, we 
know not. This principle, by connecting the 
idea of gratification with fresh acquirements, still 
urges us onwards in the pursuit of them. For 
a very similar purpose, but of greater moment — 
although not mentioned by Lord Brougham — 
there is the love of truth ; not as something that 
is new, but as something that is in conformity 
with the actual state of things — representing them 
exactly as they are. Correlative with the love 
of truth is the aversion to what is false or erro- 
neous. This is a painful feeling ; and to rid 
ourselves of it, we willingly encounter the most 
laborious exertions of the understanding. In all 
this there is contrivance. The exercise of the 
reasoning faculty conduces to the well-being — 
the improvement — of the mind; and we are 
prompted to that exercise by curiosity after what 
is new, when novelty might have had no charms 
for us. Many considerations, also, lead us to 
infer that we are designed for the attainment of 
truth ; and we are so constituted as to love truth 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



71 



and hate falsehood, when we might have been 
indifferent to them both. 

Thirdly, There is the faculty of memory — 
the power of retaining knowledge. On this faculty 
we remark, as on the faculty of reasoning, that it 
depends upon attention and is strengthened by 
habit. In proof of the important purposes to 
which memory is subservient, the following par- 
ticulars, amongst innumerable others, may be ob- 
served : — it is the most tenacious of things striking ; 
things interesting ; things felt to be intrinsically 
valuable ; things well considered ; things which 
there is an anxiety to remember. Can all this 
have possibly arisen, otherwise than from the 
will of a Being all-wise and powerful ? . . . And yet 
more, what would have been the consequence, 
if there had not been such a faculty ? Without 
such a faculty, in vain would the senses have 
presented objects to the mind, and reason have 
compared the ideas they excited. Knowledge, 
there could have been none. We could have had 
nothing approaching to it, but a succession of 
transient perceptions. We might indeed have 
derived a passing amusement from the aspect 
of what is new ; but truth could have afforded 



72 



SECTION II. 



no gratification, for we should not have had 
the power or the consciousness of possessing it. . . . 
But still farther, how ill would memory, if un- 
improved by habit, have been adapted to the 
continual means of information, with which almost 
every condition of life abounds; — how fatally 
have been opposed to the beneficial tendencies 
of an increasing power of attention, and a more 
skilful exertion of the reasoning faculty. Aiding 
each other, then, as these intellectual powers are 
in fact found to do, the unavoidable conclusion 
seems to be that all this must have originally been 

so ordained Finally, if neither the attention 

bestowed on things, nor certain qualities apper- 
taining to them, had the effect of fixing objects 
more firmly and more prominently in the memory 
— that is, if every portion of knowledge (however 
much or however little regarded) were carelessly 
and confusedly deposited there as a matter of 
course — how much would the difficulty be in- 
creased, of finding what might at any time be 
especially wanted ; how much at variance would 
be the constitution of the memory, with that of 
other most important mental faculties, exercising 
as they do the powers of discrimination and pre- 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



73 



ference ! In this point of view then, as well as 
in the others, we find the evidences of design and 
contrivance signally displayed. 

Fourthly, It is not only requisite that we should 
retain what we acquire, but in numberless instances 
of vast moment that our knowledge should be at 
hand when called for. Now, there can be no 
doubt that things similar, things connected by 
place or time, even things strongly contrasted 
with each other, are, to use a common expres- 
sion, naturally associated in the mind — that is, by 
an arrangement independent of the will; so that 
the recollection of one thing brings its associates, 
almost to a certainty, along with it. Moreover, 
by habit, artificial associations of things may be 
formed, leading to the same result. Without the 
means of thus eliciting our knowledge when wanted, 
to what little purpose would our intellectual stores 
have been accumulated ! In this manner, we find 
the proofs of design multiplying upon us at every 
step we take. 

Fifthly r , Although the effect of habit, upon the 
faculties of the mind, has been more than once 
mentioned, the subject is deserving of a separate 
notice. It is, indeed, almost entirely on practice 



74 



SECTION IT. 



and habit that we rely, for acquiring the power 
of producing the most striking results we can hope 
to produce. In our first attempts, whatever the 
intellectual operation may be, we are able to 
perform but little; and that little with great 
labour, and very awkwardly withal. And this is 
not merely because our ability is defective ; for 
it appears to be less than it really is, from being 
improperly applied. By degrees, under the in- 
fluence of habit, our power is increased ; and, what 
is of equal moment, applied to less disadvantage. 
The process goes on, till at last there is scarcely 
the consciousness of the slightest exertion. And 
thus, the ultimate effects of our faculties are fre- 
quently such as to astonish by the promptness and 
facility with which they are produced. Lord 
Brougham gives, as an instance of this, the per- 
formance of a practised extempore speaker; and, 
as might be expected, we every where trace, in his 
representation, the hand of a great master of the 
art. I cannot refrain from quoting the passage : — 

" A practised orator will declaim in measured and in 
various periods — will weave his discourse into one texture — 
form parenthesis within parenthesis — excite the passions, 
or move to laughter — take a turn in his discourse from an 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 75 

accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric 
for five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the 
illustrations to which it gives rise — mould his diction with a 
view to attain or to shun an epigrammatic point, or an alli- 
teration, or a discord ; and all this with so much assured 
reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease to 
himself, that he shall even plan the next sentence while 
he is pronouncing off-hand the one he is engaged with, 
adapting each to the other, and shall look forward to the 
topic which is to follow and fit in the close of the one he is 
handling to he its introducer; nor shall any auditor be able 
to discover the least difference between all this and the por- 
tion of the speech which he has got by heart, or tell the 
transition from the one to the other." (p. 63.) 

This indeed is not an attainment which will 
rank high in the estimation of persons of sober 
judgment; but it admirably displays the effect of 
habit upon those faculties, which, of course, we are 
capable of directing to objects of greater or of less 

importance If it should be said that much time 

is consumed, before habit has communicated the 
power of producing the striking results just treated 
of — the remark is true ; but, supposing the faculties 
to have been originally stronger, without being sus- 
ceptible of improvement in point either of strength 
or adroitness, is there not ground to infer that, 
whether we consider the time which must have 



76 



SECTION II. 



been occupied by individual exertions or the aggre- 
gate of the results, the advantage is in favour of the 
present constitution of the human mind ? Besides, the 
possession of faculties susceptible of improvement 
is an indication that they ought to be improved. 
This view of the- matter, indeed, relates to man 
considered as a moral agent ; and thus, encroaches 
upon what, according to Lord BroughanVs division 
of Natural Theology, belongs to the ethical depart- 
ment of the science. The truth is, that it is very 
difficult to keep the departments perfectly distinct 
from each other ; and in the endeavour to do so, 
almost impossible to avoid weakening the force of 
our conclusions. 

Sixthly, There are the passio7is and affections 
and sympathies of our nature; without which, 
mankind would not have been fitted for the various 
relations of social life. To state the fact is to prove 
design : and that worthy of the highest wisdom. 
Then again, there is hope; to afford, even amidst 
prosperity and ease, something that may exercise 
and interest the mind — and sustain it amidst toil 
and trouble : —fear ; to inspire prudence, and to 
protect from danger: — and so on. Indeed, im- 
perfectly acquainted, as we still are, with the entire 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



77 



workings of the human mind, there is scarcely a 
feeling or a sentiment, natural to man, which does 
not indicate to us that it exists for some end which 
may be referred to the providence of God. 

After discussing these topics, the Noble and 
Learned Author once more adverts to the principle 
of curiosity, the object of which is novelty ; and 
shows its great efficacy in exciting the mind to the 
acquisition of knowledge. In connexion with this 
principle, His Lordship mentions, as a powerful 
means of diffusing knowledge, the desire of com- 
municating it. There might have been only a 
disposition to accumulate — to lock up the treasures 
amassed ; but how much better does it accord with 
the condition of human existence, that he who pos- 
sesses information should have satisfaction in com- 
municating it to others. ... In addition to this, I 
may perhaps be allowed — although it will occasion 
some repetition — to observe that, before the facul- 
ties of reason and judgment have been much 
brought into act, the attention is mainly excited 
by novelty ; but as the powers of discrimination 
are developed, the qualities of things become more 
and more the objects of regard. To the last, 
indeed, there is some attraction in novelty ; yet. 



78 



SECTION II. 



after a time, the mind is not contented without 
propriety, utility and truth. As life advances, we 
expect, even in fiction, the semblance of reality. 
Truth — in history and in natural and moral science 
— is pursued with avidity. The fascination of 
mathematical inquiries arises from this — that they 
present a succession of truths unmixed with error. 
Now, we can conceive that knowledge might have 
recommended itself solely by its novelty ; and so, 
whether correct or erroneous, might have been 
equally acceptable; but truth being conducive to 
the well-being of the individual and of society, it 
appears to have been an appointment of the 
Supreme Will that the human mind should be 
attached to truth for its own sake. With regard 
also to the diffusion of knowledge, we feel that, 
supposing a man to have an equal opportunity of 
communicating solid truth and specious fallacy, 
there would be an unwarrantable perversion of the 
faculties, in giving currency to the latter. The ten- 
dency of all this, to prove design, is incontro- 
vertible. So likewise is the evidence that our 
intellectual frame originated in that Being, whose 
purposes were to make every thing work together 
for good. ... On these subjects, I only throw out 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



79 



hints, which might be easily expanded into essays. 
While the structure of the body, by the wonderful 
adjustments of its various parts, affords a decisive 
proof of the existence of creative wisdom, the 
mental constitution — with all " its bearings and 
its ties, its strong connexions, nice dependencies^ 
—proclaims, in no less convincing language, 
the primal agency and intelligence of its Divine 
Author. 

Lord Brougham, having discussed the subjects 
thus imperfectly noticed, takes a view of " the 
intellectual world as a whole and of the progress 
which the mind of man has been able to make, 
in consequence of its capacity, structure and dis- 
positions. His Lordship justly considers the dis- 
coveries in various departments of knowledge — 
the wonders of Chemistry, of Optical Science, of 
Astronomy and of Pure Mathematics — as prov- 
ing the surprising strength, activity and variety 
of the mental faculties; and thereby affording 
irresistible evidence of their derivation from that 
Power and Knowledge, to which we are utterly 
incapable of assigning any bounds. Upon this 
subject, although of vast consequence, I need not 
here dwell ; as there will be occasion to adduce 



80 



SECTION II. 



the sentiments of various writers, with respect 
to it, in the course of the following pages. 

In Lord Brougham's enumeration of the quali- 
ties of the human mind, there are some extra- 
ordinary omissions — which I seem called upon 
in some measure to supply. 

In the first place, the Noble Author takes no 
notice of the faculties appertaining to the Imagi- 
nation: a class of faculties which are of great 
importance in themselves, and frequently exert 
very considerable influence over the understanding 
and the affections. These faculties, therefore, 
can scarcely fail to present sufficient indications 
of their purposes and their origin. . . . Now, it has 
already been more than once observed that, in 
our earliest years, we are for the most part moved 
by mere curiosity: — things please us simply be- 
cause they are new. We afterwards expect that 
knowledge should be the vehicle of truth. This 
view of the matter has reference to the reason — 
the judgment. With respect to the imagination 
also, we learn to survey, with indifference, objects 
which appear to be only new ; and they must 
possess various recommendations, besides novelty, 
effectually to secure our regard. We are by no 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



81 



means greatly delighted, unless we discover some 
traces of the quality called beauty; nor are we 
forcibly impressed, but by certain modifications of 
grandeur and sublimity. And thus, through the 
medium of the Imagination, we become sensible of 
the glories of the material world. The symmetry, 
the magnificence and the immensity of external 
nature excite our admiration and astonishment ; 
and under the impulse of such feelings, we at once 
attribute whatever we behold of good and fair 
and great — all that indicates beneficence and skill 
and power, throughout the Universe — to the Will 
of the Supreme. 

Poetry and the fine arts are considered as the 
peculiar province of the faculty, of which we are 
now treating; and if it be recollected how surely 
the nobler productions of the Poet, the Painter 
and the Sculptor tend to carry the mind onward 
in the search after excellence which is unattained, 
unseen, unconceived — and so to shadow forth modes 
of being, unspeakably more exalted than any of 
which we have ever been witnesses — there will 
be no doubt of the effect of Imagination in rais- 
ing the mind to thoughts of the Most High, with 
whom alone dwelleth perfection. 

F 



SECTION II. 



The bearings of Imagination, upon subjects 
generally held to be under the sole dominion of 
reason, have never, I believe, been duly estimated ; 
and I suspect that they would be found to be of 
far greater moment than might in the first instance 
be supposed. By some operation of that faculty 
we are aided at almost every step we take in 
the attainment of knowledge. In demonstrative 
science, it might be thought that Imagination 
could scarcely interpose without some injury; 
and yet — to mention only one case, amongst 
many, to the contrary — I am persuaded that no 
student of Astronomy ever passes, from the con- 
templation of the diagrams required for the proof 
of his propositions to all that they represent in 
the heavenly regions, without a very considerable 

effort of Imagination Again, the love of truth 

of every kind, for itself, is a valuable principle ; 
but too indefinite, as a principle of action : being 
indeed, without some other motive, almost in- 
compatible with the pursuit of any one object. 
In the intellectual, as well as in the material world, 
the contrariety of equal attractions would be pro- 
ductive of rest. Imagination however, by com- 
municating to some one class of truths a peculiar 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



S3 



power of attraction, determines the direction which 
the mind shall take. We thus behold the pro- 
vision that has been made for the exertion of the 
mental faculties in the case of the individual ; and 
at the same time for that diversity in the appli- 
cation of them, by different individuals, which 
tends to secure the cultivation of such various 
departments of knowledge, as may advance the 
general good. 

Very striking, moreover, is the influence of the 
Imagination over the passions, the affections and 
the sympathies of our nature. It is, indeed, 
through that faculty that they mainly act. Divest 
their objects of all the colouring of the Imagina- 
tion — and, instead of the feelings really existing, 
we should be left to little more than the perceptions 
of the senses and the conclusions of the under- 
standing. How wisely therefore has it been or- 
dained that an interest should thus be given to 
our relations to each other — by means of a power, 
which, at the same time, elevates the individual 
character, and ensures the most beneficial con- 
sequences to social life. 

Lord Brougham, in the second place, omits to 
mention the Human Will ; — the power of moving 
f2 



84 



SECTION II. 



and acting, according to the suggestions of the 
various faculties of the mind. Without such a 
power, indeed, we might indulge in contemplation, 
but what account could be given of the purposes of 
the bodily frame ? The truth is, that the power of 
volition is that by which the mental and the cor- 
poreal faculties of man are adapted to each other; 
and it is quite impossible not to perceive, in that 
adaptation, the evidences of Supreme Wisdom. 

But the last omission which I shall notice — 
and by far the most remarkable of all — is that 
of the power of Conscience ; — the power by which 
every man is compelled to pass sentence of appro- 
bation or condemnation upon himself, on account 
of his own conduct. When, by means of the Will, 
the individual is enabled to carry his resolves — the 
combined result of his mental faculties — into effect, 
who sees not, and feels not, the important uses of 
this reflex operation of the mind, upon what has 
been done ? In what manner the Conscience ac- 
quires the power, and vindicates to itself the right, 
of approbation and condemnation, needs not, for 
the present purpose, to be decided. The fact is 
sufficient ; and every one becomes, in consequence, 
a moral agent— an accountable being. Now, con- 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



85 



sider man apart from conscience, and there is no- 
thing to restrain him from the exercise of his mental 
and corporeal faculties to the injury of others : — 
consider him under the controul of conscience, and 
he becomes a law unto himself. It is scarcely too 
much to assert that there is not, throughout the 
whole of external nature, a more striking instance 
of Divine adaptation, and Divine will, than is here 
presented. But this is not all. If God designed 
that man should thus become a moral agent, 
an accountable being — then has God intimated 
that He is Himself a Moral Governor of his 
intelligent creatures. In the preceding steps of our 
inquiry, we were enabled to discern the Natural 
Attributes of the Deity — as his power and wisdom ; 
together with his benevolence in providing for the 
physical happiness of his sentient creatures; but 
having now taken into account the moral nature of 
man, as attested by the supremacy of conscience in 
the human constitution, we catch a glimpse of 
God's Moral Attribute of Justice — and of his pur- 
pose of finally rendering to every one according to 
his works.* . . . Whether Lord Brougham has omit- 

* On this subject, thus writes Jeremy Taylor : — " It was soberly 
spoken of Tertullian, Conscientia optima testis Divinitatis ; our con- 
science is the best argument in the world to prove there is a God. 

For 



86 



SECTION II. 



ted to notice this moral faculty, from inadvertence 
or from design — is uncertain. I have not observed, 
in any part of his 'Discourse,'* that he has made 
the usual distinction between the Natural and the 
Moral Attributes of God. 

Having, in this section, stated the proof, af- 
forded by individual consciousness, of the existence 
of a thinking principle, possessing properties alto- 
gether distinct from those of matter ; having touched 
on the intellectual powers of man, as attesting 
their derivation from the Divine Intelligence; 
having adduced a few of the adaptations of the 
faculties of the mind — as the reason, the affections, 
the imagination, the will and the conscience— to 
each other, and to the condition of human life ; 
it is now time to advert to Lord Brougham's 
opinions, respecting the grounds of our confidence 
in the truth of this department of science. Of 
the nature and validity of those opinions the reader 

For conscience is God's deputy ; and the inferior must suppose a 
superior ; and God and our conscience are like relative terms, it not 
being imaginable why some persons in some cases should be amazed 
and troubled in their minds for their having done a secret turpitude 
or cruelty ; but that conscience is present with a message from God, 
and the men feel inward causes of fear, when they are secure from 
without; that is, they are forced to fear God, when they are safe 
from men." Ductor Dubitantium , p. 2. fol. 1676. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



87 



will have an opportunity of judging, from the fol- 
lowing extract ; 

" The evidence for the existence of mind is to the full as 
complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of 
matter. Indeed it is more certain and more irrefragable. 
The consciousness of existence, the perpetual sense that we 
are thinking, and that we are performing the operation quite 
independently of all material objects, proves to us the exist- 
ence of a being different from our bodies ,with a degree of 
evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of 
those bodies themselves, or of any other part of the material 
world. It is certain — proved, indeed, to demonstration — that 
many of the perceptions of matter, which we derive through 
the senses, are deceitful, and seem to indicate that which 
has no reality at all. Some inferences which we draw re- 
specting it are confounded with direct sensation or percep- 
tion, for example, the idea of motion : other ideas, as those 
of hardness and solidity, are equally the result of reasoning, 
and often mislead. Thus we never doubt, on the testimony 
of our senses, that the different parts of matter touch, that 
different bodies come in contact with one another, and with 
our organs of sense ; and yet nothing is more certain than 
that there still is some small distance between the bodies 
which we think we perceive to touch. Indeed it is barely 
possible that all the sensations and perceptions which we 
have of the material world may be only ideas in our own 
minds: it is barely possible, therefore, that matter should 
have no existence. But that mind — that the sentient prin- 
ciple — that the thing or the being, which we call " 7" and 
" we" and which thinks, feels, reasons — should have no 



SECTION ii. 



existence, is a contradiction in terms. Of the two existences, 
then, that of mind as independent of matter is more certain 
than that of matter apart from mind." (p. 56.) . 

Had His Lordship been content to maintain 
that " the evidence of mind [arising from con- 
sciousness or reflection] is to the full as complete 
as that [of the senses] upon which we believe 
in the existence of matter " — his argument in 
defence of mental science would have assuredly- 
been "to the full as complete 11 as it is now felt 
to be, when thus connected with observations un- 
favourable to the evidence for the existence of 
material objects. On this subject, Mr Dugald 
Stewart expresses himself more cautiously : " From 
these considerations, 11 he writes, "it appears that we 
have the same evidence for the existence of mind, 
that we have for the existence of body; nay, if 
there be any difference between the two cases, 
that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch 
as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of 
our own consciousness, and the other merely by 
the objects of our perceptions. 11 * . . . Lord Brougham 
might perhaps imagine that the loss (should there 
be any) sustained by physical science, in conse- 

* Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. r. p. 3. 8vo. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



89 



quence of his observations, would be more than 
counterbalanced by the advantage gained, in the 
comparison, by mental science; but such, I fear, 
will not generally be the result, in the estimation 
of people. Satisfactorily to discuss a matter of 
this kind falls not within the scope of the present 
work. I may, however, be allowed to say that, 
anxious as I am, for what I deem good reasons, 
to support the validity of the evidence afforded 
by the human mind to the attributes of the Supreme, 
I cannot persuade myself that "the perpetual sense 
that we are thinking, and that we are performing 
the operation quite independently of all material 
objects," has any distinct meaning; much less 
that it "proves to us the existence of a being 
different from our bodies, with a degree of evidence 
higher than any we can have for the existence of 
those bodies themselves, or of any other part of 
the material world." 

Provided that the principles of any department 
of inquiry be sound, and the consequences deduced 
from them correct, there is no need to be solicitous 
by what term the mode of reasoning is designated. 
Lord Brougham, however, appears to think that 
additional weight will be given to the psychological 



90 



SECTION II. 



branch of Natural Theology, by considering it as 
a portion of inductive science; and thus, from 
the preceding statements, he draws the subsequent 
conclusions : — 

"It follows that the constitution and functions of the 
mind are as much the subjects of inductive reasoning and 
investigation, as the structure and actions of matter. The 
mind equally with matter is the proper subject of obser- 
vation, by means of consciousness, which enables us to 
arrest and examine our own thoughts: it is even the 
subject of experiment, by the power which we have, 
through the efforts of abstraction and attention, of turning 
those thoughts into courses not natural to them, not spon- 
taneous, and watching the results." (p. 58.) 

That an individual may, by long-continued 
attention to the operations of his own mind, ac- 
quire very considerable knowledge of its various 
faculties ; that he may compare his own experience 
of its operations, with that of others, as mentioned 
or recorded by them; that he may also compare 
the results of its operations, with the results of 
the operations of other minds; and that he may 
in this manner arrive at important facts connected 
with the economy of the human mind — there can 
be no doubt. If, in consequence, we should be 
told that some advantage may arise from calling 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



this process — induction, the term may very pro- 
perly be employed. But when we are given 
to understand that, as portions of matter may 
be submitted to experiment, so likewise may 
"our own thoughts;" — which, we learn, may be 
"arrested, 1 ' and "examined," and "turned into 
courses not natural to them;" — we shall for the 
most part be slow to believe either that the thing 
is practicable — or, the practicability being granted, 
that any satisfactory conclusions can be drawn 
from it. We shall not fail to recollect that not 
every part even of external nature can be thus 
brought under our control. The philosopher 
may observe the bodies of the Planetary Sys- 
tem, but he cannot subject them to his experi- 
ments. 

Lord Brougham having given, in another part 
of his volume, some instances of experiments on 
the thoughts, the subject will again require notice. 
What, therefore, has already been stated with re- 
gard to it may suffice for the present. This, 
however, appears to be the proper place to lay 
before the reader His Lordship's views of that 
long-continued experiment, on the human mind, 
which is usually denominated Education. 



92 



SECTION II. 



" At first sight, it may be deemed that there is an 
essential difference between the evidence from mental and 
from physical phenomena. It may be thought that mind 
is of a nature more removed from our power than matter — 
that over the masses of matter man can himself exercise 
some control — that, to a certain degree, he has a plastic 
power — that into some forms he can mould them, and can 
combine into a certain machinery — that he can begin and 
can continue motion, and can produce a mechanism by 
which it may be begun and maintained and regulated — 
while mind, it may be supposed, is wholly beyond his 
reach; over it he has no grasp; its existence alone is 
known to him, and the laws by which it is regulated; — 
and thus, it may be said, the great First Cause, which 
alone can call both matter and mind into existence, has 
alone the power of modulating intellectual nature. But 
when the subject is well considered, this difference be- 
tween the two branches of science disappears with all 
the rest. It is admitted, of course, that we can no more 
create matter than we can mind; and we can influence 
mind in a way altogether analogous to our power of 
modulating matter. By means of the properties of mat- 
ter we can form instruments, machines and figures. 
So, by availing ourselves of the properties of mind, we 
can affect the intellectual faculties exercising them, train- 
ing them, improving them, producing, as it were, new 
forms of the understanding. Nor is there a greater dif- 
ference between the mass of rude iron from which we 
make the steel, and the thousands of watch-springs into 
which that steel is cut, or the chronometer which we form 
of this and other masses equally inert — than there is 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. Q3 

between the untutored indocile faculties of a rustic, who 
has grown up to manhood without education, and the skill 
of the artist who invented that chronometer, and of the 
mathematician who uses it to trace the motions of the 
heavenly bodies." (pp. 71—73.) 

It appears then, according to Lord Brougham's 
view of the subject, that the process of education, 
so far as the mind is concerned, is "altogether 
analogous" to "that of modulating matter;" to 
that, for instance, of taking "a mass of rude iron" 
— and converting it into steel — and by hammering 
and tempering and filing and polishing, reducing 
it to forms adapted to the most refined pur- 
poses. Now, in my judgment, no two things can 
be more unlike than the processes in question. 
If, indeed, His Lordship could take "the untutored 
indocile faculties of a rustic, who has grown up 
to manhood without education" — and by some in- 
genious methods, that he has invented, work up 
the said faculties, without fail, into powers qualified 
to improve and adorn man's condition — we might 
then fancy that there was some analogy between 
the smelting, the hammering and whatever else is 
applied to " the mass of rude iron" — and the opera- 
tions performed upon the human mind. But the 



94 



SECTION II. 



Noble Lord is too sagacious to engage in such a 
project. He knows that, unless education is com- 
menced at almost the earliest period of life, and 
followed up with the greatest attention, there is 
but little chance of a result which he could con- 
template with satisfaction. The effect of education, 
in developing the faculties of the mind, has been 
justly compared with that of constant exercise, 
in giving symmetry and strength and agility to 
the body; and who ever attempted to illustrate 
the exercise, so beneficial to the corporeal frame, 
by the method of converting a piece of iron ore 
into the main-spring of a chronometer? Again, 
the progress of the mind, when properly educated, 
has been held similar to that of a plant, under due 
cultivation; and this has been done, because there 
is, in each case, a principle of vitality and of 
increasing strength, which cannot exist in materials 
exposed to the action of the furnace and the ham- 
mer. In mental, as in vegetable culture, the true 
system seems to be, to give encouragement, direc- 
tion and liberty, to the energies of nature. No one 
doubts the effects of education upon the mind ; but 
every one, who reflects on the subject, must doubt 
the wisdom of presenting them under the semblance 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



95 



of " instruments, machines and figures, formed by 
the properties of matter." — The preceding observa- 
tions will enable the reader to ascertain the sense 
in which the principles of psychological science are 
said to be established by a process of induction. 

From facts deduced from observation and re- 
flection, as stated in this section, we conclude that 
the human mind — with all its various faculties, 
admirably adapted as they are to each other, and to 
the condition of man as connected with the ex- 
ternal world and with society — must have been 
derived from the One Supreme. To this con- 
clusion we come, as the only explanation, that can 
be given, of the facts before us. Lord Brougham, 
in his anxiety that every part of Natural Theology 
should be considered as inductive science, thus 
endeavours to make out the inductive character of 
the transition from the facts to the conclusion just 
mentioned. 

" The facts thus collected and compared together we are 
enabled to generalize, and thus to show that certain effects 
are produced by an agency calculated to produce them. 
Aware that if we desired to produce them, and had the 
power to employ this agency, we should resort to it for 
accomplishing our purpose, we infer both that some being 
exists capable of creating this agency, and that he employs 



96' 



SECTION II. 



it for this end. The process is not like, but identical with* 
that by which we infer the existence of design in others 
(than ourselves) with whom we have daily intercourse. 
This kind of evidence is not like, but identical with, that by 
which we conduct all the investigations of intellectual and 
natural science." (pp. 77, 78.) 

With regard to the preceding sentences, I feel 
confident that they were intended to convey some 
information to the world ; although they seem to 
have failed in executing their commission. This, 
indeed, appears to be one of the instances in which 
the love of system has involved a plain matter in 
obscurity — and that, without any recompense for 
the evil inflicted. 

Lord Brougham's Discourse was designed to 
present a general view of the nature and objects 
of Natural Theology, without the details of the 
science. His Lordship, however, has discussed the 
psychological branch with an attention, to parti- 
culars, riot to be found in any other part of the 
work ; and has stated his reasons for having done 
so. Those reasons I now proceed to consider. . . . 
" Nothing is more remarkable, 11 the Noble Author 
observes, " than the care with which all the writers 
upon this subject, at least among the moderns, 
have confined themselves to the proofs afforded by 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



97 



the visible and sensible works of nature, while the 
evidence furnished by the mind and its operations 
has been wholly neglected. ,, (p. 52.) It is, there- 
fore, to supply the omissions of others — or what 
His Lordship deems their omissions — that he has 
devoted himself with so much ardour to the Psy- 
chological branch of Natural Theology. Not con- 
tent with the general charge of " neglect," of " the 
mind and its operations," by preceding writers, 
Lord Brougham has specified four, who have to 
answer for the oversight — Ray, Derham, Clarke, 
Paley. Let us see what can be alleged in each of 
these cases, before we advert to " all the writers 
upon this subject, at least among the moderns." 

Against a well-known production of the first 
of the above mentioned authors, His Lordship ad- 
vances the following charge : — " The celebrated 
book of Ray, on the Wonders of the Creation, 
seems to assume that the human soul has no sepa- 
rate existence — that it forms no part of the created 
system." (p. 52). . . . Now, as Counsel for the De- 
fendant — His Lordship himself being allowed to be 
Judge — I submit, 1. That a person about to pub- 
lish a book, has a right to select his own subject ; 
and 2. That he who fairly discusses his subject is 

G 



98 



SECTION II. 



not to be censured because he does not discuss other 
subjects : for example, a writer on Optics is not to 
be blamed for neglecting Electricity. I would sub- 
mit also that the second edition of Ray's Wisdom 
of God manifested in the works of the Creation was 
published in the year 1692; and therefore long 
before the days of universal knowledge in which it 
is our happiness to live. The author, moreover, 
informs us, in his title-page, what are the works of 
the Creation of which he treats, viz. " The hea- 
venly bodies, elements, meteors, fossils, vegetables, 
animals," and so on. Furthermore, he tells us, in 
his preface, on what principle he had decided the 
course to be taken : — " I have, 1 "' he writes, " made 
choice of this subject, as thinking myself best 
qualified to treat of it:" — a mode of considering 
matters well deserving attention, even in times 
subsequent to those of Ray. From the preceding 
account of the purposes of this excellent man, it 
might have happened that he had left the mental 
powers unmentioned — the mention of them not 
being absolutely required by his subject. Ray, 
however, was not only a Philosopher, but a Reli- 
gious Philosopher; and therefore was very far 
indeed from " assuming," as Lord Brougham ima- 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



99 



gines, u that the human soul had no separate exist- 
ence," or " that it formed no part of the created 
system." In his 6lst page, he mentions " the vital 
flame residing in the blood, that keeps the bodily 
machine in motion, and renders it a Jit organ for 
the Soul to work by?'' Again, in his 165th page, 
towards the conclusion of the work, he thus 
writes : 

" Let us hence duly learn to prize and value our souls. 
Is the body such a rare piece, what then is the soul ? The 
body is but the husk or shell, the soul is the kernel; the 
body is but the cask, the soul the precious liquor contained 
in it; the body is but the cabinet, the soul the jewel; the 
body is but the ship or vessel, the soul the pilot ; the body is 
but the tabernacle, and a poor clay tabernacle or cottage too, 
the soul the inhabitant; the body is but the machine or 
engine, the soul that kvBSv tl that actuates and quickens it ; 
the body is but the dark lanthorn, the soul or spirit is the 
candle of the Lord that burns in it." ....And afterwards 
(p. 168.) " We highly esteem and stand much upon our 
nobility, our birth and breeding, though we derive nothing 
from our ancestors but our bodies and corporeal qualities ; 
and it is useful so far to value and improve this advantage, 
as to provoke us to imitate the good examples of our pro- 
genitors, not to degenerate from them, nor to do anything 
unworthy of our breeding; and yet the divine original of 
our souls, which are beams from the Father of Lights, and 
the immediate offspring of God Himself — tov yap Kal yeVos 
ecr/xev — hath little influence upon us to engage us to walk 
G 2 



100 



SECTION II. 



worthily of our extraction, and to do nothing that is base or 
ignoble and unsuitable to the dignity of our birth." 

Admitting, therefore, that the great Naturalist 
did not introduce into his work — what did not 
belong to it — a formal disquisition on the Soul, 
as proving the existence of the Deity, yet how 
deeply was he impressed with the excellence of 
the nature of the Soul, compared with that of the 
body ! Read the preceding extracts from " the 
celebrated book of Ray" — and then think of Lord 
Brougham's declaration, that it " seems to assume 
that the human soul has no separate existence — 
that it forms no part of the created system!" I 
should have thought that Ray's general character, 
with regard to religion, would have secured him 
from such a censure from his Lordship's pen. 

I now proceed to the case of Derham ; of whom 
the Noble Author writes in the following manner : 

" Derham has written upon Astro-theology and Physico- 
theology as if the heavens alone proclaimed the glory of 
God, and the earth only showed forth his handy-work ; for 
his only mention of intellectual nature is in the single chap- 
ter of the Physico-theology on the soul, in which he is con- 
tent with two observations : one on the variety of mans 
inclinations, and another on his inventive powers — giving 
nothing which precisely proves design." (p. 53.) 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



101 



Now, if Derham, after professing to give a 
view of all the evidences of every kind, for the 
being and attributes of God, had treated of "the 
heavens alone" or "the earth only" as bearing 
testimony to that great truth, Lord Brougham's 
observation would have had some weight; but 
when he denominated one of his works Astro- 
theology, what could he properly discuss, but the 
appearances presented by "the heavens ?" He 
entitled his other work Physico-theology ; and if 
in that work he had omitted all mention of the 
human soul — such a proceeding ought not to be 
deemed an objection, by One who draws a 
broad line of distinction between the physical 
and psychological branches of Natural Theology. 
Derham, however, giving an unusually extensive 
range to the physical department of Theology, 
has devoted a chapter, of this latter work, to the 
soul ; and I now proceed to compare the materials 
of that chapter with Lord Brougham's account 
of them. 

In the chapter alluded to, Derham, according 
to the Noble Author, is content with two obser- 
vations. The reply is, that, whatever their number 
may be, the observations, together with the notes 



102 



SECTION II. 



attached to them, occupy rather more than six 
folio pages of the "Boyle's Lectures." With re- 
gard to the opinion that they contain "nothing 
which precisely proves design 11 — I would remark 
that the author supposed, at least, that design was 
abundantly proved. But to come to particulars. 
Derham opens the subject as follows: 

"My survey of man I shall begin with the soul of man, 
by reason it is his most noble part, the copy of the Divine 
Image in us, in which we have enough to fill us with 
admiration of the munificence, power and wisdom of the 
Infinite Creator, when we contemplate the noble faculties 
of this our superior part ; the vast reach and compass of 
its understanding, the prodigious quickness and piercing- 
ness of its thought, the admirable subtilty of its invention, 
the commanding power of its wisdom, the great depth of 
its memory, and, in a word, its Divine nature and ope- 
rations." (B. v. c. 1.) 

What, I would ask, are these but the very 
topics on which Lord Brougham has so eloquently 
expatiated, through three pages of his Discourse? 
(pp. 68 — 71.) — But Derham goes on: 

" I shall not dwell on this, though the superior part 
of man, because it is the least known. Only there are 
two things I cannot easily pass by, because they manifest 
the especial concurrence and design of the infinitely wise 
Creator, as having a particular and necessary tendency 
to the management and good order of the world's affairs. ,, 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



103 



The subjects, which he was thus induced to 
dwell upon, are — the various inclinations of men's 
minds — and the inventive power of the soul ; and 
it appears that he selected them because they 
eminently displayed adaptation — adaptation to the 
circumstances and condition of mankind in the 
world. These matters are discussed— if not very 
philosophically or with very good taste — yet with 
competent knowledge and strong indications of 
zeal in the cause in which the writer was en- 
gaged. He has given pertinent quotations from 
Cicero, Galen and other old writers; and if the 
substance of his remarks be compared with the 
purport of the passages from the ancient philo- 
sophers, adduced and praised by Lord Brougham, 
(pp. 223 — 226.) on the same subjects, there will 
not, I am persuaded, be found any inferiority 
on the part of Derham. In fact he has brought 
together as much that, "precisely proves de- 
sign," as can easily be discovered in the whole 
of the passages just referred to, when taken to- 
gether. 

From Lord Brougham's censure of Derham, 
I pass on to his reprehension of a more celebrated 
individual — Dr Samuel Clarke. His Lordship's 



104 



SECTION II. 



dissatisfaction, with this great scholar, philosopher 
and divine, is expressed in the following terms: 

" Dr Clarke maintains that the evidences of design 
are much more to be traced in the natural than in the 
moral world ; but he plainly means, by this proposition, 
not so much to compare the proofs of Divine wisdom 
exhibited in the phenomena of the material with those 
exhibited in the phenomena of the intellectual world, as 
to show that the designs or intentions of the Deity are 
more easily perceived in the arrangements of the world 
with which we are most conversant, than his plans for 
our happiness, and his general intentions respecting our 
fate, are to be inferred from moral considerations. It is, 
however, to be remarked that, like all other reasoners 
upon Natural Theology, Dr Clarke confines his attention 
entirely to physical, and never adverts to psychological 
proofs." (p. 221, being a note to p. 52.) 

There is something, in this paragraph, per- 
plexing in the extreme. Dr Clarke — when proving 
the being and attributes of God — "confines his 
attention," as is generally supposed, to the argu- 
ment a priori; that is, to abstract reasoning, 
intended to be independent of the material world : 
If so, how can it be said that he "confines his 
attention entirely to physical proofs ?*" Again, 
Lord Brougham has devoted an entire section 
(pp. 81 — 97) to a review of Dr Clarke's argu- 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



105 



ment d priori, which purports to derive its force 
from other sources than experience; what then 
can be His Lordship's meaning, when he inti- 
mates that the argument is entirely drawn from 
"physical" considerations? To those who, in 
reading a book, happen to recollect, in one part, 
what they met with in another part, a paragraph 
of this kind cannot but cause the utmost embarrass- 
ment; and therefore, having formed some con- 
jectures as to the origin of this (I have no doubt) 
undesigned misrepresentation, I will venture to 
detail what I conceive to be the facts of the case. . . . 
Dr Clarke's Evidences of Natural and Revealed 
Religion , as I have already stated (p. 28), pre- 
sent no regular argument for the being and attri- 
butes of God; that subject having been fully 
discussed in the learned authors preceding work, 
The demonstration of the being' and attributes 
of God, containing the argument a priori. Yet, 
Lord Brougham, judging from the title, The 
Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, may 
possibly have supposed that this was intended to 
prove the being and attributes of God, amongst 
other matters; and finding a section purporting 
to show " why the wisdom of God is not so 



106 



SECTION II. 



clearly and plainly seen in his government of the 
moral, as in the fabric of the natural world"''' — 
made the mistake we are anxious to rectify. This 
part of the work belongs to what His Lordship 
has denominated the Ethical branch of Natural 
Theology — the object being to collect the natural 
intimations of a future state of rewards and 
punishments. Something of the kind, indeed, ap- 
pears to have been perceived by Lord Brougham ; 
who might also have discovered various psycho- 
logical considerations made use of, in the same part 
of the same treatise. For instance, in the section 
immediately preceding that just referred to, the 
argument turns upon " the design of God's creating 
such rational beings as men are — endued with 
such noble faculties, and so necessarily conscious 
of the eternal and unchangeable differences of 
good and evil;" and in the section immediately 
following, upon " the immortality of the soul and 
the natural proofs we have of it." ... I conclude 
therefore, that, in consequence of some misappre- 
hension, respecting the object of the Evidences of 
Natural and Revealed Religion, Lord Brougham 
was led to the notion that Dr Clarke "confines 
his attention to physical and never adverts to 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



107 



psychological proofs." How injurious the notion 
is to the character of that Divine, will now be 
my business to evince, in a manner which no one 
shall be able to controvert. 

On Dr Clarke's Demonstration of the being 
and attributes of God, I shall have occasion to 
offer a few remarks in a subsequent section. It 
will be sufficient, for my present purpose, to give 
some account of a portion of that work ; from 
which the reader cannot fail to discern the exact 

truth of the matter now at issue Dr Clarke's 

eighth proposition is this — The Self-existent and 
Original Cause of all things must be an Intelligent 
Being; and, "in this proposition," he observes, 
" lies the main question between us and the 
Atheists." Respecting the method of proving the 
proposition, he thus writes : 

" Now, that the self -existent Being is not such a blind 
and unintelligent necessity [as the Atheists hold] but in 
the most proper sense an understanding and really active 
Being — does not indeed so obviously and directly appear 
to us by considerations a priori; because (through the 
imperfection of our faculties) we know not wherein intelli- 
gence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary 
connexion of it with Self-existence, as we can that of 
Eternity, Infinity, Unity, &c. : But d posteriori, almost 



108 



SECTION II. 



every thing in the world demonstrates to us this great 
truth ; and affords undeniable arguments to prove that the 
world, and all things therein, are the effects of an In- 
telligent and Knowing Cause." 

Dr Clarke, therefore, has recourse to arguments 
a posteriori ; that is, derived from the experience of 
things actually existing; — amongst which argu- 
ments we find the following: — 

" Since in men in particular there is undeniably that 
power which we call thought, intelligence, consciousness, 
perception or knowledge — there must of necessity either 
have been from eternity, without any Original Cause at all, 
an infinite succession of men, whereof no one has had a 
necessary, but every one a dependent and communicated 
being; or else these beings, indued with perception and 
consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely 
out of that which had no such quality as sense, perception 
or consciousness; or else they must have been produced by 
some Intelligent Superior Being." 

And then, after proving how groundless are the 
first two suppositions, Dr Clarke dwells at great 
length upon the considerations which establish the 
last. At the conclusion of his work, also, he sums 
up the argument, depending upon observation and 
experience, in such a manner as to show how 
highly he estimated the evidence afforded by the 
intellectual powers, in proof of the existence and 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



109 



attributes of the Deity. Of this, let the reader 
judge :— 

" The notices, that God has been pleased to give us of 
himself, are so many and so obvious; in the constitution, 
order, beauty and harmony of the several parts of the world ; 
in the frame and structure of our own bodies, and the won- 
derful powers and faculties of our souls ; in the unavoidable 
apprehensions of our own minds, and the common consent of 
all other men; in every thing within us, and every thing 
without us : that no man of the meanest capacity and great- 
est disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most 
superficial observation of the works of God, and the lowest 
and most obvious attendance to the reason of things, can be 
ignorant of Him, but he must be utterly without excuse." 

More than this it is needless to adduce, in order 
that the reader may know how to dispose of Lord 
Brougham's statement, that Dr Clarke " never ad- 
verts to psychological proofs." ... It is well known 
that Bishop Butler, when a young man, wrote five 
letters to Dr Clarke, respecting some of the argu- 
ments employed in the Demonstration ; and that 
to each of those letters Dr Clarke replied with 
great courtesy and ability. In the course of his 
treatise, Lord Brougham has referred to the corre- 
spondence two or three times ; and in a manner 
which, connected with other circumstances, induces 
me to suspect that the Noble Lord's last im- 



110 



SECTION II. 



pressions respecting the Demonstration are derived 
from those letters. To decide upon the contents 
of works, by virtue of such imperfect recollections 
is very dangerous; and if my suspicion be just, 
I am surprised that His Lordship was not secured 
from the risk he encountered, by the tenor of pro- 
fessional studies and the habits of professional life. 

It is now time to examine the case of Dr Paley; 
with regard to whose labours — together with those 
of his predecessors, Ray, Derham and Clarke — 
Lord Brougham delivers the following judgment: — 

" Dr Paley, whose work is chiefly taken from the writ- 
ings of Derham, deriving from them its whole plan and 
much of its substance, but clothing the harsher statements 
of his original in an attractive and popular style,* had so 
little of scientific habits, so moderate a power of general- 
ising, that he never once mentions the mind, or any of the 
intellectual phenomena, nor ever appears to consider them 
as forming a portion of the works or operations of nature. 
Thus all these authors view the revolutions of the heavenly 
bodies, the structure of animals, the organisation of plants, 
and the various operations of the material world which we 
see carried on around us, as indicating the existence of 

* " This observation in nowise diminishes the peculiar merit of 
the style, and also of the homely, but close and logical, manner in 
which the argument is put ; nor does it deny the praise of bringing 
down the facts of former writers, and adapting them to the improved 
state of physical science — a merit the more remarkable, that Paley 
wrote his Natural Theology at the close of Ids life." Note by Lord B. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



Ill 



design, and leading to a knowledge of the Creator. But 
they pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the 
most singular work of divine wisdom and power — the mind 
itself. Is there any reason whatever to draw this line; to 
narrow within these circles the field of Natural Theology ; 
to draw from the constitution and habits of matter alone the 
proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and supports the 
universe ? Ought we not rather to consider the phenomena 
of the mind as more peculiarly adapted to help this inquiry, 
and as bearing a neai*er relation to the Great Intelligence 
which created and which maintains the system ?" (pp. 53, 54.) 

I have already shown, in defence of Ray, that, 
although his undertaking led him only to the con- 
templation of external nature, yet he considered 
the human mind as bearing an incomparably 
stronger testimony, than the material world, to 
its Divine origin. In defence of Derham, I have 
alleged the mode in which he dwelt upon the 
mental faculties, in proof of the power and wisdom 
of the Supreme. In defence of Clarke, I have 
produced one passage, in which he decided " the 
main question between us and the Atheists," by 
means of an argument arising from the existence 
of the human soul ; and another, in which he 
numbered " the wonderful powers and faculties of 
our souls'" amongst the things which leave people, 
who believe not in a God, " without excuse 



112 



SECTION II. 



Where, then, is Lord Brougham's warrant for 
asserting, that these authors " pass over in silence, 
unaccountably enough, by far the most singular 
work of divine wisdom and power — the mind 
itself?" Where are the indications of any wish, 
on their part, " to narrow within these circles 
the field of Natural Theology — or "to draw, 
from the constitution and habits of matter alone, 
the proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and 

supports the universe ?" And, now, with regard 

to Paley: — let every one be estimated by what 
he does engage, and not by what he does not 
engage, to perform. As I stated in the intro- 
ductory section, Paley entitled his work — Na- 
tural Theology; or, Evidences of the existence 
and attributes of the Deity, collected from the ap- 
pearances of Nature : and what was thus professed 
to have been done, the universal voice of mankind 
has declared to have been done well. To those 
who may be disposed to search the volume for psy- 
chological facts," I would suggest that the mind and 
its operations are not amongst " the appearances of 
Nature." If a work were entitled — as it properly 
might be — Natural Theology ; or, Evidences of the 
existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



113 



the operations of the Human Mind — who would 
expect the work to contain discussions on physical 
phenomena? To say the truth, there appears to 
be something beyond measure strange in Lord 
Brougham's objection; and, if I do not much 
mistake, the reader will agree with me in thinking 
that it is crushed to pieces by the very circum- 
stances of the case. 

x 

Again, although Paley, so far as I recollect, 
does not adduce the mental faculties in proof of 
the Divine power and wisdom, the assertion is 
not quite correct that "he never once mentions 
the mind, or any of the intellectual phenomena. 1 ' 
The whole argument of the volume depends upon 
the following position, which occurs in the second 
chapter : " Arrangement, disposition of parts, sub- 
serviency of means to an end, relation of instru- 
ments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence 
or mind. 11 And, to omit other instances, after 
suggesting considerations which may lessen the 
difficulties, respecting a future state, felt by those 
"who have taken up the opinion that the acts 
of the human mind depend upon organisation " 
or "that the mind itself consists in organisa- 
tion 11 — Paley declares such considerations to be 

H 



114 



SECTION II. 



little, if at all, wanted by those " who refer the 
operations of mind to a substance totally and 
essentially different from matter;" who "adopt 
perhaps a juster reasoning and a better philosophy" 
— "as most certainly these operations, though 
affected by material causes, hold very little affinity 
to any properties of matter with which we are 

acquainted"* The fact indeed, that Paley has 

not employed the mental powers in support of his 
main argument, is attributed by Lord Brougham 
to his having had "so little of scientific habits — 
so moderate a power of generalising." His Lord- 
ship, however, lays no claim to infallibility. Let 
us, then, suppose — and there is nothing absurd 
in the supposition — that it was not from want of 
intelligence that Paley did not engage in psycho- 
logical disquisitions; and see what account may 
still be given of the matter. Now, when a man 
of sense — such as, on the whole, I believe His 
Lordship holds Paley to have been — undertakes 
to write a book, for the instruction of all who 
ever read books, it behoves him to consider, not 
only the kind of reasoning which he can him- 
self manage, but that also which his readers can 

* Natural Theology, 4th and 3rd paragraphs from the end. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH, 



115 



comprehend. Lord Brougham's opinion is, that 
psychological views were beyond Paley's " power 
of generalisation — would they then have come 
within the "power of generalisation " possessed 
by his readers ? Locke is usually allowed to have 
been no mean proficient in mental science — let 
him therefore furnish a reply to the query: — 
" Though he that contemplates the operations 
of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear 
ideas of them, yet unless he turn his thoughts 
that way, and consider them attentively, he will 
no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the 
operations of his mind, and all that may be ob- 
served therein, than he will have all the particular 
ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions 
of a clock, who w T ill not turn his eyes to it, and 

with attention heed all the parts of it The 

first years are usually employed and diverted in 
looking abroad. Men's business in them is to 
acquaint themselves with what is to be found with- 
out ; and so, growing up in a constant attention to 
outward sensations, seldom make any considerable 
reflection on what passes within them, till they come 
to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all."* 

* Essay on Human Understanding, B. n. c. i. s. 7, 8. 
H2 



116 



SECTION II. 



But if it should be thought that the difficulties? 
attending these abstract speculations, have sub- 
sequently been removed, and that to perceive the 
most subtile distinctions is now quite an ordi- 
nary attainment — Let Lord Brougham answer 
for the present times : " Although undoubtedly 
the process of reasoning [respecting the mind] 
is the shortest of all, and the least liable to 
deception, yet so connected are all its pheno- 
mena with those of the body, that it requires a 
process of abstraction alien from the ordinary 
habits of most men, to be persuaded that we have 
a more undeniable evidence of its separate exist- 
ence than we have of the separate existence of the 
body. " (p. 25.) Of all this, Dr Paley, as a man 
of sense, must assuredly have been aware ; and 
however great his talents for metaphysical in- 
quiries, must have known that to exert them on 
such an occasion would inevitably frustrate his 
own purposes. Had abstract disquisitions of the 
kind mentioned by Lord Brougham been scattered 
through the work, its author might have been 
praised by a few philosophers, but he could not 
possibly have instructed and convinced the thou- 
sands of all conditions who, as the work now 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



117 



exists, have lingered over his pages with never- 
failing delight. 

As I have already intimated, Dr Paley's 
Natural Theology was undoubtedly designed for 
the information of all classes of society. Lord 
Brougham, indeed, has noticed the " attractive 
and popular style" of the work; and yet His 
Lordship censures the omission of topics, which, 
even in his own opinion, are far removed from 
ordinary apprehension. Although I do not believe 
that, after the preceding remarks, His Lordship's 
censure will have much weight, I have satisfaction 
in presenting the view of the matter which has 
been taken by a philosopher of great celebrity — 
to whom the noble author of the ' Discourse' 
has repeatedly referred, in terms of high and 
well-deserved commendation. When Mr Dugald 
Stewart's predilection for psychological inquiries 
is borne in mind, his praise of Paley will be felt 
to be peculiarly creditable, as well to the giver as 
the receiver. Thus then writes the author of The 
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind: — 
" Among the disciples of Law, one illustrious 
exception to these remarks occurs in Dr Paley, 
whose treatise on Natural Theology is unquestion- 



118 



SECTION II. 



ably the most instructive as well as interesting 
publication on that subject which has appeared in 
our times. As the book was intended for popular 
use, the author has wisely avoided, as much as 
possible, all metaphysical discussions ; but I do 
not know that there exists any other work, where 
the argument from final causes is placed in so great 
a variety of pleasing and striking points of view.""* 
With regard to Lord Brougham's statement — 
that Paley's work is "chiefly taken from the 
writings of Derham, deriving from them its whole 
plan, and much of its substance 17 — I remark, 
1. that, in Paley's " Life" published by his Son, we 

* Dissertation on the progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and 
Political Philosophy, Part n. p. 117. 

Having mentioned my disposition to observe the effects of things 
upon minds not much improved by cultivation, I will venture, in a 
note, to state a fact which came under my own observation. . . . An 
intelligent working-gardener — who did me the justice to think that I 
should attend to such a matter — requested of me an old copy of 
Paley's Natural Theology. On inquiring in what manner he had 
become acquainted with the work, it was, I found, by means of some 
extracts, which had been met with, and had excited the greatest 
admiration and curiosity. Prom the extracts then specified, and from 
the remarks made after the perusal of the treatise, I am thoroughly 
convinced that, if the work had been of the metaphysical cast which 
would have pleased Lord Brougham, the individual in question 
would not. have taken the slightest interest in the subject. ... From 
this case, we may learn the mode in which Paley's writings are 
operating upon the public mind. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



119 



find the following information touching the prepara- 
tions for the work on Natural Theology. " There 
are three or four large manuscript books filled with 
observations and short substantial hints taken from 
various authors, and in the order in which they 
are here set down : Boyle, Gregory, Cheselden, 
Derham [Physico-theology, I suppose], Ray, Mon- 
ro, Derham's Astro-theology, Adams, Wilkins's 
Principles of Natural Religion, Search, Sturm, 
Goldsmith, Lesser, Smellie, Religious Philosopher, 
Spectator, Seed, Nature Displayed, Hervey, Addi- 
son, Keill, Watson, St Pierre, Cappe's Causes 
of Atheism, Memoirs of Natural History by the 
Royal Academy of Paris, Priestley, Maclaurin." * 
We see, therefore, from what a variety of sources, 
besides Derham — and there are many others re- 
ferred to in the book itself — Paley collected " short 
substantial hints," which he worked up in his own 
peculiar and masterly manner: — I remark 2. that, 
according to the best of my judgment, no two 
books, on the same subject, can be well imagined 
more different, both as to plan and substance, than 
those of Derham and Paley: — and 3. that, from 
whatever quarters Paley may have derived " short 

* Life of Ur Paley, by the Rev. Edmund Paley, p. 321. 



120 



SECTION II. 



substantial hints," lie took care to see things with 
his own eyes, to examine them for himself, and 
to exercise the faculties of his own powerful mind 
upon every object that was presented to him. 
And thus, there is scarcely a page of his Volume 
which bears not the impress of decided originality. 

But Lord Brougham's complaints of Paley's 
unfitness for his undertaking are not yet exhausted. 
Duly to understand the nature of the accusation 
now to be considered, the following extract, toge- 
ther with the note subjoined to it, must be read. 

" Such is the process of reasoning by which we infer 
the existence of design in the natural and moral [qu. 
intellectual?] world, To this abstract argument, an addi- 
tion of great importance remains to be made. The whole 
reasoning proceeds necessarily upon the assumption that 
there exists a being or thing separate from, and inde- 
pendent of, matter, and conscious of its own existence, 
which we call mind. For the argument is— "Had 1 to 
accomplish this purpose, I should have used some such 
means;" or, "Had I used these means, I should have 
thought 1 was accomplishing some such purpose." Per- 
ceiving the adaptation of the means to the end, the infer- 
ence is, that some being has acted as we should ourselves 
act, and with the same views. But when we so speak, 
and so reason, we are all the while referring to an intelli- 
gent principle or existence ; we are referring to our mind, 
and not to our bodily frame. The agency which we infer 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



121 



from this reasoning is, therefore, a spiritual and immaterial 
agency — the working of something like our own mind— - 
an intelligence like our own, though incomparably more 
skilful. The being of whom we thus acquire a knowledge, 
and whose operations as well as existence we thus deduce 
from a process of inductive reasoning, must be a spirit, 
and wholly immaterial. But his being such is only inferred, 
because we set out with assuming the separate existence 
of our own mind, independently of matter. Without that 
we never could conclude that superior intelligence existed 
or acted. The belief that mind exists is essential to the 
whole argument by which we infer that the Deity exists. . . . 
It is the foundation of Natural Theology in all its 
branches ; and upon the scheme of materialism no rational, 
indeed no intelligible, account can be given of a first 
cause, or of the creation or government of the universe." 
(pp. 78, 79.) 

To this passage, the note is as follows : 

" It is worthy of observation, that not the least allusion 
is made in Dr Paley's work to the argument here stated, 
although it is the foundation of the whole of Natural 
Theology. Not only does this author leave entirely un- 
touched the argument a priori (as it is called) and also 
all the inductive arguments derived from the phenomena 
of mind, but he does not even advert to the argument 
upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest — 
that design which is the whole subject of his book. Nothing 
can more evince his distaste or incapacity for metaphysical 
researches. He assumes the very position which alone 
sceptics dispute. In combating him they would assert that 



122 



SECTION II. 



he begged the whole question; for certainly they do not 
deny, at least in modern times, the fact of adaptation. 
As to the fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least 
allusion is ever made to it in any of his writings, even in 
his Moral Philosophy." 

Now, with regard to the argument stated by 
Lord Brougham— to which, His Lordship says, 
" not the least allusion is made in Dr Paley's 
work" — it somehow seems — possibly in conse- 
quence of the mode of statement — rather to elude 
the understanding. The hand might almost as 
well attempt to grasp quicksilver. But, at a ven- 
ture, I will produce a passage, from Paley's Natural 
Theology, which, I strongly suspect, does allude 
to the very same argument : which, if I am right 
in my conjecture, not only alludes to the argu- 
ment, but expresses all that it was intended to 
support, in language so plain and forcible as at once 
to carry the most complete conviction to the mind. 
The following observations occur in his twenty- 
third chapter, on The personality of the Deity : 

" Contrivance, if established, appears to me to prove 
every thing which we wish to prove. Amongst other 
things, it proves the personality of the Deity, as distin- 
guished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes 
called a principle : which terms, in the mouths of those who 
use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



123 



to express an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a personal 
agent. Now, that which can contrive, which can design, 
must he a person. These capacities constitute personality, 
for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that 
which can perceive an end or purpose ; as well as the power 
of providing means, and of directing them to their end. 
They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from 
which volitions flow ; which is mind. The acts of a mind 
prove the existence of a mind; and in whatever a mind 
resides, is a person. The seat of intellect is a person." — 
And afterwards, to show in what manner we arrive at such 
conclusions, he goes on : — " Wherever we see marks of con- 
trivance, we are led for its cause to an intelligent author. 
And this transition of the understanding is founded upon 
uniform experience. We see intelligence constantly contriv- 
ing; that is, we see intelligence constantly producing effects, 
marked and distinguished by certain properties ; not certain 
particular properties, hut by a kind and class of properties, 
such as relation to an end, relation of parts to one another, 
and to a common purpose. We see, wherever we are wit- 
nesses to the actual formation of things, nothing except 
intelligence producing effects so marked and distinguished. 
Furnished with this experience we view the productions of 
nature. We observe them also marked and distinguished in 
the same manner. We wish to account for their origin. 
Our experience suggests a cause perfectly adequate to this 
account. No experience, no single instance or example, can 
be offered in favour of any other. In this cause, therefore, 
we ought to rest ; in this cause the common sense of man- 
kind has, in fact, rested, because it agrees with that, which, 
in all cases, is the foundation of knowledge — the undeviating 



124 



SECTION II. 



course of their experience In like manner, and upon the 

same foundation (which in truth is that of experience) we 
conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence 
and design ; because, in the properties of relation to a pur- 
pose, subserviency to a use, they resemble what intelligence 
and design are constantly producing, and what nothing 
except intelligence and design ever produce at all. Of 
every argument, which would raise a question as to the 
safety of this reasoning, it may be observed, that, if such 
argument be listened to, it leads to this inference, not only 
that the present order of nature is insufficient to prove the 
existence of an intelligent Creator, but that no imaginable 
order would be sufficient to prove it ; that no contrivance, 
were it ever so mechanical, ever so precise, ever so clear, 
ever so perfectly like those which we ourselves employ, 
would support this conclusion. A doctrine, to which I con- 
ceive no sound mind can assent." 

The subject now under discussion is really- 
important; and I entreat the reader closely to 
compare the preceding extract, with the previous 
paragraphs from Lord Brougham's Discourse. In 
each instance, the object is — from the experience 
of contrivances and adaptations having originated 
in our own mind, and from the observation of 
similar effects having originated in the minds of 
others — to explain the manner in which we ascend 
to the Supreme Mind, as the great Cause of all 
the adaptations and contrivances throughout nature. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



125 



If I do not mistake, the transition, from Lord 
Brougham's account of the matter to Dr Paley's, 
will be somewhat like a transition from the mirage 
of the desert, to the living landscape of some genial 
climate. 

But, continues Lord Brougham in the note 
cited pp. 121, 122, " Not only does this author" — 
meaning Dr Paley — " leave entirely untouched the 
argument a priori (as it is called)" — Now, in 
answer to this objection, 1. I must repeat that 
" this author" never undertook to give all the 
evidences of every kind, for the existence and attri- 
butes of God; — 2. I remark that the argument 
a priori, if strictly so, has no concern whatever 
with the " evidences collected from the appearances 
of Nature," which the author did undertake to 
give; — and 3. that Lord Brougham himself, as 
will hereafter appear, condemns the argument a 
priori, as unintelligible and inconclusive. With 
what propriety, therefore, can His Lordship state, 
as a matter of reproach to Dr Paley, that he has 
left this argument "entirely untouched" ?*... As 

* Lord Brougham rejects the argument a priori, in the following- 
terms : " This is another, and to my mind, a very strong, additional 
reason for resting the evidences of Natural Theology upon the argu- 
ment ii posteriori alone." (p. 238.) 



126 



SECTION II. 



to the Noble Author's opinions respecting Paley's 
not adverting to "the argument upon which the 
inference of design must of necessity rest," and 
his begging " the whole question" — I again refer 
to the two passages which I have brought together 
for the purpose of comparison ; and if any one who 
is sceptical after reading Paley, should be convinced 
by Lord Brougham, I shall begin to think that 
there is some ground for relying upon His Lord- 
ship's judgment in the matter That to " the 

fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least 
allusion is ever made, in any of his [Paley's] 
writings, even in his Moral Philosophy" — may 
be true, if the remark be understood to apply to 
any notice of the doctrine of cause and effect in 
the abstract; but it is also true that the doctrine, 
as explained (p. 231) by Lord Brougham — namely, 
that from experience of the connexion between our 
own volitions and the movements resulting from 
them, we are enabled to rise to the notion of effects 
consequent upon the volitions of the Supreme 
Being — although not perhaps formally laid down 
by Paley, is frequently (as in the passage lately 
quoted) worked up into his argument, with a force 
which seldom attends the abstract statement of 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



127 



things. Throughout His Lordship's sections, on 
the physical and psychological branches of Natural 
Theology, there is not, I believe, u the least allu- 
sion" to the doctrine of causation ; and yet it would 
be difficult to show that the conclusions lose any 

portion of their probability on that account 

With regard to the final complaint against Paley, 
that, " even in his Moral Philosophy," there is no 
allusion to the doctrine, I can only confess my 
utter inability to imagine in what part of the 
work, or for what purpose, a chapter on that sub- 
ject could have been introduced. 

Although Lord Brougham has acquitted Paley's 
language, of any tendency to materialism, His 
Lordship seems to doubt whether he was "fully 
impressed with the evidence of mental existence." 
In my own opinion, the last extract from his Na- 
tural Theology could scarcely have been written by 
any one who was not " fully impressed" with that 
evidence. As however His Lordship has men- 
tioned such a doubt, and has moreover avowed, 
without reserve, his conviction of Paley's " distaste 
or incapacity for metaphysical researches," I would 
refer the reader to the last three paragraphs of his 
Evidences of Christianity. On this occasion, it 



128 



SECTION II. 



may not, perhaps, be improper to state that the 
first inclination to such researches, felt by the 
present writer, was excited, very early in life, by 
those paragraphs ; which he still believes to con- 
tain more information on such subjects than can 
easily be found in the same space. One of the 
paragraphs shall be transcribed. 

"Thought is different from motion, perception from 
impact: the individuality of a mind is hardly consistent 
with the divisibility of an extended substance ; or its voli- 
tion, that is, its power of originating motion, with the 
inertness which cleaves to every portion of matter which 
our observation or our experiments can reach. These dis- 
tinctions lead us to an immaterial principle: at least, they 
do this — they so negative the mechanical properties of 
matter, in the constitution of a sentient, still more of a 
rational being, that no argument drawn from these pro- 
perties can be of any great weight in opposition to other 
reasons, when the question respects the changes of which 
such a nature is capable, or the manner in which these 
changes are effected. Whatever thought be, or whatever 
it depend upon, the regular experience of sleep makes one 
thing concerning it certain, that it may be completely 
suspended, and completely restored." 

This is a mode of writing which excites curio- 
sity, and enforces reflection. Such remarks are 
not to be forgotten : they become the materials 
of future contemplation. The author who can 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



129 



so think, and so express his thoughts, can scarcely 
be said to have a " distaste," certainly not an " in- 
capacity," for metaphysical researches. But now 
that we are adverting to Paley's supposed "distaste" 
and " incapacity^" let us consider the circumstances 
under which his Natural Theology — with which 
alone we are concerned — was drawn up. And, in 
the outset, we are enabled to give, on his own 
authority, the reasons for undertaking what ap- 
peared to him "as, in all probability, his last 
labour." His "last" it proved to be. 

" A weak, and, of late, a painful state of health, de- 
prived me of the power of discharging the duties of my 
station in a manner at all suitable, either to my sense of 
those duties, or to my most anxious wishes concerning them. 
My inability for the public functions of my profession, 
amongst other consequences, left me much at leisure. 
That leisure was not to be lost. It was only in my study 
that I could repair my deficiencies in the church : it was 
only through the press that I could speak."* 

We are also enabled to present a similar testi- 
mony from the pen of his Son : 

" The circumstances under which he finished, and in- 
deed, it may very fairly be said, begun his work, added 
a great interest to it for those who were anxions for his 
health. He had been long struggling with those attacks 
* Natural Theology, Dedication to Bishop Barrington. 
I 



130 



SECTION II. 



which are the usual symptoms of diseased viscera; and this 
constitutional disorder had gained so much upon him, that 
his intervals of ease became few and far between. It was 
quite admirable at -such times to observe, not only how 
lively were his animal spirits, but how his mind, quite un- 
subdued, seemed to labour to show itself as happy as could 
be, with the very privilege of existence ; but even this was 
not equal to the calmness and patience and composure 
which he showed under the severest bodily sufferings, even 
at the very time when he was busily engaged in contem- 
plating and describing the benevolence of the Deity, and 
the provisions for mans enjoyment.'** 

Lastly, we are enabled to survey the same scene 
from the representation of Dr Clark, a highly- 
esteemed Physician at Newcastle, who had the 
satisfaction of contributing to the comfort of Dr 
Paley at that period: 

" That truly eminent man [Dr Paley] was then engaged 
in finishing his Natural Theology ; but the completion 
of that great undertaking was frequently interrupted by 
severe accessions of a painful disorder, under which he had 
long laboured. Dr Clark often expressed his admiration 
at the fortitude with which he bore the most painful 
attacks ; and at the readiness, and even cheerfulness, with 
which, on the first respite from pain, he resumed his literary 
labours. When it is considered that the twenty-sixth 
chapter [on the Goodness of the Deity] was written under 
these circumstances, what he has said of the alleviations 
* Life of Paley, by the Rev. Edmund Paley, p. 337. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



131 



of pain acquires additional weight. I t is not a philosopher, 
in the Ml enjoyment of health, who talks lightly of an 
evil which he may suppose at a distance. When Dr Paley 
speaks of the power which pain has '« of shedding a satis- 
faction over intervals of ease, which few enjoyments ex- 
ceed;" and assures us that "a man resting from severe 
pain is, for the time, in possession of feelings which un- 
disturbed health cannot impart;" the sentiment flowed from 
his own feelings."* 

I will not injure the effect of these simple 
statements, by any observations upon them. They 
disclose, in a manner which attests their accuracy, 
the situation of our Christian Philosopher, when 
composing his Treatise on Natural Theology ; and 
if borne in mind, cannot fail to give new interest 
to the perusal of the work. That great work, 
indeed, needs no allowance, on any ground what- 
ever. It depends upon its own intrinsic value. 
But there are occasions when a few pages may 
again be read, for the purpose of refreshing our 
recollection of its aptness of illustration and pre- 
cision of language; and while reading for that 
purpose, we may also have an opportunity of reas- 
suring ourselves of the possibility of a production, 

* Meadley's Life of Paley, p. 205, 2nd ed. ; the passage, as there 
found, is taken from Dr Fenwick's Sketch of the ■professional Life a/;W 
Character of Dr Clark. 

I 2 



1 32 SECTION II. 

so instinct with vigour of mind and kindliness of 
disposition, having been written during such pre- 
carious intervals of ease, as were allowed by a 
most painful disorder, which speedily consigned 
its author to the tomb. 

Enough but, I trust, not more than enough — - 
for it is right that these matters should be clearly 
understood — has now been laid before the reader^ 
in defence of Ray, Derham, Clarke and Paley.. 
Let us now proceed to consider what can be al- 
leged, in favour of "all the writers'' on Natural 
Theology, "at least among the moderns" — who ? 
as Lord Brougham affirms, have in their specula- 
tions on that subject " wholly neglected the mind 
and its operations." This is the more needful^ 
inasmuch as, according to His Lordship, " there 
cannot be a doubt that this extraordinary omission 
had its origin in the doubts which men are prone 
to entertain of the mind's existence independent of 
matter." (p. 54.) We have a farther reason for 
investigating the subject in the circumstance, that 
the affirmation, respecting " all the writers, at 
least among the moderns," has been, by a recent 
author, deemed adverse to the doctrine of the 
immateriality of the soul. " Did it not occur 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH, 



133 



to the Noble Lord," inquires the author alluded 
to, " that the writers on Natural Theology who 
had preceded him, and, as he admits, omitted 
to discuss or entertain this metaphysical and 
vexatious doctrine, did so with design, and because 
they were of opinion that it was neither neces- 
sary nor useful to introduce doubtful doctrines, 
in the hope of extending certain knowledge — and 
that therefore the negative precedent was one 
which ought to be followed ?'' 1 * Now there is one 
maxim, in philosophy, which is on all sides al- 
lowed to be most excellent: it is this — First be 
sure of the fact, and then endeavour to account 
for it. Now, the fact, stated by Lord Brougham, 
is, that, "modern writers" on Natural Theology 
have " wholly neglected the mind and its opera- 
tions. 11 At this moment, I cannot but feel the awk- 
wardness of my situation; for the fact, which I 
am under the necessity of stating and proving, 
is — that " modern writers" on Natural Theology 
have very generally employed "the mind and its 
operations, 1 ' as evidences of the being and attri- 
butes of God. So far, indeed, as I can depend 

* Observations on the Discourse of Natural Theology, by Henry 
Lord Brougham. By Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL.D. One of His 
Majesty 's Counsel at Law in Ireland, p. 18. 



134 



SECTION II. 



upon my memory, that topic has scarcely ever 
been omitted by them. But be that as it may, 
I shall venture to show, by actual quotations from 
authors of no small account, the kind of consi- 
deration which has really been bestowed upon the 
subject. The following extracts are taken from 
such works as immediately occurred to recollection 
and were within reach; and I would persuade 
myself that they will amply reward the trouble 
of perusal, 

Out of compliment to the Legal Profession, 
of which Lord Brougham is so distinguished a 
Member, I begin with the testimony of Sir 
Matthew Hale ; who, in his Primitive Origi- 
nation of' Mankind, dwells at great length upon 
the intellectual faculties. Of the mode of thinking, 
with regard to them, adopted by the great Lord 
Chief J ustiee, I give the following specimens : 

"There are many excellencies in the Human Nature, 
which manifest a far more eminent excellency in his 
First Efficient ... The symmetry, beauty, majesty and ad- 
mirable composure of his body: to which there can be 
nothing added, nor detracted without a blemish to it. The 
admirable faculties of his soul, those that concern him in 
his lowest rank of life, the faculty by which he is nourished ; 
those that concern him in his middle rank of life, soul and 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 135 

sensation, memory and appetite ; those that concern him 
in his supreme rank of life, Intellect and Will. The ad- 
mirable union of his soul to his body ; whereby he becomes 
one intellectual being, though consisting of principles of 
different natures." 

" His faculties of sense are accommodated to a sensible 
being : forasmuch as he is to converse in a corporeal world 
and with corporeal beings, there is no one quality of cor- 
poreal nature that he hath occasion to use or converse with, 
but he hath a faculty by one of his five senses to receive 
and discern. In his intellectual faculty, it admirably serves 
him for the ends of his being : he was appointed to govern, 
direct and rule other animals ; and therefore he hath the 
advantage of a superior faculty above them, whereby he 
is able to exercise that direction and government. He was 
made to be the spectator of the great works of God, to 
consider and observe them, to glorify and serve that God 
that made them; and he is accordingly furnished with an 
Intellectual Faculty answerable to his condition."* 

In the estimation of this learned writer, these 
and other considerations, arising from a survey of 
the mental constitution of man, lead the thoughts 
to the First Cause of all finite intelligence. 

I now appeal to Bishop Wilkins; who men- 
tions, as affording special evidence of an Intelli- 
gent Creator, "that kind of frame which relates 
to our Understanding Power, whereby we are 

* Primitive Origination, pp. 326, 327. 



136 



SECTION II 



able to correct the errors of our senses and ima- 
ginations ; to call before us things past and future ; 
and to behold things that are invisible to sense."" 
We also find him writing as follows : 

" If a man doth but consider how he is endowed with 
such a natural principle, whereby he is necessarily inclined 
to seek his own well-being and happiness : and likewise 
with one faculty whereby he is enabled to judge of the 
nature of things, as to their fitness or unfitness for this end : 
and another faculty whereby he is enabled to choose and 
prosecute such things as may promote this end, and to 
reject and avoid such things as may hinder it: — and 
this may be another argument to convince him that the 
Author of his being must be infinitely wise and powerful." 

Bishop Wilkins moreover adduces, in proof of 
a Moral Governor of the world, " Natural Con- 
science, which is God's deputy, and doth inter- 
nally witness for Him, as other creatures do 
externally * 

The next extracts shall be from Dr Cudworth's 

Intellectual System ; a work abounding in thought 

as well as learning, It ought to be premised that 

the language is somewhat rugged. 

"The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of sub- 
stances in nature : The first — extension or magnitude, 

* Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, pp. 82. 83, 90. 6th ed, 
1710. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



137 



(really existing without the mind) which is a thing that 
hath no self-unity at all in it ; but is infinite alterity and 
divisibility, as it is only mere outside and outwardness, it 
having nothing within ; nor any other action belonging to it, 
but only locally to move when it is moved: — The second — 
life and mind; or the self- active cogitative nature, an inside 
being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal 
energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker 
himself, or in the inside of him ; which therefore (though 
unextended, yet) hath a certain inward recess, /3a'0os, or 
essential profundity. And this is a thing which can act 
all of it entirely, upon either a greater or lesser quantity 
of extended substance or body, and its several parts, pene- 
trating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it."' 
(p. 832.) 

" And now we have made it manifest that these Atheists 
are so far from being able to disprove a God, from this 
topic of cogitation, knowledge or understanding, that they 
cannot possibly salve the phenomenon thereof without a 
God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his ex- 
istence. For first, If no life or cogitation, soul or mind, 
can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life 
and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing 
extended into length, breadth and thickness — then is it 
so far from being true that all life and understanding is 
junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that 
of necessity, either all lives and souls were self-existent 
from eternity, or else there must be One perfect unmade 
life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were 
derived ; there must be an eternal knowledge before sense 



138 



SECTION II- 



and sensible* ; which is that that hath printed the stamps 
and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole 
world." (p. 871). - 

In the seventh of Dr Barrow's Sermons on 
the Creed, entitled — The being of God proved 
from the frame of human nature — the bearing 
of the intellectual part of man, upon the argu- 
ment, is discussed at considerable length. The 
views of the subject, entertained by this great 
man, may be collected from two quotations, which 
I shall here give. 

"To think a gross body may be ground and pounded 
into rationality, a slow body may be thumped and driven 
into passion, a rough body may be filed and polished into 
a faculty of discerning and resenting things; that a cluster 
of pretty thin round atoms (as Democritus forsooth conceited), 
that a well-mixed combination of elements (as Empedocles 
fancied), that a harmonious contemperation (or crasis) of 
humours (as Galen, dreaming it seems upon his drugs 
and his potions, would persuade us), that an implement 
made up of I know not what fine springs, and wheels, 
such mechanick knacks (as some of our modern wisards 
have been busy in divining) should without more to do 
become the subject of so rare capacities and endowments, 
the author of actions so worthy and works so wonderful; 
capable of wisdom and virtue, of knowledge so vast and 
desires so lofty; apt to contemplate truth and affect good; 
able to recollect things past and to foresee things future; 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BKAXCH. 139 

to search so deep into the causes of things, and disclose 
so many mysteries of nature; to invent so many arts and 
sciences, to contrive such projects of policy and achieve 
such feats of prowess : briefly, should become capable to 
design, undertake and perform all those admirable effects 
of human wit and industry which we daily see and hear 
of ; how senseless and absurd conceits are these ; how can 
we, without great indignation and regret, entertain such 
suppositions ? " 

" I shall to these only subjoin one farther consideration 
worth attending to; that the wisest and most considerate 
men in several times, only by reflecting upon their own 
minds, and observing in them what was most lovely and 
excellent, most pure and straight, have fallen upon and 
conspired in notions concerning God, very suitable to those 
which we believe taught us by revelation ; although con- 
trary to the prejudices of their education, and to popular 
conceits : many admirable passages to this purpose we 
may find dropped from the mouth of Socrates and the 
pen of Plato; in Cicero, in Epictetus, yea in the least 
credulous or fanciful of men, Aristotle himself. Whence 
plainly enough we may collect how near affinity there is 
between God and us ; how legible characters of the divinity 
are written upon our souls ; how easily we may know God, 
if we be not ignorant of ourselves; that we need not go 
far to fetch aguments to prove that God is, nor to find 
lessons to learn what he is; since we always carry both, 
about us or rather within us; since our souls could indeed 
come from no other than such a Being, whom they so 
resemble and represent."* 

* Works, Vol. n. pp. 104, 108. fol. 1683. 



140 



SECTION II. 



Bishop Stillingfleet discourses at great 
length on the human soul, in proof of the being 
of a God ; as will appear from the intimations 
contained in the following passage : 

" I come now to the third evidence of a deity ; which 
is, That there are some heings in the world, which cannot 
depend upon matter and motion ; i. e., that there are some 
spiritual and immaterial substances or heings; the con- 
sequence of this for the proving a Deity neither hath been, 
nor I suppose will be denied, by those who question an 
Infinite Being ; the same principles leading to the denying 
and the proof of both, and immaterial beings being the 
strongest proof that there is something above matter in 
the world. If there be then such things in the world, 
which matter and motion cannot be the causes of, then 
there are certainly spiritual and immaterial beings, and 
that I shall make appear both as to the minds of men, 
and some extraordinary effects which are produced in the 
world."* 

I next adduce Wollaston, the author of 
The Religion of Nature delineated. This learned 
writer, after maintaining that "the frame and 
constitution of the world, the astonishing mag- 
nificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds 
of beings, the uniformity observed in the pro- 
ductions of things, the uses and ends for which 
they serve, do all show that there is some Almighty 

* Origines Sacrae, B, m. c. 1. s, 17, 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



1-1-1 



Designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the 
top of all these things' 11 — dwells upon this pro- 
position, namely, that " Life, sense, cogitation 
and the faculties of our own minds show the 
existence of some Superior Being from whom 
they are derived." He also enlarges upon the 
distinction between the soul and the body ; prov- 
ing that the thinking faculty cannot arise from 
matter, whatever may be its magnitude, form, tex- 
ture or motion.* 

Lord Brougham has, on several occasions, re- 
ferred to Dr Bentley's famous sermons at Boyle's 
Lecture ; not indeed without a remark upon " the 
vituperation rather than sermon" with which the 
course is opened, but still with manifest respect 
for the talents of "that most learned preacher" Of 
Dr Bentley's sense of the value of the intellectual 
part of man, Ave may form some judgment, when 
he declares that — "if we consider the dignity of 
an Intelligent Being, and put that in the scales 
against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, 
without over-valuing human nature, that the soul 
of one virtuous and religious man is of greater 
worth and excellency than the 'sun and his planets, 

* Religion of Nature, pp. 347—353, 7th ed. 1750. 



142 



SECTION II. 



and all the stars in the world."* His second 
sermon is entitled — Matter and motion cannot 
think : or, a confutation of Atheism, from the 
faculties of the human soul. From this discourse 
I will give two short extracts belonging to the 
same argument: 

" And first, I say, there is an immaterial substance in 
us, which we call Soul, essentially distinct from our bodies. 
I shall lay it down as self-evident, that there is something, 
in our composition, that thinks and apprehends, and reflects 
and deliberates ; that determines and doubts, consents and 
denies ; that wills and demurs and resolves and chooses and 
rejects : that receives various sensations and impressions from 
external objects, and produces voluntary motions of several 

parts of our bodies." " And now that 1 have sufficiently 

shown that sense and perception can never be the product 
of any kind of matter and motion, it remains that it must 
necessarily proceed from some incorporeal substance within 
us. And though we cannot conceive the manner of the 
soul's action and passion, nor what hold it can lay on the 
body when it voluntarily moves it, yet we are certain that it 
doth so as of any mathematical truth whatsoever I dis- 
cern some excellent final causes of such a vital conjunction 
of body and soul ; but the instrumental cause I know not, 
nor what invisible bands and fetters unite them together. 
I resolve all that into the sole pleasure and fiat of our Omni- 
potent Creator; whose existence is so plainly and nearly 
deducible from the established proof of an immaterial soul, 

* Eighth Sermon, near the beginning. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH, 



143 



that no wonder the resolved Atheists do so labour and bestir 
themselves to fetch sense and perception out of the power of 
matter. I will despatch it in three words. For, since we 
have shown that there is an incorporeal substance within 
us, whence did that proceed, and how came it into being ? 
It did not exist from all eternity; that's too absurd to be 
supposed; nor could it come out of nothing into being, 
without an efficient cause. Something therefore must have 
created our souls out of nothing ; and that something (since 
no thing can give more than it has) must itself have all the 
perfections that it hath given to them. There is therefore 
an immaterial and intelligent Being that created our souls ; 
which Being was either eternal itself, or created immediately 
or ultimately by some other Eternal, that has all those per- 
fections. There is therefore originally an Eternal, Imma- 
terial, Intelligent Creator ; all which together are the attri- 
butes of God alone"* 

Such was Dr Bentley's view of the faculties 
of the human mind, as affording a convincing proof 
of the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. On 
looking over the sermons preached at Boyle's Lec- 
ture, I find the intellectual powers of man ad- 
duced, in evidence of the same fact, by Gastrel, 
Harris, Clarke, Hancock, Woodward, Derham, 
Leng, and Gurdon. 

The third sermon, in Abernethy's Discourses 
concerning the being and natural perfections of 
* Sermons, pp. 51, 68. ed. 1735. 



144 



SECTION II. 



God, is entitled, 6 The being of God proved from 
human intelligence and morality.' Instead of pre- 
senting any of the arguments employed in this 
Discourse — which are somewhat metaphysical, and 
too extended for brief extracts — I transcribe the 
general view which he takes of the subject at the 
beginning of that discourse. 

" I have endeavoured, in the two preceding discourses, 
to prove the being of God from his works ; that is, as the 
question is properly stated between Atheists and us, to 
prove an active intelligence in the formation of the universe. 
Indeed the existence of the very lowest things we see, the 
most contemptible pebble or clod of earth, cannot be ac- 
counted for without the agency of an intelligent and power- 
ful Cause; much less this beautiful system of the world, 
disposed in such exquisite order, and having its parts so 
exactly fitted to each other, as to make up one regular whole. 
But above all, that understanding, which we are conscious 
of in ourselves, even constrains us to acknowledge the 
Supreme Eternal Mind as its Author. For if inanimate 
matter formed into a system discovers his glorious wisdom 
and activity, much more his own living image in our per- 
ceptive and self-determining powers. This last well de- 
serves a more particular consideration, as containing a 
peculiarly illustrious manifestation of the divine wisdom : 
and I hope by a due attention to what passes in our own 
minds, we shall find ourselves obliged to recognize the All- 
ruling intelligence of our Maker, and to adore Him who is 
perfect in knowledge." 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



145 



We find Dr Foster writing of the mental 
faculties in the following strain : 

" We have, as yet, only surveyed the tenement of man, 
and have not, properly speaking, conversed with man him- 
self; nor taken a view of the essential, and more noble, 
principles in his constitution. Let us go on, therefore, to 
search a little into the make of his mind, his powers of 
reason, his moral faculties, his implanted social instincts 
and benevolent propensions ; which are the things that most 
honourably distinguish, and mark out humanity, and render 
it capable of an association with angels, and the life of God. 
In the supreme directing and executive powers of human 
nature — powers by which alone man justly sustains his 
rank, prosecutes his end, and can arrive at due perfection — 
in these, I say, we may reasonably expect to find the plain- 
est delineations and strongest characters of his former, his 
father, after whose image his mind was originally made. 
For, surely, it can never be imagined that the parent of 
being has lavishly expended his greatest care and art upon 
inferior designs and meaner compositions ; and is least 
visible and has left the faintest traces of his divine skill, in 
his most excellent workmanship."'* 

Dr Foster proceeds to consider, at great length, 
the particulars thus laid down. Did my limits 
permit, I should be glad to give some extracts 
from his remarks. I must, however, be content to 
present his view of the relative value of the proofs, 

* Discourses on all the principal branches of Natural Religion 
and Social Virtue. By James Foster, D.D. p. 101. 4to. 174.0. This 
was the " Modest Foster" of Pope. 

K 



146 



SECTION II. 



of the divine power and wisdom, as derived from 
external nature, and from the intellectual frame. 

" Thus have I suggested several instances of most ador- 
able and stupendous wisdom, that are apparent in the works 
of nature; and have endeavoured to fix on such, chiefly, 
as for the facts themselves are unexceptionable, and where 
the evidence lies most obvious to the common apprehension 
of mankind, unimproved by deep science and skill in philo- 
sophy. And as many of these are proofs that strike our 
very senses, which, by the wise appointment of the God of 
nature, are always open to let in some light upon passive 
minds ; and prevent, by this means, the whole human race, 
a very few excepted, from sinking into rude and savage 
ignorance: these, 1 say, being sensible proofs, must be 
better adapted for yielding universal conviction, than more 
abstruse deductions of reason. It is natural for me to 
observe that the same method is taken in the Holy Scrip- 
tures, to impress the minds of men with a stronger idea of 
the supreme wisdom of the Deity ; and that many of the 
most remarkable displays of wisdom in the fab rick of the 
world, which I have particularly mentioned, are therein 
also distinctly taken notice of, and especially by David, in 
the 104th Psalm ; which shows the pious adoration therein 
expressed to be not the enthusiastic flight and transport 
of a poetical genius, but the result of deliberate reflection ; 
and we may likewise collect from hence, in some measure, 
the general corresponding sense of human nature."* 

From the Sermons of Samuel Bourn, an 
eminent Dissenting Minister, I select the following 

* Discourses, p. 109. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



147 



excellent remarks, from many others which might 
be adduced : 

" In the beginning of life the human soul, subsists with 
few ideas, according to its minute capacity. But they 
multiply fast: every thing is then new, and consequently 
an object of wonder; and the inquisitive curiosity is adapted 
to, and gratified with, a continual accession of new objects. 
And when the stock of ideas is sufficiently encreased, the 
comparing and judging faculty begins to operate upon the 
materials which sense hath furnished : — It orders and 
disposes, unites and separates, divides and compounds, 
distinguishes like and unlike, equal and unequal, fit and 
unfit, beautiful and deformed, good and evil. Here reason 
commenceth; and is henceforward continually employed 
in disposing the intellectual furniture of the mind ; arrang- 
ing every thing in due place and order, reviewing its 
internal fund of knowledge, and by new images and new 
reflections still adding to the number, variety, form and 
order of the whole ; rising continually from things more 
simple, clear and easy, to things more complex, obscure 
and difficult; from material to moral and spiritual objects ; 
and finally ascending to the highest and noblest degree 
in the scale of human knowledge ; and from the whole of 
what we previously see and know, learning to know this : 
that an Eternal, All-perfect Being is the cause of all, to 
whom we belong, and from whom we derive all good. — 
Is there no design of Creative Wisdom in this admirable 
and evident process of nature?"* 

* A series of Discourses on the Principles and Evidences of 
Natural Religion and the Christian Revelation. Vol. i. p. 39. 1760„ 
K2 



148 



SECTION II. 



Mr Burke having at one time been led to 
the consideration of some of the intellectual facul- 
ties, recorded in the following language his feeling 
with regard to the marks of their divine origin 
which are impressed upon them : 

" The more accurately we search into the human mind, 
the stronger traces we every where find of His wisdom 
who made it. If a discourse on the use of the parts of 
the hody may he considered as an hymn to the Creator — 
the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, 
cannot be barren of praise to Him, nor unproductive to 
ourselves of that noble and uncommon union of science 
and admiration, which a contemplation of the works of 
infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind ; whilst 
referring to Him whatever we find of right or good or 
fair in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom in 
our own weakness and imperfection, honouring them 
where we can discover them clearly, and adoring their 
profundity where we are lost in our search, we may be 
inquisitive without impertinence, and elevated without 
pride ; we may be admitted, if I may dare to say so, into 
the counsels of the Almighty by a consideration of his 
works." * 

In Dr Crombie's Natural Theology — a modern 
work of great value — this subject, namely, The 
intellectual and moral faculties of man furnish 
evidence ; that he is the production of an Intelligent 

* On the Sublime and Beautiful, Part x. s. 19. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



149 



and Wise Being, occupies more than one hundred 
pages. From the just-cited portion of the work, 
I shall select a single passage, and with it bring 
my series of quotations to a close. 

" We are so habituated to the operation of these three 
powers [sensation, memory and imagination], and so fami- 
liarized to their effects, that they excite no astonishment; 
and yet they present to us a fact, to which in part we 
have already alluded, and which is calculated powerfully 
to excite admiration. It is this. By sensation we perceive 
present objects, and become acquainted with events now 
passing before us; by memory we are enabled to retain 
or recal past perceptions, and the ideas of objects now 
removed both in time and place ; when by imagination we 
can look forward to future events and future ages. Thus 
does man bring the past and the future into combination 
with the present. Though existing only in one spot, and 
living only in the passing moment, he is capable of ranging 
through the varied events of preceding years, and through 
former scenes now far distant, and at the same time of 
expatiating through the ages of futurity and the boundless 
regions of space. He lives in the present, the future and 
the past. There is something, in this capacity, astonishing 
and incomprehensible. It presents a phenomenon which 
strikes us with wonder ; combining contrarieties which seem 
mutually irreconcilable; indicating the ordination of an 
Intelligent Power, whose eye embraces eternal ages and 
immeasurable space." * 

* Crombie's Natural Theology, Vol. n. p. 33. 1829. 



150 



SECTION II. 



For the purpose I have now had in view, I 
might have devoted pages to the names of English 
Writers, who have dwelt upon the mental powers, 
as indications of an Intelligent Creator — or have 
filled volumes with extracts from their works ; but 
I preferred an intermediate plan of proceeding. 
Lord Brougham's strange misapprehensions, and 
consequent misrepresentations of the matter, re- 
quired to be met by something more satisfactory 
than a bare assertion that His Lordship was in 
total error; and, I trust, the passages adduced, 
although few in comparison with the numbers that 
were at hand, will evince his error, beyond all 
possibility of doubt. Whoever, besides, will con- 
sider the charge brought against modern writers — 
which is, that they have neglected " the mind and 
its operations, 11 from the want of a sufficiently firm 
belief of its immateriality — must be sensible how 
completely the importance of the subject will jus- 
tify the circumstantial method, which has been 
adopted, of establishing the exact truth of the case. 
Many ill effects might be produced, by His Lord- 
ship's statement, upon the public at large; and 
thus — to prove that such statement has not the 
slightest foundation in fact — is to do something 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



151 



more than justify the literary character of this 
country in the public estimation. 

In reality — taking the series of English Writers 
who have touched on subjects connected with Na- 
tural Theology — they have much more frequently 
appealed to " the mind and its operations, 11 as 
evidences of a Supreme Intelligence, than might 
previously be expected ; and as will probably soon 
be seen, there are reasons for thinking that the 
argument has been placed by them in that precise 
point of view which renders it the most striking 
to ordinary understandings. 

Lord Brougham not only condemns the neglect 
of psychological proofs by the moderns, but also 
contrasts their conduct with that of the ancients, 
in relation to such proofs. This will be manifest 
from the following extract : 

" In these speculations of the ancient philosophers, we 
cannot find any process of strict inductive reasoning; and, 
accordingly, the facts are not turned to the best account for 
the purposes of the argument. But this defect appears, at 
the least, as much in the physical as in the psychological 
portion of the reasoning. Indeed, the latter comes more 
near to our own philosophy ; and certainly we must admit 
that those old writers upon Natural Theology, in the place 
which they assigned to intellectual phenomena, pursued a 
more sound and consistent method of philosophising, than 



152 



SECTION II. 



the moderns have done when speculating upon the same 
subject/' (p. 227, being part of a note to p. 52.) 

Having produced several instances of modern 
psychological speculation, my plan, of enabling 
the reader to form his own judgment on every 
topic that may be discussed, now leads me to give, 
from Lord Brougham's note just referred to, the 
whole of the specimens there found of psychological 
speculation amongst the ancients. I shall present 
them as they occur in the note — the Greek pas- 
sages translated into English, and the Latin in 
their original language. 

" Nor has the Deity been satisfied with taking care of 
the body alone: he has implanted in man what is a far 
greater work to have made — a most excellent soul: — for 
what other animal possesses a mind that can perceive the 
existence of the Gods by whom all these vast and fair works 
have been formed? What other creature than man wor- 
ships those Gods? What other intelligence is superior to 
mans in providing against hunger and thirst and cold and 
heat ? or in curing diseases, or in exercising strength, or in 
cultivating learning, or in storing up the recollection of 
things heard and seen and learnt."* 

" They [the Gods] have implanted reason in our nature, 
whereby we inquire touching external things ; and, arguing 
and remembering, we learn the uses of each, and hit upon 
many contrivances for attaining good and avoiding evil. 
* Xen.Memor. i. iv. 13. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



153 



Have they not also given us the gift of speech, by which 
we can communicate mutually all we have learnt, and 
thus instruct each other, and make laws, and regulate 
civil polity."* 

"The constitution of the understanding, whereby it 
not only receives impressions through the senses, but also 
deals with the ideas thus received, and combines and com- 
poses something out of them, proceeding from things that 
are near to things that are quite remote, proves the exist 
ence of an Artificer ; since things carrying such marks 
of contrivance could not exist spontaneously and without 
design." f 

"Aliud a terra sumsimus, aliud ab humore, aliud ab 
igne, aliud ab a'ere eo quern spiritu ducimus : illud autem 
quod vincit hsec omnia, rationem dico, et si placet, pluribus 
verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi 
invenimus, unde sustulimus?" J 

" Jam vero animum ipsum, mentemque hominis, ratio- 
nem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non divina cura perfecta 

esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere 

Ex quo scientia intelligitur quam vim habeat, qualis sit, 
qua ne in Deo quidem res est ulla preestantior." § 

" Sic mentem hominis. quamvis earn non videas, ut Deum 
non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex 
memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique 
pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito." || 

Such were the psychological speculations of 

ancient times ; and it is truly gratifying to find 

* Xen. Memor. iv. in. 11. t Epict. Enchir. i. 9. 

t Cicero de Nat. Deor. ii. 6. $ Tbid. ii. 59. 

|| Cic.Tusc. Disp. i, 28. 



154 



SECTION II. 



the most illustrious sages of Greece and Rome 
thus appealing to the faculties of the human mind, 
as proofs of Creative power and wisdom. But 
how was it possible for Lord Brougham to suppose 
that there was nothing parallel to such specula- 
tions, in the writings of the moderns ? The means 
of deciding that point are now in the reader's 
hands; and even a slight comparison, of the ex- 
tracts contained between the 134th and the 149th 
page of the present volume, with those just given, 
will show how much more effectually the same 
argument is urged by the authors there quoted, 
than by the philosophers of antiquity. Lord 
Brougham has taken the trouble (p. 222) to ac- 
count for this supposed modern neglect of an old 
argument. The reasoning, although somewhat 
metaphysical and obscure, is ingenious ; and if there 
had been a fact to account for, might perhaps have 
been considered as sufficient to account for it. 

The manifest adaptations of things to each other 
prove the existence of an Intelligent Agent: — this 
is the principle upon which the Physical branch of 
Natural Theology depends. At least, the gene- 
rality of treatises on the subject, intended to be 
popular, have been constructed on this principle; 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



155 



which also forms the ground-work of the Physical 
department of the science, both in Lord Brougham's 
6 Discourse,' and in the present volume. Now, if 
the reader will once more refer to the various pas- 
sages ancient as well as modern (pp. 134 — 153), con- 
nected with the Psychological branch, he will find 
the excellence of the mental faculties enlarged upon, 
and the important uses, to which they are sub- 
servient, described; — while the various adaptations 
of those faculties to each other are but slightly 
noticed. The conclusion seems to be, that the 
writers on such topics considered the modifications 
of material things, as affording much more striking 
evidences of a Deity, than their existence — and the 
existence and primary uses of the mental faculties, 
as of greater weight, in that respect, than their 
adaptations to each other. Can any satisfactory 
reason be given, for so remarkable a distinction ? 

It may be worth while to consider the point 

In the first place, although plain men may be 
bewildered by subtleties, they will still believe 
that there is nothing of which they can be more 
certain than of the existence, and, in numberless 
instances, the mutual adaptations^ of material 
objects. Whatever difficulties they may feel — and 



156 



SECTION II. 



they do feel great difficulties — with regard to solid 
substances beginning to be, they know that things 
actually existing admit of modifications ; and they 
are certain that such modifications for a deter- 
minate end can have originated only in intellectual 
power. Hence the propriety of avoiding, in pro- 
fessedly popular discourses, all discussions respect- 
ing the first existence of material things; and of 
expatiating upon the wonderful contrivances which 
abound throughout the visible world — as the most 
generally convincing evidences of a Supreme Being. 
In the second place, plain men are conscious of 
intellectual endowments; and although they may, 
as before, be bewildered by subtleties, they feel that 
the mind within them is something essentially 
different from matter — and that their own, as well 
as all other finite intelligence can have been in the 
first instance derived from nothing but that Intelli- 
gent Being, whose existence is attested on every 
side. Such persons, moreover, being enabled to 
apply their mental faculties to many valuable pur- 
poses, and observing the beneficial effects resulting 
from the mental faculties of others, can easily trace 
the intellectual adaptation of human beings to 
their external condition. Hence the propriety 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 



157 



of dwelling, in popular discourses, upon such par- 
ticulars as mark the wisdom with which the 
internal frame of man has been adjusted to his 
temporal state. In the third place, when plain 
men, who are chiefly occupied by material objects, 
have their attention directed to the various powers 
of their own minds — the nice adaptations of those 
powers to each other, as well as the modes in 
which they respectively control or facilitate each 
other's operations — plain men, I say, having no- 
thing sensible here to guide them, are speedily 
lost in the maze. Such persons understand the 
conformity of parts in the structure of the body, 
because there is something submitted to the sight 
and the touch ; but having little inclination for 
abstract inquiries and having devoted scarcely any 
time to them, they listen to a discourse on the 
conformity of the parts of the mental system, as 
to a disquisition on words without ideas. They 
have some conception of the manner in which the 
different members of the corporeal frame, while 
to each is assigned its appropriate action, are com- 
bined so as to constitute one body ; but they per- 
ceive not in what way the various mental faculties, 
each with its peculiar office, are formed into one 



158 



SECTION II. 



mind. Hence, I apprehend, the little notice which 
has been taken, in popular treatises on Natural 
Theology, of the adaptation of the intellectual 
powers to each other. 

The reader will not infer, from the foregoing 
paragraph, that Lord Brougham is at all to be 
blamed for having employed a few pages in 
describing some of the adjustments which may 
be discovered amongst the faculties of the human 
mind. His Lordship was writing, not solely per- 
haps, but principally, for persons versed in philo- 
sophical speculation ; and therefore was warranted 
in discussing psychological topics in the manner 
he has adopted. Although my own views, with 
regard to philosophical readers, are by no means 
so exalted as those of the Noble Author, I have 
followed the path which he has traced out; and 
it will be satisfactory to know that the reasoning 
from intellectual adaptations, as given in these 
pages (pp. 69 — 86) is thought to strengthen 
the cause of religion. My intention, however, 
has all along been to state, as I have now done, 
what I conceive to be the most striking arguments 
for the Divine power and wisdom, which can 
be drawn from psychological sources. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 159 

To review the main objects of the present 
section : The first purpose was to show that, in 
whatever light we consider the mental faculties — 
whether as simply existing; or as by their force 
and variety producing eminently great and bene- 
ficial effects ; or as admirably adjusted to each 
other — we can neither fail to acknowledge the vast 
addition of strength they afford to the arguments, 
drawn from external things, for the being of God 
and his attributes of power and wisdom and good- 
ness — nor to be struck with the complete accord- 
ance of the testimony, borne by the Intellectual 
and Material worlds, to the same momentous truths, 
Moreover, to supply an omission on the part of 
Lord Brougham, a few observations have been 
made, on the capacity, possessed by the human 
race, of distinguishing between right and wrong — 
and on the judicial character with which Conscience 
has been invested in the frame of man — -as attesting 
the moral attributes of the Deity. Lastly, con- 
siderable pains have been taken to vindicate not 
only Ray, Derham, Clarke and Paley — but also 
modern writers in general — from Lord Brougham's 
reproach of having entirely neglected the evidences 
of the Divine Nature presented by " the mind and 



160 



SECTION II. 



its operations. " . . . That, in discussing the state- 
ments of this part of the 4 Discourse,"' the Noble 
Author's meaning has always been fully appre- 
hended, I can scarcely hope ; but I have no scruple 
in declaring that it has never been intentionally 
misrepresented. 

Towards the close of the section, Lord 
Brougham has introduced two or three pages of 
remarks, well deserving attention, on the Instincts 
of animals — as in some degree belonging to that 
portion of the inquiry. The same subject has been 
illustrated by the genius of Paley ; whose reason- 
ings upon it have received the highest commend- 
ation from Mr Dugald Stewart.* The subject, 
indeed, is extremely interesting; and there are 
few phenomena in which we find brighter mani- 
festations of the Supreme power and wisdom 
and goodness, than in the instincts of animated 
nature. 

* Dissertation on Metaphysical, &c. Philosophy, Part n. p. 202. 



161 



SECTION III. 

ETHICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

(Discourse, Section V. pp. 98 — 137). 

The Psychological and Ethical branches of 
Natural Theology are closely connected with each 
other. They are connected in various ways — 
in particular, by means of this principle, common 
to them both ; namely, that the mind is some- 
thing which exists, and yet is not material. In 
the last section, the mind, its manifold faculties, 
and their respective uses and relations, were ad- 
duced, as evidences for the being of a God — 
his power, his wisdom and his goodness. In the 
present section, the mind and its operations will 
be appealed to, as affording intimations of a fu- 
ture life ; and thus we shall have in some measure 
disclosed to us the moral bearing of the whole 
subject. 

According to Lord Brougham's statement in 
the portion of his ' Discourse" now to be treated 

L 



162 



SECTION III. 



of, the Ethical branch of Natural Theology com- 
prises "the probable designs of the Deity, with 
respect to the future destiny of his creatures :" — 
and the means of investigating those designs are 
derived, 1. " from the nature of the human mind," 
and 2. " from the attributes of the Creator." 
Each of these points, therefore, will require a 
distinct notice. In this, as well as in the Psy- 
chological branch, His Lordship has taken much 
more than a cursory glance at the objects pre- 
sented to his consideration; his purpose having 
been to discuss the matter somewhat at large, 
with the design of supplying an alleged defect 
in professed works on Natural Theology. Lord 
Brougham, indeed, informs us that the doctrines 
of the Ethical department " have been much less 
cultivated, by scientific inquirers," than those even 
of the Psychological department*. In the fore- 
going section, I explained the Noble Author^ 
views of the Psychological branch of the science; 
and also examined his statement — that argu- 
ments drawn from the nature of the human mind 
had hardly ever before found a place in the spe- 
culations of the Natural Theologian. Several of 

* Discourse, p. 99. 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



168 



the passages from works on Natural Theology, 
there laid before the reader, are so related to 
the subjects to which the present section is ap- 
propriated, that very serious misgivings must 
already be felt, as to Lord Brougham's repre- 
sentations of the neglect, by preceding writers, 
of the topics now to be dwelt upon. It is, un- 
doubtedly, not a little singular that His Lordship 
should have put forth such a representation; for 
on adverting to the subject of a future existence, 
as indicated by the nature of the human mind, 
and the Divine attributes — we find that scarcely 
any other portion of Natural Theology has been 
more fully discussed, by writers of reputation and 
ability. But leaving the generalities which are 
almost inseparable from introductory observations, 
I proceed to the first of the two divisions, which 
have been marked out, for the more distinct sur- 
vey of the Ethical department. 

1. Psychological argument, or evidence of 
the Deity's designs drawn prom the na- 
ture OF THE MIND. 

Under this head, Lord Brougham, in the first 
place, resorts to experience, as deciding that no- 

L2 



164 



SECTION III. 



thing but what is material can arise from either 
the combination, or the modification, of matter. 
An acid and an alkali, when mixed, produce a 
third body, and nothing more. A block of marble, 
although chiselled into the form of the Apollo, is 
matter still. That mind, therefore, should ori- 
ginate in any combination, or modification, of 
matter, is contrary to experience. But His Lord- 
ship shall state the argument in his own language : 

" We may first of all observe that if a particular com- 
bination of matter gives birth to what we call mind, this 
is an operation altogether peculiar and unexampled. We 
have no other instance of it; we know of no case in 
which the combination of certain elements produces some- 
thing quite different, not only from each of the simple 
ingredients, but also different from the whole compound. 
We can, by mixing an acid and an alkali, form a third 
body, having the qualities of neither, and possessing qua- 
lities of its own different from the properties of each; 
but here the third body consists of the other two in com- 
bination. There are not two things — two different exist- 
ences the neutral salt composed of the acid and the 

alkali, and another thing different from the neutral salt, 
and engendered for the first time by that salt coming into 
existence. So when, by chiselling, 'the marble softened 
into life grows warm,' we have the marble new moulded, 
and endowed with the power of agreeably affecting our 
senses, our memory and our fancy ; but it is all the while 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



165 



the marble : there is the beautiful and expressive marble 
instead of the amorphous mass, and we have not, besides 
the marble, a new existence created by the form which 
has been given to that stone. But the materialists have 
to maintain that, by matter being arranged in a particular 
way, there is produced both the organized body, and some- 
thing different from it, and having not one of its proper- 
ties — neither dimensions, nor weight, nor colour, nor 

form If, therefore, their theory is true, it must be 

admitted to rest upon nothing which experience has ever 
taught us : it supposes operations to be performed, and 
relations to exist, of which we see nothing that bears the 
least resemblance in any thing we know." (pp. 102 — 104.) 

The extracts already given from Dr Barrow 
(p. 138.) and Dr Bentley (p. 142.) show that, in 
their estimation, the modifications of matter are 
quite insufficient to account for the powers of the 
human mind. I quote the following passage from 
Dr Clarke, because the manner of thinking bears 
considerable resemblance to that employed by 
Lord Brougham : 

" It will easily appear that perception or intelligence 
is really a distinct quality or perfection, and not a mere 
effect or composition of unintelligent figure and motion : 
and that, for this plain reason — because intelligence is 
not figure, and consciousness is not motion. For what- 
ever can arise from, or be compounded of any things, is 
still only those very things, of which it was compounded, 



166 



SECTION III. 



And if infinite compositions or divisions be made eternally, 
the things will still be eternally the same; and all their 
possible effects can never be anything but repetitions of 
the same*." 

To persevere in quotations of this kind, for 
the purpose of proving how unadvisedly Lord 
Brougham has censured preceding writers, for neg- 
lect of such doctrines, would assuredly be super- 
fluous. The materialism of Hobbes in the seven- 
teenth century — and that of Collins and Priestley 
in the eighteenth — excited and kept up attention 
to the inquiry; and the names, in succession, of 
Archbishop Bramhall and Richard Baxter — Dr 
Clarke and Andrew Baxter — Dr Price, Mr Bry- 
ant, Dr Reid and Dr Beattie — not to mention 
many others of equal celebrity — show that the 
doctrine of the soul's immateriality has not been 
in want of defenders. But by whomsoever this 
doctrine may have been previously maintained, we 
cannot but rejoice that it has found a vindicator 
in Lord Brougham. 

His Lordship's second argument, in support of 
the same opinion, is derived from the consciousness 
of possessing the power of thought, and from 

* Clarke on the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. viii. See 
also his Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Prop. iv. 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



167 



reflection upon the operations of our own minds. 
Although the subject — as treated by the Noble 
Author — has been glanced at (pp. 87 — 89.), it 
may be worth considering once more. External 
phenomena, as ascertained by means of our senses, 
assure us of the existence of something external 
to us, without which there would be no such 
phenomena; and certain internal acts of thinking, 
willing, &c, made known to us by our own con- 
sciousness, assure us of the existence of something 
within us, that performs those acts. Moreover, 
the external phenomena and the internal acts are 
so completely dissimilar, that we cannot suppose 
them to have the same origin. We are impressed 
with the conviction that they arise from causes 
essentially distinct from each other. And thus, 
external phenomena being attributed to something 
material, or body — the internal acts of thinking, 
&c. are attributed to something immaterial, or 
mind. Higher than this it is impossible to as- 
cend, in our attempts to trace the sources of our 
knowledge. Our senses and our consciousness are 
the primary means of intelligence : our reason 
enables us to judge of the notices they present : 
and if at last we doubt the truth of the inform- 



168 



SECTION ill. 



ation thus afforded, there remains for us nothing 
but hopeless scepticism. Such is the ground wisely 
taken by the disciples of Dr Reid ; amongst whom, 
in the main, is to be numbered the highly-gifted 
Author of the 6 Discourse of Natural Theology." 
It is indeed to be lamented that, from a wish 
to strengthen what he deems his principal po- 
sition, he should appear to weaken a station of 
scarcely less importance. To insinuate a doubt, 
as His Lordship does, respecting the evidence of 
the senses, by no means tends to inspire confi- 
dence in the evidence of consciousness. He who 
is taught to doubt the truth of testimony upon 
which he has been accustomed to rely — will have 
some hesitation in relying upon any other, Lord 
Brougham's previous reasoning on this subject — 
concerning which I ventured to express my opi- 
nion (p. 88.) in the foregoing section — is enforced 
on the present occasion with great zeal. The 
notices from without and the intimations from 
within are made the subjects of the following 
comparison — the import of which is diffused 
through a pretty long paragraph : 

" We believe that matter exists, because it makes a 
certain impression upon our senses., that is because it pro- 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



duces a certain change or a certain effect : and we argue, 
and argue justly, that this effect must have a cause, though 
the proof is by no means so clear that the cause is some- 
thing external to ourselves. But we know the existence 
of mind by our consciousness or reflection on what passes 
within us : and our own existence as sentient and think- 
ing beings implies the existence of the mind which has 
sense and thought. To know, therefore, that we are, and 
that we think, implies a knowledge of the soul's exist- 
ence. But this knowledge is altogether independent of 
matter, and the subject of it bears no resemblance what- 
ever to matter, in any one of qualities, or habits, or modes 
of action. Nay, we only know the existence of matter 
through the operations of the mind ; and were we to doubt 
of the existence of either, it would be far more reason- 
able to doubt that matter exists than that mind exists." 
(p. 105.) 

No one will doubt Mr Dugald Stewart's 
anxiety that the principles of mental philosophy 
should appear in all their strength. Some obser- 
vations of that excellent author, on the subject 
of the preceding paragraph, have already been 
offered (p. 88.) ; and I now present a short sen- 
tence from his pen, in relation to the same 
matter. " The belief," he writes, " with which 
Consciousness is attended has been considered as 
the most irresistible of any; insomuch that this 
species of evidence has never been questioned : 



170 



SECTION III. 



and yet it rests on the same foundation with 
every other kind of belief to which we are de- 
termined by the constitution of our nature.*' 1 * 
By anything like exaggeration, we are put upon 
our guard, as by the representations of an advo- 
cate ; but to a statement, like that of Mr Stewart, 
we listen, as to the decision of a judge. 

From the last, however, as well as from the 
former arguments of Lord Brougham, we wil- 
lingly admit the correctness of his inference, that 
the intellectual principle is immaterial; and the 
next consequence (p. 107-) is, that, although the 
body may be resolved into its elements, the mind 
cannot be so resolved — having no parts — being 
absolutely one and simple. This consequence is 

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 18. Let me here adduce 
the remarkable, and apparently well-weighed, words of Locke : 
;< Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances; 
and Reflection, that there are thinking ones : experience assures us 
of the existence of such beings: and that the one hath a power to 
move body by impulse, the other by thought : this we cannot doubt 

of But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, 

our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire farther into their 
nature, causes and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension 
clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any far- 
ther, one is as easy as the other : and there is no more difficulty to 
conceive how a substance we know not should, by thought, set body 
into motion, than how a substance ue know not should, by impulse, 
set body into motion." Essay on Understanding. B. n. c. xxiii. 
s. 28. 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



171 



enlarged upon from page 108 to page 111; in a 
manner which, however well intended, really in- 
volves the subject in uncertainty. Whether His 
Lordship employed so much disquisition, from 
an impression that the argument had been neg- 
lected by preceding writers, I know not; but, in 
truth, the argument is common to nearly all who 
have touched upon the natural evidences of a 
future state. It will be sufficient to give the 
observations of Dr Clarke, on the subject : 

" Since the powers and faculties of the soul are the 
most remote and distant from all the known properties of 
matter that can be imagined, it is at least a putting great 
violence upon our reason to imagine them superadded by 

Omnipotence to one and the same substance It is 

highly unreasonable and absurd to suppose the soul made 
up of innumerable consciousnesses, as matter is necessa- 
rily made up of innumerable parts ; and on the contrary, 
it is highly reasonable to believe the seat of thought to be 
a simple substance, such as cannot naturally be divided 
and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is subject to 

be Consequently the Soul will not be liable to be 

dissolved at the dissolution of the body ; and therefore 
it will naturally be immortal. All this seems to follow, 
at least with the highest degree of probability, from the 
single consideration of the Soul's being endued with sense, 
thought or consciousness."* 

* Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Prop. iv. 



172 



SECTION III. 



For the purpose of illustrating the possibility 
of the existence and activity of the mind inde- 
pendently of matter, Lord Brougham has recourse 
in the next place to some experiments upon the 
corporeal frame, during sleep — when " the bodily 
functions," those at least which depend upon vo- 
lition, are suspended. The experiments in ques- 
tion are effected by means of such external 
applications to the senses as can be ventured 
upon " without awakening the sleeper.". . . " The 
consequence," His Lordship observes, " of the ces- 
sation which takes place of all communication of 
ideas through the senses, is that the action of 
the mind, and above all, of those powers con- 
nected with the imagination, becomes much more 
vigorous and uninterrupted. This is shown in 
two ways — first, by the celerity with which any 
impression upon the senses, strong enough to be 
felt without awaking, is caught up and made 
the groundwork of a new train of ideas, the 
mind instantly accommodating itself to the sug- 
gestions of the impression, and making all its 
thoughts chime in with that; and secondly, by 
the prodigiously long succession of images that 
pass through the mind, with perfect distinctness 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



173 



and liveliness, in an instant of time. 11 Now, 
without even knowing the nature of the expe- 
riments to be tried, is there not something like 
a contradiction between the expressions which I 
have given in Italics ? In other words, if there 
is " any impression upon the senses which is 
caught up," how can there be " a cessation of 
all communication of ideas through the senses ?" 
But to proceed to the experiments themselves : 
" Every one knows the effect of a bottle of hot water 
applied during sleep to the soles of the feet : you in- 
stantly dream of walking over hot mould, or ashes, or a 
stream of lava, or having your feet burnt by coming too 
near the fire. But the effect of falling asleep in a stream 
of cold air, as in an open carriage varies this experiment 
in a very interesting, and, indeed, instructive manner. You 
will, instantly that the wind begins to blow, dream of be- 
ing upon some exposed point, and anxious for shelter, but 
unable to reach it ; then you are on the deck of a ship, 
suffering from the gale — you run behind a sail for shelter, 
and the wind changes, so that it still blows upon you — 
you are driven to the cabin, but the ladder is removed, 
or the door locked. Presently you are on shore, in a 
house with all the windows open, and endeavour to shut 
them in vain ; or seeing a smith's forge, you are attracted 
by the fire, and suddenly a hundred bellows play upon 
it, and extinguish it in an instant, but fill the whole 
smithy with their blast, till you are as cold as on the 
road:' (pp. 112, 113.) 



174 



SECTION III. 



Mr Dugald Stewart mentions some external 
applications of the same kind — not as experiments, 
but as remedies ; and infers, from their effects, 
that " our dreams are frequently suggested to us 

by bodily sensations." 44 1 have," he observes, 

44 been told by a friend, that having occasion, in 
consequence of indisposition, to apply a bottle of 
hot water to his feet when he went to bed, he 
dreamed that he was making a journey to the 
top of Mount Mtna, and that he found the heat 
of the ground almost insupportable. Another per- 
son, having a blister applied to his head, dreamed 
that he was scalped by a party of Indians." Such 
I take to be the origin of Lord Brougham's ex- 
periments. The bodily frame is out of order; 
and a blister is applied to the head, or a bottle 
of hot water to the feet. Whatever the effect 
may be, who shall decide how much is to be 
attributed to disorder, and how much to the 
bottle or the blister? When Mr Stewart adds — 
44 1 believe every one, who is in the habit of 
dreaming, will recollect instances, in his own case, 
of a similar nature" — we see the limitation in- 
troduced, namely, 44 one who is in the habit of 
dreaming;" and ought to consider the limitation 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



175 



implied, namely, one who is suffering from bodily 
indisposition. From such premises there is no 
warrant to draw general conclusions.* 

Supposing however, for the sake of argument, 
Lord Brougham's representations to be correct, 
their real tendency is only to show to what a 
perturbed state of existence, to what a perverted 
activity, some of the mental faculties are con- 
signed, during sleep. Such representations prove 
the excitability and wildness of the Imagination, 
under the circumstances there detailed ; and the 
importance of its being under the direction of 
the reasoning powers. Something indeed, of the 
kind above described, may have happened to an 
individual, once in his life-time, even when per- 
fectly well — or, from peculiar temperament, may 
have happened to him more than once; but how 
great is the number of persons to whom nothing 
of the kind ever has happened, or ever will hap- 
pen ! In making experiments upon things ma- 
terial — after many trials producing an invariable 
result, we may safely rely upon the information 
derived from a process of induction so decisive; 
while the cases here dwelt upon serve but to con- 

* Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. r. p. 336. 



176 



SECTION III. 



vince us of our inability to subject the mind to 
direct experiment, and thus teach us the propriety 
of not drawing our conclusions, in mental philo- 
sophy, from such methods of investigation. This, 
at least, is the only opinion which a full consi- 
deration of the subject has enabled me to form. 
If I am in error, my mistake can do no harm — 
inasmuch as the reader has the means placed 
before him, of judging for himself. 

For reasons similar to those just stated, [ am 
unable to perceive how any doctrine, respecting 
the human mind, can be satisfactorily established 
on some other experiments subsequently men- 
tioned by Lord Brougham. If we take the case 
of the man " who being extremely overpowered 
with drowsiness — as after sitting up all night, 
and sleeping none the next day — lies down, and 
begins to dictate -the first thing that strikes 
us is the strange condition and employment of 
the person, the operations of whose mind we 
are about to observe. " He will." as His Lord- 
ship truly predicates, " find himself falling asleep 
after uttering a few words." The next part of 
the business is not so self-evident. " He will be 
awakened by the person who writes repeating 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



177 



the last word, to show he has written the whole ; 
not above five or six seconds may elapse, and 
the sleeper will find it at first quite impossible 
to believe that he has not been asleep for hours, 
and will chide the amanuensis for having fallen 
asleep over his work — so great apparently will 
be the length of the dream he has dreamt, ex- 
tending through half a lifetime." (p. 114.) And 
this intercourse between the dozing dogmatist 
and the unhappy scribe is supposed to continue 
for some time. To estimate the matter arith- 
metically, His Lordship supposes the amanuensis 
to write two words in a second, and four words to 
be dictated at once. There are, then, two seconds 
between each act of dictation; and if half that 
interval be consumed in falling asleep, the dream, 
which " seems to last for years," is in reality but 
for one second. With such rapidity do the images 

of things pass through the human mind ! 

Now, in the first place, the circumstances here 
detailed, if intended to furnish general conclu- 
sions, ought to be general in their occurrence; 
whereas there are very few, I suspect, by whose 
experience they have ever been confirmed. In 
the second place, the mere wanderings of the 

M 



178 



SECTION 1,1 j. 



imagination, during so feverish a state of the 
body, can afford no criterion of the healthy and 
unobstructed operations of the intellectual powers. 

In fine, I would compress my opinion of all 

these, and all similar experiments, into one ques- 
tion — How is it possible — by means of such me- 
chanical kinds of operations of the senses — to 
ascertain any thing, respecting the nature and 
properties of the mind, when the whole system 
of the bodily functions shall be no more? 

In addition to such experiments and reason- 
ings, the Noble Author has given several in- 
stances of remarkable dreams, occasioned by cor- 
poreal pain or excitement of mind ; the inferences 
from which are all liable to the various objec- 
tions just adduced. If, however, the reader is 
curious about the subject, he will refer to the 
4 Discourse, 1 (pp. 115— 118.) and determine what 
weight is really due to the statements there pre- 
sented. 

On leaving the topics above mentioned, Lord 
Brougham occupies much the same ground with 
that previously taken by Bishop Butler, in the 
first chapter of his Analogy — On a future state. 
Did the limits, which I have assigned to myself, 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



179 



allow me, I should gladly discuss this part of 
the argument; but having dwelt so long on the 
preceding subjects, I will only recommend that His 
Lordship's observations (pp. 118 — 126.) should be 
perused in connection with the disquisitions of 
that great prelate. 

Before I pass on, to the second head, it 
occurs to me to mention an argument, for the 
immateriality of the soul, which Lord Brougham 
might, perhaps not improperly, have introduced 
into this part of his 6 Discourse. 1 The argument 
derives its force from the inertness — the inability 
to move of itself — which is proved by all observa- 
tion and experiment to be a property of matter — 
contrasted with the power of originating motion 
indisputably possessed by the human mind. This 
distinction between mind and matter deserves the 
most attentive consideration. Bishop Butler has 
availed himself of it, in the chapter just referred 
to; and Mr Andrew Baxter has enlarged upon 
it, with great effect, in his Inquiry into the na- 
ture of the Human Soul."*. 

"A power of beginning motion," says Mr 

* The first edition of the work was published without date, the 
second in 1737. 

M 2 



180 



SECTION III. 



Dugald Stewart, "is an attribute of mind, no 
less than sensation and thought ; and wherever 
motion commences, we have evidence that mind 
has operated."* 

ii. moral argument, or evidence of the 
Deity's designs, drawn from his attri- 
butes in connection with the condition 
of the species. 

The study of the works of creation, as daily 
exhibited to our view, has ever been deemed, by 
thinking men, one of the most certain means of 
acquiring valuable knowledge; and of the world 
within us it may with truth be said, that its 
wonders, if duly contemplated, cannot fail to af- 
ford increase of wisdom. The soul of man, in 
its very nature, bears tokens of a divine origin, 
as well as a destination to eternal life; and al- 
though, while carefully examining the texture (so 
to speak) of the human mind, we sometimes find 
it en wrought with mysterious characters — those 
very characters impress us strongly with the idea 
of their having been inscribed by the finger of 
God. But amidst much that is obscure in the 

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 165. 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



181 



intellectual frame, we there discover unquestion- 
able intimations of a future state of existence ; 
and the time is now come to inquire how far 
those intimations are confirmed by the informa- 
tion, which we have been able to obtain, re- 
specting the attributes of the Deity .... There is, 
indeed, a certain temper and disposition, which 
is peculiarly suited to investigations of this na- 
ture; and on no occasion could Lord Brougham 
have more properly enforced the necessity of a 
" humble and submissive spirit," than that on 
which he has done so — namely, when he was 
about to consider the attributes and designs of the 
Deity, as affecting the destiny of the human race. 

The first argument employed by Lord Brough- 
am, in proof of a future state of existence, is 
drawn from the goodness of God, conjointly with 
the desire of immortality common to all men. 
The benevolence of the Deity is manifested by 
His providential arrangements for the temporal 
well-being of our species. Not only does the mind 
appear by its very nature destined for immor- 
tality — but even the certain knowledge of the 
inevitable dissolution of the body cannot abate 
the expectation of endless life. If, then, that 



182 



SECTI.ON III. 



life be a reality, how clearly do we see the com- 
plete accordance between the goodness of God, 
and the hopes of future existence which he has 
implanted in the mind. In short, suppose that we 
are intended for endless life — and the intimations 
of it which have been afforded, and the longings 
after it which form part of ourselves, correspond 
exactly with other manifestations of the Creator's 
superintending care: — suppose the contrary- — and 
we involve that portion of the Divine dispensa- 
tions, which is of the deepest moment to the 
whole human race, in perplexity not to be dis- 
entangled. Under such circumstances, our un- 
derstandings will not permit us to hesitate about 

drawing our conclusions The Noble Author has 

treated the subject in other and better language — 
which I recommend to the reader's attention. 

In connexion with the longing after immor- 
tality, may be mentioned the improvement of 
which the mental powers are susceptible, as life 
advances — their more extended range through the 
material and intellectual worlds — their growing 
anticipations of higher and better modes of ex- 
istence than experience has afforded, or even ima- 
gination suggested. This capacity of the mind, 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



183 



for greater attainments, in whatever constitutes 
the excellence of our rational nature, seems to 
assure us, in the most agreeable and convincing 
manner, that the present state of existence is 
but introductory to another — in which our facul- 
ties will be directed to objects still more brightly 
reflecting the Divine Perfections. 

Lord Brougham next adverts to the affections 
of our nature, as combining, with our sense of 
the Divine goodness, to assure us of a future 
existence. No doubt, the importance of those 
affections, during the present life, is abundantly 
manifest; and did they cease with the apparent 
termination of the relations which called them 
forth, no farther account of them could be re- 
quired. But when we consider them as, in num- 
berless instances, continuing unimpaired by the 
separation caused by death — the fact seems to 
afford grounds of hope that the separation will 
be but temporary; and that, in another state, 
our best sympathies will still exist, and under 
happier auspices. Lord Brougham has touched 
the subject with great feeling ; and when his 
reflections on this occasion are compared with 
a remarkable passage at the close of his Dedica- 



184 



SECTION III. 



tion to Earl Spencer, we have convincing evi- 
dence of that kindliness of disposition which is 
attributed to the Noble Author, by those to 
whom he is intimately known. In truth, I can 
easily imagine him to have frequently derived far 
greater satisfaction from the recurrence of such 
sentiments, than he has ever derived from the 
recollection of all the triumphs of his eloquence, 
and all the various achievements of his extra- 
ordinary powers There may occasionally be 

discovered in the following extract — as in much 
of His Lordship's writing — an attempt to add 
strength to the argument by giving force to the 
expression — an attempt which scarcely ever suc- 
ceeds, by whomsoever it may be made : — in 
other respects, the extract will be read with 
pleasure by every one. 

" The tender affections so strongly and so universally 
operating in our nature afford another argument of a 
like kind. No doubt the purpose to which they are sub- 
servient in this life is much more distinctly perceivable ; 
yet still it is inconsistent with the provisions of a bene- 
volent Power to suppose that we should be made sus- 
ceptible of such vehement feelings, and be suffered to 
indulge in them, so as to make our happiness chiefly 
consist in their gratification, and that then we should 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



185 



suddenly be made to undergo the bitter pangs of sepa- 
ration, while, by our surviving, those pains are lengthened 
out without any useful effect resulting from our suffer- 
ings. That such separations should be eternal appears 
irreconcilable with the strength of the affections wounded, 
and with the goodness so generally perceived in the order 
of the universe. The supposition of a re-union hereafter 
overcomes the difficulty, and reconciles the apparent in- 
consistency. " (p. 129.) 

Amongst the most remarkable indications of 
a future life, Lord Brougham justly numbers 
those feelings of our nature which attest their 
existence, by religious observances of one kind 
or other, in whatever region of the earth human 
beings are to be found. Every age has witnessed 
the universal prevalence of such observances; 
which, originating in apprehensions, inseparable 
from the mind itself, of an unseen world, will 
unquestionably continue, through all succeeding 
ages, to indicate the hopes and fears which will 
still agitate the human breast. Now, it is not 
easy to believe that such apprehensions can be 
permitted so to occupy the mind, unless they 
are intended to forewarn men of that state of 
existence which assuredly shall be hereafter. 
Those apprehensions, indeed, are of the utmost 



186 



SECTION III. 



importance during the present life — as encourage- 
ments to good, and restraints from evil. If, on 
this account, an objector should allege that the 
apprehensions are of the same importance, even 
supposing there is no future state corresponding 
to them — nothing, it may be replied, can be 
imagined more directly opposed to all that we 
have observed of the Divine proceedings, than 
the notion that, in a matter of such consequence, 
the conduct of rational creatures is providentially 
influenced by hopes which must inevitably be 
disappointed, and fears of that which shall never 
come to pass. In this case therefore, as in the 
instances before adduced, the supposition, that 
the present life comprises the whole of our ex- 
istence, involves our earthly condition in utter 
perplexity — while the assurance of another life 
accounts for some of the most striking properties 
of our mental constitution, and eminently displays 
the wisdom of the appointments of the Deity 
with regard to us. 

But the great argument of all, in proof of 
a future existence — I am sorry to record the 
fact — is despatched by Lord Brougham in the 
following paragraph : 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



187 



" The unequal distribution of rewards and punish- 
ments in this world, that is, the misery in which virtue 
often exists, and the prosperity not seldom attendant upon 
vice, can in no way be so well accounted for, consistently 
with the scheme of a benevolent Providence, as by the 
supposition of a future state." (p. 130.) 

When we contrast the strong language em- 
ployed by Lord Brougham, in enforcing other 
arguments for a future state, with the slight and 
almost hesitating manner in which the argument, 
from the unequal distribution of rewards and pu- 
nishments in this worlds is noticed — we can 
scarcely avoid feeling some uneasiness of mind; 
and our uneasiness gains strength, when we re- 
collect the previous omission (pointed out p. 84.) 
of all reference to the moral constitution of man, 
as leading the thoughts to a Moral Governor 
of the world. That a state of final retribu- 
tion is " consistent with the scheme of a bene- 
volent Providence " there can be no doubt— -and 
it is clear that the act of retribution implies the 
Divine attribute of justice; but why is the moral 
character of the Deity thus veiled from the sight ? 
Had the power of conscience been duly insisted 
upon, in the Psychological branch of the science, 
with a view of indicating the Moral Attributes 



188 



SECTION III. 



of God — here would have been the place to 
point out its operation in other respects. The 
judicial authority which conscience bears — the 
right of acquittal and condemnation which it is 
commissioned to exercise — the premonitions which 
it fails not to afford, that its decisions will be 
ratified hereafter — might on this occasion have 
been introduced with great advantage. To that 
topic would naturally have succeeded the various 
intimations that men are, during the present life, 
in a state of probation ; so that on their con- 
duct while on this earth will depend their future 
welfare. And finally, His Lordship might have 
availed himself of the considerations which, not- 
withstanding the moral disorders abounding in 
the world, lead us to infer that God is no in- 
different spectator of virtue and of vice ; that 
the marks of his righteous dispensations are even 
now perceptible ; and that such inferences, com- 
bined with the evidences of the Divine attri- 
butes derived from other sources, fully warrant 
our belief in an ultimate adjudication of every 
one's lot, in strict accordance with his real cha- 
racter Discussions like these would have well 

become the Ethical department of Natural Theo- 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 18.9 

logy ; and the omission of them cannot fail to 
excite the most serious regret. 

Lord Brougham closes his review of the 
Ethical department of Natural Theology, by 
comparing the weights of the arguments respect- 
ively resulting from the first and the second 
divisions of this branch of the subject. " The 
most satisfactory proofs," he observes, " of the 
soul's immortality are those of the first, or psy- 
chological class, derived from studying the nature 
of mind; those of the second class which we 
have been surveying, derived from the condition 
of man in connexion with the attributes of the 
Deity, are less distinct and cogent."" If His 
Lordship intends to maintain, as I conclude he 
does, that the entire evidence with regard to a 
future state, afforded by the nature of the human 
mind, is more " distinct and cogent" than the 
evidence afforded by the condition of man in 
connexion with the attributes of the Deity — 
I cannot but think that he has formed a very 
erroneous estimate of the matter. Suppose the 
mind to be by its very nature secure of exist- 
ence after the bodily frame shall have been re- 
solved into its component particles — who can 



190 



SECTION III. 



tell, from that consideration alone, whether the 
mind's future being may not consist in mere con- 
sciousness — or in restless activity — without hap- 
piness and without hope ? The truth is, that, 
after reflection on the immaterial nature of the 
human mind has given probability to the opinion 
that it will survive the body, we must have re- 
course to all the other intimations of a future 
state which we can discover — all the aspirations, 
the capabilities, the sympathies, the moral and 
religious apprehensions of our intellectual nature — 
all the indications that we are now in a state of 
trial — all the manifestations of the power and 
wisdom and goodness and justice of God — be- 
fore we can indulge in any thing like rational 
hopes of reward for those who take heed to that 
which is right. Mr Dugald Stewart appears to 
have somewhat understated the value of the ar- 
gument derived from " the nature of mind 
but his view of its bearing upon the whole ques- 
tion is assuredly more correct than that of Lord 
Brougham. "In collecting,'" says Mr Stewart, 
"the various evidences which the light of nature 
affords for a future state, too much stress has 
commonly been laid upon the souFs Immateriality. 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



191 



The proper use of that doctrine is not to de- 
monstrate that the soul is physically and neces- 
sarily immortal ; but to refute the objections 
which have been urged against the possibility of 
its existing in a separate state from the body. 
Although our knowledge of the nature of Mind 
may not be sufficient to afford us any positive 
argument on the subject ; yet, if it can be shown 
that the dissolution of the body does not neces- 
sarily infer the extinction of the soul; and still 
more, if it can be shown that the presumption 
is in favour of the contrary supposition; the 
moral proofs of a future retribution will meet 
with a more easy reception, when the doctrine 
is freed from the metaphysical difficulties which 
it has been apprehended to involve. 1 '' * 

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 209. So also, in his Dis- 
sertation on the progress of Metaphysical Philosophy, " Where is 
the sober Metaphysician to be found, who now speaks of the immor- 
tality of the soul as a logical consequence of its immateriality ; in- 
stead of considering it as depending on the will of that Being by 
whom it was at first called into existence 1 And, on the other hand, 
• is it not universally admitted by the best philosophers, that whatever 
hopes the light of nature encourages beyond the present scene, rest 
solely (like all other anticipations of future events) on the general 
tenor and analogy of the laws by which we perceive the universe to 
be governed'?" (Part r. p. 88.) It may here be observed that 
Lord Brougham's division of the Ethical part of Natural Theology 
seems to have been derived from this work of Mr Dugald Stewart ; 

who 



192 



SECTION III. 



The mind — even if, by the nature with which 
it has been endowed, immortal — is still depend- 
ent for existence on the Supreme Being. What 
has been created may be annihilated — may be 
disposed of, according to the pleasure of the 
Creator. The case of the human soul is not a 
case of simple existence — apart from all other 
considerations. There are moral considerations 
which may seriously affect its destiny. In our 
anxiety, therefore, for information respecting our 
future condition, we must have recourse, not so 
much to the nature of the mind, as to the va- 
rious intimations of the Divine Will, which have 
been vouchsafed to us on the subject. 

On looking over the Ethical Branch of Natu- 
ral Theology, as treated by Lord Brougham, it pre- 
sents so little which can properly be called Ethical, 
that some curiosity is excited, to revert to the 
Introduction to the 'Discourse'; for the pur- 

who treats — 1. Of the argument for a Future State, derived from the 
nature of mind — and 2. Of the Evidences for a Future State, arising 
from the Human Constitution, and from the circumstances in which 
man is placed, (pp. 209, 217.) Let me farther state, that the ge- 
neral arrangement of the ' Discourse' very closely resembles that 
adopted by Dr Crombie, in his excellent work on Natural Theology, 
already referred to. 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



193 



pose of ascertaining how far the original plan 
has been carried into effect. Lord Brougham, 
then, in his introductory remarks, seems to con- 
sider Natural Theology as having two objects: — 

1. "the discovery of the existence and attributes 
of a Creator, by investigating the evidences of 
design, in the works of the creation, material 
as well as spiritual" — which was intended for 
the Physical and Psychological branches; — and 

2. " the discovery of his will and probable inten- 
tions with regard to his creatures, their conduct 
and their duty" — which was reserved for the 
Ethical branch. When however, as the reader 
will find stated in page 161, we arrive at the 
section appropriated to the Ethical branch, we 
are simply told that it comprises 44 the probable 
designs of the Deity with regard to the future 
destiny of his creatures;"' 1 — and thus, all that re- 
lates to "their conduct and their duty*" — from 
which, in fact, the Ethical branch derives its 
name — is dropped by the way. The conduct 
and the duty of men are not touched upon in 
the course of the section ; nor do I recollect 
that they are brought forward in any other part 
of the 6 Discourse.' If it be said that the Will 

N 



19* 



SECTION III. 



of God, with regard to the conduct and duty 
of men, forms the subject of Moral Philosophy, 
and therefore could not properly be introduced 
into a 6 Discourse of Natural Theology 7 — the 
reply is easy — that the plan of the work, as 
described in the Introduction was most undoubt- 
edly the result of very different views of the 
matter. But to state every thing fairly, had the 
subject of Morals been discussed, the Noble Au- 
thor must have extended the limits which he had 
probably assigned to himself ; unless, indeed, there 
had been — what I think there might have been, 
without any disadvantage — considerable omissions 
and abbreviations, in various parts of the work. 
At the same time, if the neglect, here observed 
upon, be in any way connected with the neg- 
lect, previously pointed out, of certain moral 
bearings of the subjects under consideration — 
the proceeding cannot be too strongly condemned. 
However the case may be, the omitting to place, 
distinctly before the reader's mind, the Moral 
attributes of God — the Moral nature of man — 
and the Moral conduct of man — will be deemed, 
by thinking persons, most detrimental to the 
credit of the 6 Discourse.' 



ETHICAL BRANCH. 



195 



The subject of Morals is too weighty and 
extensive, to admit of discussion at the end of 
a Section — more especially, in a work like the 
present. In what consists the difference between 
that which is right and that which is wrong, 
in human conduct — how we become sensible of 
the distinction — on what principles, and from 
what motives, we choose the right — are questions 
which, for more than a century and a half, have 
exercised the talents of some of the ablest au- 
thors whom this country has produced. Although 
those of my readers, who are acquainted with 
the literary history of that period, need not the 
information, it may be advisable to state that I 
particularly refer to the labours of Cudworth, 
Cumberland, Clarke, Butler, Hutcheson, Adam 
Smith, Paley, Dugald Stewart and Brown. In 

N C Z 



196 



SECTION III. 



the writings of these eminent men, the subject 
is presented in a great variety of views — which 
cannot fail to enlarge the student's mind. The 
systems adopted by them, even when different, 
are seldom contradictory; and the very fact — 
that there are so many considerations which se- 
parately point out the same conduct, as that 
which men ought to pursue — manifests in the 
most striking manner the futility and danger of 
all attempts to withdraw themselves from the 
power of moral obligation. 



197 



SECTION IV. 

ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

(Discourse, Part II. pp. 175—213.) 

Lord Brougham has discoursed, on the advan- 
tages arising from the study of Natural Theo- 
logy, with so much eloquence and ability — and 
indeed they are of themselves so manifest — that 
my remarks on the subject may with great pro- 
priety be but few and brief. The study is con- 
sidered, by his Lordship, as affording, first, the 
pleasures which attend scientific pursuits in ge- 
neral — secondly, the pleasures and advantages pe- 
culiar to itself — and thirdly, aid to the cause of 
Revelation. It is the last of these topics which 
will require the greatest attention; but let each 
of them be taken in its order. 

I. That the pleasures attendant on scientific 
pursuits belong to the study of Natural Theology 
will not be disputed, when it Is borne in mind 
that the study is founded on the knowledge of 



198 



SECTION IV. 



nature— on science in general. He who reads 
the book of nature for himself proceeds from 
fact to fact: observes things, connected with each 
other by resemblances with shades of difference — 
and separated by diversity with marks of resem- 
blance: is struck with instances followed by in- 
stances of affinities and dependencies and adjust- 
ments and co-operations. He who, for the pur- 
pose of enlarging his views, has recourse to the 
labours of others — whether affording information, 
or presenting artificial means of improving the 
power of observation — finds his knowledge of 
the processes of nature, and the mutual relations 
they involve, greatly increased. He who, in 
addition to such methods of inquiry, avails him- 
self of the light of mathematical science, to as- 
sist him in his researches into physical pheno- 
mena, is amply repaid by the new and surprising 
lustre shed upon facts previously known, as well 
as by the discovery of numberless other facts, 
which only that science can enable him to com- 
prehend. Whatever, besides, can be ascertained 
respecting the moral and intellectual faculties of 
the human race — and the moral tendencies of the 
system of which we form a part —is of the ut- 



ADVANTAGES. 



199 



most importance to him who has the leisure and 
the capacity to collect and examine the various 
indications, which are presented, of the truth of 
the doctrines of Natural Theology. A science, so 
connected with the physical, the intellectual and 
the moral world, cannot fail to abound in in- 
teresting objects of contemplation. So long, there- 
fore, as accessions of knowledge, derived from the 
most extensive range of observation, of experi- 
ment and of reasoning, can gratify the human 
mind, the student of Natural Theology may be 
secure of finding, in his investigations, that satis- 
faction which is peculiar to mental exertions in 
the pursuit of truth. We are, indeed, so formed 
as to be delighted even with truth in the ab- 
stract, without regard to its "gross and material 
utility;' 1 with a mathematical theorem, for in- 
stance, a physical fact, a law of nature — inde- 
pendently of its application to practical purposes. 
We love to generalize; to trace resemblances and 
analogies; to compare the quantities of things. 
We are fond of resolving what is complex into 
its simplest elements, and verifying our results 
by the reverse operation. We feel an elevation 
of mind in accompanying the great Masters of 



wo 



SECTION IV. 



Science in their discoveries, and beholding the 

mysteries of nature laid open before us But 

although the satisfaction arising from our in- 
quiries into the constitution of nature is amply 
sufficient to incite us to perseverance — yet, on 
reflection, we cannot but feel some anxiety re- 
specting the purposes to which the knowledge we 
have obtained may be applied. And here, the 
subject takes two directions: — the one leading to 
the uses of our knowledge with regard to the 
present life — the other, to its uses in a Theo- 
logical point of view. After a very few remarks 
upon the former of these topics, I shall discuss 
the latter in the second division of the section. 

By observing the processes throughout the 
system of the Universe — by studying the mecha- 
nism (so to speak) of the material world, with 
the various compensations and adjustments which 
every where abound —men learn various modes 
of applying the powers of nature. In a limited 
sphere, they acquire a dominion over the ele- 
ments, which they may almost be said to wield 
at pleasure. They are thus enabled to make 
their knowledge of external things conduce to 
the well-being and embellishment of private life ; 



ADVANTAGES. 



201 



facilitate the intercourse of communities; and es- 
sentially contribute to the prosperity of empires, 

It is to the relations of things — their mu- 
tual adaptations — and the purposes to which 
they are subservient — that, as has been stated 
again and again, the attention is especially di- 
rected by Natural Theology; and in no other 
points of view are the objects of our contem- 
plation capable of filling the mind with finer 
feelings of delight and admiration. There is, 
moreover, such a tendency to similarity in those 
ends and adjustments, that the student is speedily 
led by them to compare results — to form classes 
- — to establish systems. Long-continued observa- 
tion at last warrants probable conjecture. The 
careful interpreter of nature becomes the saga- 
cious prophet. One age has announced to it the 
anticipations of the philosopher — another wit- 
nesses their fulfilment. 

Lord Brougham, following the footsteps of 
Mr Dugald Stewart, has very properly made 
some remarks, with a view of showing how im- 
portant, to the extension of physical knowledge, 
is the consideration of the purposes of things, 
required by Natural Theology. From the dili- 



202 



SECTION IV. 



gent study of natural phenomena, a conviction 
arises, that all things are useful in one way or 
another; so that, whenever the student finds an 
object, of the tendency of which he can give 
no account, he at once attributes his embarrass- 
ment to his own ignorance. His curiosity is 
excited; and in his subsequent endeavours to 
resolve the difficulty, he probably lights upon 
some unexpected manifestation of the wonderful 
economy of nature. It was by considering the 
reason that could be assigned for the valves of 
the veins, that Harvey discovered the circula- 
tion of the blood The anecdote, as related 

by Mr Boyle, is given by Lord Brougham, in 
the 185th page of his 'Discourse;' and by Mr 
Stewart, in the 185th page of his 4 Outlines of 
Natural Philosophy.'' In this part of his Lord- 
ship's work, there are many observations well 
deserving attention. I must now pass on to the 
second head. 

II. What has already been advanced leads 
us to conclude that the study of Natural Theology 
has its peculiar pleasures and advantages. In the 
first place, indisputable relations, dependencies, 
adjustments, ends, purposes— or whatever term 



ADVANTAGES. 



203 



may be employed — indicate contrivance — under- 
standing — foreknowledge. We feel, indeed, that 
it was not by some slow and cautious process 
of reasoning, that the Supreme Intelligence pro- 
duced the results we witness — however astonish- 
ing the mode in which they are connected with 
each other; but we feel also that, by a careful 
and modest application of the faculties, with 
which we have been endowed, to the Divine pro- 
ductions, we may become wiser, and yet more 
sensible of our ignorance, as we contemplate " the 
manifold wisdom of God."* The tracing of de- 
sign in the works of the creation furnishes a 
wholesome exercise to the intellectual powers. 
It calls forth ingenuity — sharpens the reason — 
and delights the imagination. Moreover, by con- 
stantly referring every thing to a Creating and 
Superintending Mind, it preserves a solemn im- 
pression of responsibility, in the conduct of our 
inquiries; and calls upon us to recollect that 

WE ARE IN THE PRESENCE OF GoD In the 

second place, the study now treated of is not one 
which can be pursued only in our libraries — - 

1 Eph. iii. 10. t) TroXvTroiKiXos (ro(pia rov Bcov, is the beautiful 
expression of the original. 



204 



SECTION IV. 



amidst books of science, and various kinds of 
experimental apparatus : — not one which is con- 
fined to some favoured region of the earth, abound- 
ing in the materials adapted to such inquiries: — 
every climate furnishes ample means for the 
purpose — and, like the air that is breathed, 
without expense. The appearances of nature are 
obvious to all; and though superior talents and 
learning, in these as well as other pursuits, se- 
cure important advantages to the philosophical 
inquirer — yet the art of observing the arrange- 
ments and processes of the material world, so as 
greatly to inform and gratify the mind, is under 
the ordinary circumstances of life by no means 

of difficult attainment In the last place, the 

study of Natural Theology traces every thing that 
exists, from that which by its minuteness eludes 
the unaided senses, to that which overwhelms 
the imagination by its magnitude — every law 
that is observed to prevail throughout the vast 
extent of the visible creation — to the will of 
God ; and thus, the peculiar kind of contemplation 
which is required constantly tends, by its very 
nature, to exalt our conceptions of the power 
and wisdom and good providence of the Creator. 



ADVANTAGES. 



205 



This habitual ascent of the thoughts, from things 
material to the Supreme Being, can scarcely fail 
to have a permanently beneficial effect upon the 
minds and characters of men; and when we con- 
sider the intimations, in various ways presented 
to us, of a future existence, the condition of 
which as to happiness will depend upon our moral 
improvement in this life, we cannot but feel that 
such views of the economy of the world are of 
the deepest interest to us, as creatures designed 

for immortality It is, then, not merely for 

the confutation of those who believe not in the 
being of a wise and righteous Governor of the 
universe, that the study of Natural Theology is 
to be undertaken. When arguments for that 
purpose have been familiarized to the mind — 
when we have traced the consequent indications 
that the present state is appointed for probation, 
the next for retribution — and satisfied ourselves 
as to the Divine will, with regard to the dispo- 
sitions and conduct required of us — the study 
may still be pursued with pleasure and advantage. 
New conceptions of the attributes of God will 
be formed within us; new reasons be suggested, 
for acquiescing in the dispensations of his pro- 



206 



SECTION IV, 



vidence; and new incitements afforded, for ado- 
ration of his greatness and obedience to his 
laws. ... On these topics, my limits will not 
allow me to expatiate; and therefore, content to 
have thrown out a few imperfect hints respect- 
ing them, I refer those readers who would wish 
to see considerations of that kind eloquently en- 
forced — to the pages of Lord Brougham. 

III. We have now to ascertain the aid, 
rendered by the study of Natural Theology, to 
the cause of Revelation ; or, in other words, 
the connexion between Natural and Revealed 
Religion. Such an inquiry seems to be right in 
itself; and indeed becomes quite indispensable, 
under the circumstances stated by Lord Brougham, 
in the following terms : 

" An objection [against Natural Theology] has some- 
times proceeded, unexpectedly, from the friends of Reve- 
lation — who have been known, without due reflection, to 
contend, that by the light of unassisted reason we can 
know absolutely nothing of God and a Future State. 
They appear to be alarmed lest the progress of Natural 
Religion should prove dangerous to the acceptance of 
Revealed; lest the former should, as it were, be taken 
as a substitute for the latter. They argue as if the two 
systems were rivals, and whatever credit the one gained 
were so much lost to the other. They seem to think 



ADVANTAGES. 



207 



that if any discovery of a First Cause and another world 
were made by natural reason, it would no longer be true 
that life and immortality were brought to light by the 
Gospel." (pp. 199, 200.) 

The preceding paragraph is so general in its 
views of the subject to which it relates, as to 
leave the mind in great uncertainty with regard 
to the extent to which the opinions there re- 
corded have prevailed; and therefore, without 
attempting — - what yet would be neither unin- 
teresting nor unimportant — a regular history of 
those opinions — I will endeavour to present a 
few distinct notices of their rise and progress, 
since the time of the Reformation. 

So far as I can at present recollect, Socinus 
— Faustus Socinus — first maintained the opinions 
mentioned by Lord Brougham. In the life of 
Socinus, by one of his modern followers and ad- 
mirers, the following statement occurs : 

" With respect to the power of man to discover, by 
the light of nature, the being of God, and the truths 
of what is called Natural Religion, Socinus thought that 
these principles were above his natural powers; and that 
the first notices of a Divine Being were derived from 
Revelation, or immediate communications from God."* 

* Toulmin's Memoirs of Faustus Socinus, 1777. p. 216. 



208 



SECTION IV. 



St Paul's declaration — that the invisible things 
of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly 
seen, being understood by the things that are made, 
even his eternal power and Godhead — stood in 
the way of the opinion, " that it cannot be 
proved from the creature that there is a God;" 
and so was to be set aside by some means or 
other. Bishop Pearson, in one of his learned 
notes, has well disposed of what he calls the 
" pitiful criticisms" of Socinus, for that purpose. — 
Such then, on these points, were the sentiments 
of the individual, who is generally accounted the 
father of the Unitarianism of the present day.* 

During the seventeenth century, the opinions 
of Socinus did not flourish in this country. 
The seed was sown, but the ground was not 
quite prepared for it; nor were there, till after 
the middle of the eighteenth century, any great 
signs of vegetation. And the fact is remarkable, 
that, with the increase of Unitarian doctrines — 
while they were avowedly maintained by some, 
and regarded with complacency by others — 
there undoubtedly was a tendency to a revival 

* Rom. i. 20. See Pearson on the Creed, Art. J believe in God. 



ADVANTAGES. 



209 



of the opinions of Socinus, touching Natural Re- 
ligion. Indications of the existence of such a 
tendency may be traced even in our own times. 
I do not quote the late Bishop Watson, as a 
person symbolizing with the Unitarians, but as 
one who appears to have felt no dissatisfaction 
at the progress of their tenets ; and we find 
him thus expressing his sentiments, respecting a 
future state, in a letter to Mr Gibbon : " I have 
no hope of a future existence except that which 
is grounded on the truth of Christianity " The 
reason subsequently given to The King, for such 
a declaration, is certainly a good one, supposing 
the doctrine involved to be well founded ; but it 
leaves that point untouched. " I had, 1 '' he says, 
" frequently met with respectable men, who che- 
rished an expectation of a future state, though 
they rejected Christianity as an imposture, and 
I thought my publicly declaring that I was of 
a contrary opinion might perhaps induce Mr 
Gibbon, and other such men, to make a deeper 
investigation into the truth of religion than they 
had hitherto done."* The late Mr Gilbert Wake- 
fields Unitarian principles are well known ; and 

* Bishop Watson's Anecdotes of his own Life, Vol. t. p. "107. 8vo. 
O 



•210 



SECTION IV. 



in the course of his writings, he frequently pre- 
sents the following views : " The reason why 
I never took any pleasure in moral ethics, and 
would not give one penny for all the morality 
in the world, is because there is no foundation 
for virtue and immortality, but in Revelation: 
and therefore I could never see any advantage 

from moral writings."* I do not affirm, nor 

do I suppose, that such opinions are universally 
held by Unitarians — although well according 
with their peculiar views. Unitarians have this 
difficulty to contend with : — Christianity, as ex- 
plained by them, differs but little from the Re- 
ligion of Nature. Is this credible, with regard 
to a Dispensation promulgated in so wonderful 
a manner? Now if Natural Religion be an ima- 
ginary thing, the difficulty is apparently lessened. 
May not such considerations have had some 
effect in forming their opinions on the subject 
now discussed ? My purpose, however, is to 
state facts; and I would only farther observe, 
that there seems to be this difference between 
Socinus and the Modern Unitarians alluded to — 
Socinus denied that the being of God, as well 

* Wakefield's Memoirs of his own Life, Vol. r. p. 512. 



ADVANTAGE^. 



211 



as all its important consequences, could be de- 
duced by the power of reason — the Unitarians 
rather restrict their denial, to the consequences 

of that great fact But to proceed to a class 

of Theologians, very remote, in their sentiments, 
from SocinUs and his modern disciples. 

In the latter part of the seventeenth century 
— to counteract the mischievous tendency and ill 
effects, in a practical point of view, of the in- 
discreet mode in which certain high doctrines 
had been preached — there were divines of great 
eminence, who made it their business to impress 
upon the conscience a serious sense of moral 
obligation. They dwelt much upon the duties of 
life. Some of them, unfortunately, called Christ- 
ianity a Republication of the Law of Nature : — 
not intending, most assuredly, that Christianity 
is a mere republication, but designing to hold it 
forth as a Religion abounding in new motives 
to the observance of all that is required of men 
in their present state of being. The Adversaries 
of the Gospel affected to understand what was 
said, of the " republication of the law of nature," 
in its strictly literal sense; and availed themselves of 
the opportunity to show, that Christianity is, on 
o 2 



212 SECTION IV. 

that principle, " as old as the creation." Controver- 
sies arose: in the midst of which appeared cer- 
tain zealous, but not very prudent, friends of 
Revelation, whose aim was to prove that there 
is no such thing as Natural Religion at all. 
Before the disputes alluded to were closed, a Lay 
Divine and Religious Philosopher presented to the 
world some lucubrations which attracted a good 
deal of notice. " A very curious and inquisitive 
person (as Mr Whiston justly calls him) Mr 
Hutchinson, thought that, by the light which 
revelation afforded him, compared with his own 
observations, he saw farther into the constitution 
of the universe, and the operations carried on 
in it, than Sir Isaac [Newton] had done. 1 '* 
Such is the account, given by Bishop Home, of 
the philosophy of Hutchinson ; who deriving the 
principles of " the constitution of the universe and 
the operations carried on in it" from Scripture, 
could scarcely allow that any thing appertaining 
to Religion could be collected from other sources. 
Accordingly, we are informed that " he looked 

* Bishop Home's Works, Vol. i. p. 445. It may be observed, 
by the way, that Hutchinson has asserted that he was the principal 
collector of the Fossils bequeathed by Dr Woodward to the Univer- 
sity of Cambridge. What the fact may have been I know not. 



ADVANTAGES. 



213 



upon Natural Religion as Deism in disguise; an 
engine of the devil, in these latter days, for the 
overthrow of the Gospel; and therefore boldly 
called it the Religion of Satan or Antichrist"* In 
such opinions, philosophical and religious, Hutch- 
inson had several followers of great respectability, 
as the names of Home, Parkhurst and Jones 
(not to mention others) will testify; but the 
Hutchinsonian philosophy was not formed to en- 
dure the scrutiny of the eighteenth century — 
and the inferences from it, as to religion, would 
have entirely disappeared, had there not been 
some attempts to evince their correctness by other 
considerations. By maintaining the senses to be 
the only natural inlets to knowledge — that is, 
by discarding reflection, on the operations of the 
mind, as another source of information — Dr Ellis, 
the author of a Treatise entitled, The Knowledge 
of Divine things from Revelation, not from 
Reason or Nature, undertook to prove that neither 
the being of a God, nor any other principle of 
religion, could possibly be deduced from the study 
of the phenomena of the Universe. To give some 

* Preface to the second edition of Jones's Life of Bishop Home, 
p. xx. See the first. Volume of Home's Works. 



214 



SECTION IV. 



notion of the purport of the book, I extract the 
following passage: 

"A mind that has no knowledge but of sensibles, 
sees and hears no other objects, can abstract no ideas 
from matter, but what are material; and had he moun- 
tains of them, his attempt would be as fruitless, as the 
giants invading Jupiter. Heap matter upon matter, it 
will never amount to immateriality, nor open to his view 
the new scene of insensibles and invisibles. Without an 
instructor to open his eyes, it would not be possible to 
conceive an angelic being, because it can have no re- 
semblance, no idea of a substance purely spiritual; yet 
vastly remoter from matter is an omnipotent Being, com- 
prehending in itself all the possibilities of things."* 

The volume now cited — and a collection of 
tracts, with the title of The Scholar armed 
against the Errors of the Time (3rd ed. in 1812) 
zealously enforcing the same principles — undoubt- 
edly had, for a season, some effect upon the 
opinions of people, with regard to Natural Re- 

* Knowledge of Divine things, &c. p. 460. 3rd ed. The first 
edition of the work was published in 1743 ; the second in 1771 ; and 
the third in 1811. Dr Ellis appears to have been educated at 
Oxford and established in Dublin. The reader who would see a 
strange interpretation of Rom. i. 20. is referred to pp. 266, &c. of 
the Volume here quoted. This may perhaps be a proper place to 
observe that the late Archbishop Magee was a follower of Dr Ellis, 
in his sentiments respecting Natural Religion. 



ADVANTAGES. 



215 



Kgion ; but those principles do not appear to have 
taken any firm or permanent hold of the public 
mind. I am not aware that, during the last thirty 
years, there has been, in the University of Cam- 
bridge, more than one learned man, who avow- 
edly professed the leading doctrines of Dr Ellis's 
Treatise. It has, indeed, occasionally happened 
to me to hear a surmise that that numerous class 
of Churchmen who have long looked up to the 
late Dr Milner, and his brother the Rev. Joseph 
Milner, with respect, in matters of religion, have 
generally adopted the peculiar views of Dr Ellis. 
This I believe to be very far from the truth ; 
although amongst them, as amongst other per- 
sons, such views are now and then to be found. 
Of Dr Milner I can state that, during the latter 
part of his life, I had several conversations with 
him on the subject of Dr Ellis's book ; in the 
course of which, he condemned, in the strongest 
terms, the scheme of rejecting the operations of 
the human mind, as one of the primary sources 
of knowledge. He seemed to think of the book 
altogether with great dissatisfaction ; and men- 
tioned it as a production, of which " the more 
he read, the less he could understand.". . . . His 



216 



SECTION IV. 



brother has left his own opinions, on the sub- 
ject of Natural Religion, on record. From his 
Answer to Gibbon, I present the following ex- 
tracts; which, I believe, will be new to most of 
my readers — and, I trust, acceptable to them all: 

" Thus, St. Paul being judge, God has not left him- 
self without witness, even in the natural world. The 
works of creation speak to us from without; and the 
moral nature, which he has given us, speaks to us from 
within. In conjunction they declare his Being and Sove- 
reign authority, his power, wisdom, and goodness, his 
equitable government, and the accountableness of the 
human race for all their moral conduct before him. And 
this is the utmost stretch of natural religion, an intuitive 
feeling rather than the result of any laborious investiga- 
tion. Strong and deep in its nature, though confused 
and indeterminate in its degree, it lays, however, all man- 
kind under a formal obligation of obedience, because all 
mankind feel its force, and of necessity acquiesce in its 
authority, while they strive in vain to reason away its va- 
lidity." Again, " Let any man coolly attend to what passes 
within himself, and ask what account can be given of that 
principle within him which we call Conscience. However 
it has been derided, it is not derided out of the world; 
and any person may, if he pleases, convince himself of 
its power, by attending to the energy of its rebukes, in 
spite of the most subtile reasonings which he may have 
made use of to drown its voice. Still it speaks, and 
speaks not like other principles and instincts of human 



ADVANTAGES. 



217 



nature ; but with an authority steady and strong, yet 
ever upright and equitable, commanding the whole man, 
and commanding no less the esteem than the fear of the 
whole human race. All render themselves more or less 
obnoxious to its rebukes; but to bribe it into silence, or 
rather to stupify and intoxicate it, would ask a long and 
enormous course of confirmed fiagitiousness ; and if it be 
ever effected at all, it leaves a man in a state too mon- 
strous and unnatural, to excite any other ideas than those 
of horror and detestation. If any man might be conceived 
to have conquered in himself this awful principle, so as 
to have lost all idea of its influence, one is tempted to 
think it was Mr Hume : yet hear how elegantly as well as 
emphatically, he describes it. Speaking of Somerset, the 
murderous favourite of James I. he says, ' The favourite 
had hitherto escaped the enquiry of justice; but he had 
not escaped that still voice which can make itself be heard 
amidst all the hurry and flattery of a court, and asto- 
nishes the criminal with a just representation of his most 
secret enormities/ And a little after, ' the grace of his 
youth gradually disappeared; the gaiety of his manners 
was obscured; his politeness and obliging behaviour were 
changed into sullenness and silence.' " * 

Such were the sentiments of that learned and 
pious man, with regard to Natural Religion. 
Something, I may remark by the way, of the 
same turn of thought, would have given, to 

* Gibbon's Account of Christianity considered. By Joseph 
Milner, M.A. pp. 198, 202—204. 1781. 



218 



SECTION IV. 



Lord Brougham's 4 Discourse, 1 a moral dignity — 
an influence over the human mind, which neither 
acuteness nor eloquence can command. But to 
bring the whole matter into a small space — 
Socinus long ago, and various Unitarians of mo- 
dern times — certain Trinitarians also, for more 
than a century past — have taken credit to them- 
selves for their opposition to Natural Religion, 
as an invention of man- — at once unwarrantable 
and mischievous. Lord Brougham considers such 
"reasoners 1 ' as "neither the most famous advo- 
cates of revelation, nor the most enlightened;" 
and yet, as his Lordship observes, c< we may do 
well to show the groundlessness of the alarms 
which they would excite." 

The Noble Author truly states that the most 
eminent writers on Natural Theology have been 
sincere and zealous Christians; who were there- 
fore most unlikely to support a cause that could 
place any thing, appertaining to Christianity, in 
danger. Ample scope was afforded, for the de- 
fence of Natural, as well as Revealed Religion, 
by the Lecture founded by Mr Boyle ; at which 
Lecture, accordingly, were delivered, by Christian 
Preachers, some of the ablest vindications of 



ADVANTAGES. 



219 



Natural Religion, that have ever been presented 
to the world. From the time of Hooker, in short, 
to our own, the great Divines, by whose labours 
our literature has been so wonderfully enriched, 
never seem to have thought it possible that Na- 
tural and Revealed Religion, if properly under- 
stood, could be in a state of hostility with each 
other. On the contrary, they believed that they 
were contributing to the advancement of divine 
truth, when they considered Natural and Revealed 
Religion as appointed by the Almighty, to " work 
together for good" to the human race. In such 
sentiments, moreover, they were sustained by the 
most illustrious philosophers that ever appeared 
to develope the laws by which material things are 

governed — by Bacon and Boyle and Newton 

But not to rest solely upon the authority of 
names, however venerated — it may be useful to 
point out some of the bearings of Natural Re- 
ligion upon that which is Revealed. 

Let us, then, suppose that an individual lays 
claim to be a messenger sent from God; and 
that, in proof of his claim, he appears to work 
miracles. Now, on the one hand, this person 
may be, as he represents, a messenger from God 



220 



SECTION IV. 



— or a clever enthusiast — or an artful impostor — 
or half enthusiast and half impostor : — on the 
other, however important it may be to admit his 
claims in the first case, it is equally important 
to reject them in the other cases. To decide the 
point at issue, those opponents of Natural Re- 
ligion, who are consistent with themselves, hold 
that the evidence for the reality of the miracles 
is the only test of the divine mission. In other 
words, they disregard the internal evidence, re- 
sulting from the moral character of the commu- 
nication — and depend upon the external evidence, 
arising from the manifestation of supernatural 
power. " They," says a learned writer of this 
class, " who insist upon proving the truth of Re- 
velation by its internal evidence, or by a de- 
monstration of its fitness and expediency, treat 
it as if it were of human, not of Divine origin. 
For man, indeed, has no right to expect assent 
from his fellow-creatures to the truth of any 
system he proposes, unless he can show that it 
is, in itself, wise and good. But God commands 
with authority. His word is sufficient evidence, 
or sufficient surety at least, that whatever he pro- 
poses to us must be true and good." Those, 



ADVANTAGES. 



221 



on the contrary, who conceive that " the world 
and all that it inhabit" bear witness to the ex- 
istence and attributes of the Deity, are per- 
suaded that a Revelation, from the same Being, 
will come recommended to men, by its accord- 
ance with the conclusions of their reason and 
their moral perceptions— and not merely overawe 
them by " the signs and wonders" by which it 
appeals to their senses. Their study, indeed, of 
the natural world has taught them that, in the 
ways of God, there are " many things hard to 
be understood" — many things far beyond the 
reach of their intellectual powers; and thus, in 
a divine revelation, they are prepared to expect 
mysteries still farther removed from human com- 
prehension. In this manner, they conceive that 
men will be addressed as what they are, rational 
creatures of finite capacity. So likewise they 
conclude that a real revelation from God will 
exhibit indubitable marks of its divine origin, in 
its entire adaptation to the nature and condition 
of man, as a moral agent. This internal evi- 
dence, moreover, is felt to be of so much im- 
portance, that we find some authors — whether 
unawares or not, I am unable to say — deserting 



222 



SECTION IV. 



their own principles, and zealously availing them- 
selves of its assistance, in proof of the Christian 
Religion. As an example, I will mention Mr Gil- 
bert Wakefield — already shown (p. 210.) to have 
been a determined opponent of all morality, except 
that derived from Revelation. This gentleman 
wrote a book, of about 230 pages, in defence of 
Christianity; and the volume is almost entirely 
confined to the internal evidences and moral ex- 
cellence of the system. It is not unpleasant to 
observe the natural feelings of people thus com- 
pletely overthrowing their theoretical positions.* 
" Natural Religion, 1 ' Dr Hey observes, " is 
presupposed in Revealed."t A person, claiming 
to have been sent from God, appeals to miracles 
wrought by himself, as proofs of his mission ;— 
and our antecedent notions of the divine power 
warrant the belief, that miracles may have been 
wrought in attestation of such a fact. The com- 
munication made by that individual indicates the 
highest degree of mercy and goodness, on the 
part of the Deity, towards the human race; — 
and the intimations of the divine benevolence, 

* Wakefield's Evidences of Christianity, 2nd ed. 1793. 
t Lectures in Divinity, Vol. i. p. 14. 



ADVANTAGES, 



223 



presented by the world around us, allow us to 
trust that the Creator and Preserver of mankind 
may vouchsafe expressly to reveal to them his 
purposes on their behalf. The character of the 
same person, and his instructions respecting the 
dispositions and conduct which become men in 
their present state, transcend our best concep- 
tions of what is morally excellent ; — and the 
moral nature, with which we have been endowed, 
affords the strongest assurance that God would 
affix that seal to a dispensation coming immedi- 
ately from Himself. On such foundations we may 
safely build our faith. An individual, so fur- 
nished with evidences of his divine appointment, 
has a right to demand that the fullest credit 
should be given to his declarations regarding the 
future destinies of the human race. Whatever 
he may unfold — concerning the nature of God, 
and his dealings with men both here and here- 
after — is to be received with the utmost humility 
of mind; for the little that can be previously 
known on these subjects is only sufficient to show 
how much must remain unknown, unless it should 
please the Almighty to remove the obscurity in 
which they are involved. 



224 



SECTION IV. 



The moral and intellectual faculties may be 
weakened and perverted. Hence the distorted and 
discordant views, of the Deity and a future state 
and human duty, which are found in the writings 
and opinions of the ancient philosophers. Hence 
the degrading representations of the Christian Re- 
ligion, in the systems of various Christian sects. 
As the differences and contentions, amongst these 
Christian sects, throw no doubt upon the reality 
of a Revelation, common to them all — so neither 
ought the scarcely more discreditable disputes, 
amongst the philosophers, to bring into question 
the reality of Natural Religion. 

With regard to the opinion which has been 
held — that Natural Religion tends to supersede 
Revelation — I will only say, that it is perfectly 
incomprehensible to me, how such a notion can 
even be hinted at by any person who has taken 
the trouble to compare the intimations of the 
one with the decisions of the other, on many 
important points — and the profound silence of 
the one with the authoritative declarations of the 
other, in matters of still greater moment. When 
the utmost has been made of Natural Religion, 
it can give no information on subjects on which 



ADVANTAGES, 



225 



Revelation is the most copious — the various dis- 
pensations of God towards man — our redemption 
from the effects of transgression — and in the 
language of the Creed — "the forgiveness of sins, 
the resurrection of the body, and the life ever- 
lasting." 

I have seen Lord Brougham's account of the 
connexion between Natural and Revealed Reli- 
gion (pp. 204 — 209.) quoted with approbation. 
Although it contains a few expressions which I 
do not quite like, and is at the same time rather 
vague and indefinite, I recommend it to the 
reader's attention. . . . The next service mentioned 
by His Lordship (pp. 209 — 211.), as rendered by 
Natural Religion to Revelation, is of a very 
ambiguous character. Without transcribing the 
whole paragraph in which this service is point- 
ed out, I will extract a few sentences, which 
will assuredly be sufficient to convey the writer's 
meaning : 

" Were our whole knowledge of the Deity drawn from 
Revelation, its foundation must become weaker and weaker, 
as the distance in point of time increases from the ac- 
tual interposition .... Upon testimony all Revelation must 
rest. Every age but the one in which the miracles were 
P , 



226 



SECTION IV. 



wrought, and every country but the one that witnessed 
them — indeed, all the people of that country itself save 
those actually present — must receive the proofs which 
they afford of Divine interposition upon the testimony of 
eye-witnesses, and of those to whom eye-witnesses told 

it We are by no means affirming that Revelation 

would lose its sanction by lapse of time, as long as it had 
the perpetually new and living evidence of Natural Re- 
ligion to support it. We are only showing the use of 
that evidence to Revelation, by examining the inevitable 
consequences of its entire removal, and seeing how ill 
supported the truths of Revelation would be, if the prop 
were withdrawn which they borrow from Natural Theo- 
logy; for then they would rest upon tradition alone." 
(pp. 209—211.) 

Lord Brougham's representation seems to be 
to this effect : — The evidences of Revelation, 
being founded on human testimony, are continu- 
ally growing weaker, from the lapse of time; 
whereas the evidences of Natural Religion are 
constantly gaining strength : and thus, as ages 
pass away, Natural Religion acts to greater and 
greater advantage in support of Revelation — 
which, it seems, would otherwise " lose its sanc- 
tion." On this subject, my remarks shall be 
brief. About the beginning of the last century, 
a Scotch Mathematician made the validity of the 



ADVANTAGES, 



227 



argument, arising from human testimony, the sub- 
ject of calculation— subsequently applying his prin- 
ciples to determine the year of our Lord, after 
which it would be unbecoming a philosopher to 
give credence to the miracles, on which our Re- 
ligion is held to have been founded; and I have 
been informed that, not many years ago, some 
learned Germans were busily employed in the 
same investigation.* In spite of calculation, how- 
ever, the world has gone on believing; and there 
are, as yet, no indications of a belief regulated 
by mathematical theorems. The credit indeed 
given to matters of well-authenticated history 
is but little affected by the lapse of time. We 
are as well assured of the events of the reign 
of Henry VIII. as of those of the reign of 
Charles I. or of George I. The acts of Julius 
Caesar are no less certain to us than those of 
Oliver Cromwell. Now the miracles, which in- 
troduced the Christian Religion, are facts — his- 

* This writer's name was Craig. His work — a 4to pamphlet 
of 36 pages, entitled ' Theologia? Christianas principia mathematica' 
—was published in 1699. The mathematician was quite willing 
that Christianity should be received, on its present evidence, till 
a. d. 3153. Such are the speculations of men who are rather learned 
than wise. I am not aware that Craig meant to injure the cause of 
Revealed Religion. 

r 2 



228 



SECTION IV. 



torical facts — facts recorded by the friends of 
that Religion, and allowed by its enemies. Who- 
ever now believes in those miracles — and who, 
after all, will venture to say that he does not 
believe in them? — believes, with as firm a faith, 
as he who lived at an interval of one hundred 
years from the period at which they were wrought. 
Moreover, the continual progress of the Gospel 
in the world — new instances of the accomplish- 
ment of prophecy — and various unexpected illus- 
trations of circumstances connected with external 
and internal evidence — may greatly overbalance 
all that the original testimony can be imagined 
to lose, by transmission through a long series of 
ages. Till, therefore, we know from experience 
something more of the effect of time, in impairing 
the credibility of facts so well attested, we will post- 
pone all consideration of the mode by which the 
waning evidence of Christianity — if such it should 
then be deemed — may be aided with subsidiary 
light. To say the truth, there is, in Lord 
Brougham's notion, something which too much 
resembles a falling back upon Natural Religion, 
when the direct defence of Revelation can be 
no longer maintained. But is not such a view 



AD VANTAGES. 



229 



of the matter altogether at variance with those 
Scriptures, by which, when we have acknow- 
ledged their authority, we cannot, without incon- 
sistency, refuse to abide ? When our Lord pre- 
dicted the perpetuity of the Church which he was 
about to found, who can imagine that he referred 
to the means of protection afforded by Natural 
Religion? Those, who doubt not the fulfilment 
of that prediction, believe that the Church of 
Christ is founded upon a rock, and is in itself 
secure alike from external violence, and the silent, 
insidious encroachments of time. 

After alluding to " the recourse had by the 
inspired penmen, to the views which are de- 
rived from the contemplation of nature, when 
they would exalt the Deity by a description of 
his attributes, or inculcate sentiments of devo- 
tion towards him" — a subject which would admit 
of much interesting discussion — Lord Brougham 
remarks (p. 213.) upon the "little that is to be 
found, of particularity and precision, in any thing 
that has been revealed to us respecting the na- 
ture of the Godhead 1 ' — "the mystery in which 
almost all the divine attributes, beyond what 
natural reason teaches, are wisely veiled — con- 



230 



SECTION IV. 



eluding that " those attributes are nearly the 
same in the volume of nature and in that of his 
revealed word." With reference to observations 
of this kind, we shall do well to consider that 
Revelation is effected through the medium of 
language; from the imperfections of which, it 
may be impossible to make known, in any de- 
gree, the essential nature of the Deity: — we 
shall do well to consider how unequal the human 
mind must be, in the present state, to compre- 
hend the mode of existence of " The High and 
Lofty One, that inhabiteth eternity Moreover, 
the knowledge of the Supreme Being, afforded 
by the Revelation vouchsafed to us, is undoubt- 
edly of that kind, with which we are the most 
concerned. It was evidently not intended to 
gratify curiosity, but to " make wise unto sal- 
vation." In this respect, the views presented to 
us are so momentous, that there is great diffi- 
culty in conceiving how any one can suppose 
that the intimations, of the attributes of the 
Deity, collected from the study of nature, can 
bear a moment's comparison with those glorious 
manifestations of the Divine Perfections which 
illuminate the pages of Holy Writ. 



ADVANTAGES. 



231 



I have now followed Lord Brougham through 
those departments of Natural Theology which are 
most usually the objects of attention — offering, 
as I proceeded, such remarks, whether in the 
way of explanation, of approbation or of caution, 
as the matters successively brought under con- 
sideration appeared to demand. A work like the 
present can scarcely be mistaken for a complete 
system, or even a complete outline, of the science 
of Natural Theology. Many points, of great im- 
portance, have been left untouched; but the re- 
flections, suggested by the c Discourse 1 , may, as 
T am willing to hope, render some service to the 
cause of Religion. Had I been engaged in 
writing a regular treatise on the subject discussed, 
I should have aimed at greater precision of lan- 
guage, than will be found in the present volume. 
My wish has been to write clearly, without that 
painful attention to accuracy of composition which 
is sometimes attributed to Academical persons : — 
an attention equally forbidden, in my own case, 
by the want of time and the want of inclination. 
If, in executing what I conscientiously believed 



232 



SECTION IV. 



to be my duty, I shall be thought to have shed 
additional light upon any portion of Natural 
Theology — or if I shall have interested even a 
few readers, in inquiries of unquestionable im- 
portance, I shall feel myself to be amply re- 
warded for my labour. 

The remainder of the volume will be devoted 
to matters variously related to what has preceded; 
and may possibly be not unacceptable to those 
who are fond of abstruse and learned specula- 
tions. There are, indeed, several subjects, ex- 
amined with great acuteness in Lord Brougham's 
Notes, which yet appear susceptible of farther 
elucidation ; but circumstances compel me to re- 
strict myself to three topics — to each of which 
a section will be appropriated. The topics are— - 
The argument a priori, as it is called — The 
sentiments of the Ancient Philosophers — and The 
opinions of Bishop Warburton. 



233 



SECTION V. 

ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 

(Discourse, Section IV. pp. 81 — 97). 

I now proceed to review Lord Brougham's ac- 
count of what is called the argument a priori? 
in proof of the being and attributes of God — 
an abstract mode of reasoning, the nature of 
which will be better understood from the pre- 
sent section, than from any formal definition. 
Thus much, however, it will be needful to state 
in the outset — that the proof heretofore enforced 
mainly rests upon the marks of design and con- 
trivance abounding in the world; whereas the 
proof yet to be considered, through the medium 
of the Noble Author's representations, is prima- 
rily independent of those marks. So far, the 
argument a priori is, to adopt His Lordship's 
language, " without reference to facts." Lord 
Brougham, however, taking the ground that the 
argument a priori is absolutely and entirely " with- 



234 



SECTION V. 



out reference to facts,' 1 draws out a long array of 
objections to which the deductions from it are in 
consequence liable. He then shows that the ar- 
gument is, in reality, not " without reference to 
facts." Now, under such circumstances, unless 
there is some evidence — and none appears — that 
the advocates of the argument maintain that it 
is " without reference to facts," to what purpose 
are the objections brought forward? But not 
to dwell on this point, the objections shall be 
extracted without abridgement: 

"The first thing that strikes us on this subject is the 
consequence which must inevitably follow from admitting 
the possibility of discerning tbe existence of the Deity 
and his attributes a priori, or wholly independent of 
facts. It would follow that this is a necessary, not a 
contingent truth; and that it is not only as impossible 
for the Deity not to exist, as for the whole to be greater 
than the sum of its parts, but that it is equally impos- 
sible for his attributes to be other than the argument is 
supposed to prove they are. Thus the reasoners in ques- 
tion show, by the argument a priori, that he is a being 
of perfect wisdom and perfect benevolence. Dr Clarke is 
as clear of this as he is clear that his existence is proved 
by the same argument. Now, first, it is impossible that 
any such truths can be necessary: for their contraries 
are not things wholly inconceivable, inasmuch as there 
is nothing at all inconceivable in the Maker of the uni- 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



235 



verse existing as a being of limited power and of mixed 
goodness, nay of malevolence. We never, before all ex- 
perience, could pronounce it mathematically impossible that 
such a being should exist, and should have created the 
universe. But next, the facts, when we came to examine 
them, might disprove the conclusions drawn a priori. 
The universe might by possibility be so constructed that 
every contrivance might fail to produce the desired effect: — 
the eye might be chromatic and give indistinct images — 
the joints might be so unhinged as to impede motion — 
every smell, as Paley has it, might be a stink, and every 
touch a sting.* Indeed we know that, perfect as the frame 
of things actually is, a few apparent exceptions to the 
general beauty of the system, have made many disbelieve 
the perfect power and perfect goodness of the Deity, 
and invent Manichean theories to account for the exist- 
ence of evil. Nothing can more clearly show the absur- 
dity of those arguments by which it is attempted to de- 
monstrate the truths of this science as mathematical or 
necessary, and cognizable a piiori." (pp.81 — 83.) 

Being very far from giving credit to the pos- 
sibility of proving the being of a God, in a man- 
ner similar to the demonstration of a geometrical 
theorem — and not being aware of any one who 
conceives the possibility — I have no motive to 

* I am happy to say that this is not exactly " as Paley has 
it." Paley's words are these : "He [the Deity] might have made 
every thing we tasted bitter ; every thing we see loathsome ; every 
thing we touched a sting ; every smell a stench ; and every sound 
a discord." Moral Philosophy, B. n. c. 5. 



236 



SECTION V. 



vindicate the propriety of the word "necessary," 
when applied to the Deity, on the principles laid 
down by Lord Brougham. There is, however, 
something from which the mind recoils, in the 
idea of making the Divine existence " a contin- 
gent truth." " Contingent," Johnson informs us, 
has the signification of " falling out by chance ; 
accidental ; not determinable by any certain rule." 
How far such expressions belong to such a sub- 
ject, I will leave to the reader's judgement: — 
observing only that the being of God is a fact 
which differs from every other fact ; — that every 
other fact depends upon Will, and so is contin- 
gent; that is, contingent to us, not to Him who 
possesses all power and all knowledge. 

With regard to the method of proving the 
goodness of the Deity— to which Lord Brougham 
adverts in the subsequent part of the extract, 
when referring to Dr Clarke — I shall shortly 
have occasion to show, that His Lordship's state- 
ment involves as great a mistake as can well be 
imagined. When the subject is resumed, it will 
be under circumstances which will enable us to 
render the discussion more complete than we can 
hope to do at the present moment. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



237 



Towards the close of the paragraph, the Noble 
Author seems to attribute the invention of Ma- 
nichean theories to the disbelief of the perfect 
power and perfect goodness of the Deity. The 
fact is — we have good evidence that it was 
for the purpose of reconciling the existence of 
evil with the Divine power and goodness that 
the Manichean theories were invented. There is 
scarcely any writer whom Lord Brougham re- 
spects more highly — and scarcely any more worthy 
of his respect — than Dr Cud worth ; and we find 
that great Christian philosopher adopting the fol- 
lowing language : 

" Now as for that fore-mentioned Ditheism or opinion 
of two Gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident that its 
original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm per- 
suasion of the Essential Goodness of the Deity ; together 
with a conceit that the evil that is in the world was 
altogether inconsistent and irreconcileable to the same; 
and that therefore, for the solving of this phenomenon, 
it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish 
principle self-existent, or an Evil God."* 

It may be worth while to add that the opi- 
nions of M. Beausobre, Dr Lardner and Dr Hey, 
coincide with those of Dr Cudworth, respecting 

* Intellectual System, p. 213. 



238 SECTION V. 

the origin of Manichean theories — But to re- 
sume the main subject — From the preceding ob- 
servations, the reader will justly infer that I hold, 
with Lord Brougham, the absurdity of all at- 
tempts "to demonstrate the truths of this science 
as mathematical or necessary, and cognizable 
a priori? I only lament that His Lordship should 
have censured Dr Clarke, in particular, for em- 
ploying a demonstration of that kind — when he 
was on the point of making it his business to 
show that Dr Clarke had really used an argu- 
ment of a very different kind. Moreover, the 
Noble Author is, in my judgment, perfectly right, 
in assigning a different character to Dr Clarke's 
reasoning. If then, as Lord Brougham contends 
and as I admit, Dr Clarke's reasoning is not the 
argument a priori, already treated of — the ques- 
tion naturally occurs — How came it to pass that 
the term a priori was ever applied to that rea- 
soning? Now, although a tolerable answer may 
be given to this question, there is, I confess, 
cause to lament that the term has ever been so 
applied. The misapplication indeed, for it is 
such, has occasioned great ambiguity — many in- 
voluntary mistakes -—and probably some not un- 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



239 



designed misrepresentations. The case, however, 
appears to have been as follows : Philosophers 
had, for many ages, turned their thoughts to the 
discovery of a proof of the being of a God, alto- 
gether independent of facts. A proof, if so con- 
structed, must wholly consist of purely abstract rea- 
soning; and supposing the possibility of the thing, 
would be properly called the argument a priori, 
On the other hand, the common proof of the 
being of a God, being founded on the innume- 
rable facts and marks of design and contrivance 
prevailing throughout the world, was contradistin- 
guished by the title of the argument a posteriori. 
At length, however, a proof, of an intermediate 
kind— ^bearing some affinity to each of those just 
described — was ventured upon. The proof alluded 
to proceeded from this one simple fact — that some- 
thing does actually exist; — in other respects dis- 
regarding the numberless phenomena of the ma- 
terial world. This mode of proof was, from its 
nature of a very abstract character; and being 
made, in some of its parts, to depend upon rea- 
soning which may be fairly called a priori — 
and not because the reasoning was a priori 
from first to last — was termed the argument 



240 



SECTION V. 



d priori. The statement now offered, if well 
considered, will, I think, be sufficient to account 
for the name given to the reasoning adopted by 
Dr Clarke, and other learned men; but will not 
completely justify the correctness of the appella- 
tion. Law, in one of the notes to his translation 
of King's 6 Origin of Evil, 1 has expressed, in few 
words, the sense in which the phrase a priori is 
to be understood, when applied to Dr Clarke's 
method of reasoning — prior to the examination 
of particular phenomena* — and so, not prior to 
the conviction that there is something which exists. 
In confirmation of my view of the matter, I will 
adduce two passages — one from Lord Brougham's 
favourite author, Dr Cudworth — another from a 
writer more recent than Dr Clarke, whose adhe- 
rent he was, in the main. To the first of the 
passages, although long, I request the reader's 
especial attention ; for it throws great light upon 
the present subject of inquiry. 

" True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have them- 
selves affirmed that there could be no demonstration of 
a God ; which assertion of theirs hath been by others 
misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore 

* King's Origin of Evil, p. 58. 4th ed. 1758. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



241 



no certainty at all to be had of God s existence, but only 
a conjectural probability ; no knowledge or science, but only 
faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those 
ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any de- 
monstration of a God, was only this, that the existence 
of a God could not be demonstrated a priori, himself 
being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander 
Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions, after 
he had propounded an argument for a God, according 
to the Aristotelick principles, from motion, declare him- 
self: tj Se?£<c Kara dvd\v<riv, ov yap olovre t^s Trpwrt]*; 
ap"^r\<t cnrobei^iv elvai, ctWct heT aVo twv vaTepoov tc kcu 
(pctvepcov dp^afxevov^, Kara ty\v irpo\ tuvto. av/JKpwvlav 
avaXvcrei ^poj/nevov; avaTtjcrai rrjv exe'ivov <pv<xiv — that 
this argument or proof of his was in the way of analysis 
only : it being not possible that there should be a demon- 
stration of the first principle of all. Wherefore we must 
here fetch our beginning from things that are after it, and 
manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the 
proof of that first nature which was before them. And to 
the same .purpose Clemens Alexandrinus, having first af- 
firmed, we ovcrfxeTCf^eipKTToraTo^ 6 irep\ tov Oeov \oyos' 
eirei yap dp^rj TravTo\ tr pdy\\a.Tos hvrevpeTos, wavTa? 
irov tj TrpwTr} K<xt TrpecrfivTaTr] dp-^rj dvcrheiKTO?, ^Vte KCti 
to?<? aXXoio. unaa-iv cut la tov yevecrdcu kcu yevofxevov^ 
elvai, that God is the most difficult thing of all to be dis- 
coursed of; because since the principle of every thing is 
hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, 
which was the cause to all other things, of their being 
made, must ne^ds be the hardest of all to be declared or 
<i 



242 



SECTION V. 



manifested: he afterwards subjoins, d\\d ovhe ivumfaQ 
\afx/3dv€rat Trj «7roBeiKTtK»7* ctvTt] yap en Trporepwv k«i 
yvopifxwrepusv <rvv!<TTaTai' tov Ze dyevvtjrov ovdev Trpov- 
trdp-^ei. but neither can God be apprehended by any de- 
monstrative science. For such science is from things 
before, in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas 
nothing exists before that which is altogether unmade. 
And certain it is that it implies a contradiction, that God 
or a Perfect Being should be thus demonstrated, by any 
thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless, it doth not 
therefore follow that there can be no certainty at all had 
of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural proba- 
bility ; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we 
may have a certain knowledge of things, the BtoT< whereof 
cannot be demonstrated h priori, or from antecedent ne- 
cessary causes : As for example, that there was something 
eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demon- 
strable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictious 
to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless, upon 
supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man 
can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an 
opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of 
irrefragable reason, that there never was nothing, but 
something or other did always exist from eternity, and 
without beginning. In like manner, though the existence 
of a God or Perfect Being cannot be demonstrated a priori, 
yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose 
existence we cannot doubt of) and from what is contained 
in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by 
undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his ex- 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



243 



istence. And whensoever anything is thus necessarily in- 
ferred, from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is 
a demonstration — though not of the Burn, yet of the on 
of it: that the thing is, though not why it is."* 

The foregoing valuable passage, from Dr Cud- 
worth's work dated 1678, shows how clearly the 
distinction, between the veritable argument a pri- 
ori and the argument now so called, was per- 
ceived, at that time. It shows us, moreover, not 
only that the writer agreed, with one of the 
most acute of Aristotle's commentators and one 
of the most learned of the Fathers, in thinking 
that the pure argument a priori was altogether 
inapplicable — but also that he admitted the va- 
lidity of the kind of argument so fully after- 
wards drawn out by Dr Clarke. Let me also 
remark that, notwithstanding the fondness of the 
Schoolmen for metaphysical speculation on this 
very subject, they appear to have placed no re- 
liance upon the argument a priori^ as originally 
understood.f I now present the opinion of a 
more recent author, respecting the modern argu- 
ment a priori; concerning which he thus writes; 

* Intellectual System, pp. 715, 716. 

t Thus, for example, writes Thomas Aquinas: " Deum esse, 
quamvis non a priori, a posteriori tamen demonstrari potest." 
0,2 



SECTION V. 



"Here then lies the groundwork of the argument we 
are entering upon : something now exists, or has a real 
being; therefore something has always existed, or had 
a real being. This is the only method in which we can 
prove the existence of the first cause, by beginning a pos- 
teriori ; for the argument a priori does not, nor indeed 
can prove, that there is a first cause, but supposes it 
already proved."* 

The distinction between the old imaginary 
argument a priori, and that at present known by 
the name, has, I trust, become perfectly mani- 
fest; and I will proceed to show, by one re- 
markable instance, the importance of keeping the 
distinction in mind. . . . Mr Hume devotes the ninth 
part (or section) of his Dialogues concerning Na- 
tural Religion to the argument a priori. — Demea 
thus introduces the topic : — "If so many diffi- 
culties attend the argument a posteriori, had we 
not better adhere to that simple and sublime ar- 
gument a priori, which, by offering to us infal- 
lible demonstration cuts off at once all doubt and 

* Knight, On the Being and Attributes of God, p. 10. 1747 

I have the materials for an Historical and Critical Account of the 
modern (so called) Argument a priori, with remarks upon its proper 
use ; but considering that there are probably not above half a score 
persons in the kingdom who would care to peruse a work of that 
kind, the propriety of devoting to the composition so much time, as 
it would unavoidably require, is very questionable. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



245 



difficulty ?" Now the argument so described is 
unquestionably the imaginary a priori reasoning 
of the ancients. But to attend to the dialogue : 
Cleanthes interposes, and requests an explanation 
of the argument; of which Demea gives the fol- 
lowing account : ;< The argument, which I would 
insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists 
must have a cause or reason of its existence; 
it being absolutely impossible for anything to 
produce itself, or be the cause of its existence. 
In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, 
&c." an indifferent representation of the mo- 
dern argument a priori. To all this Cleanthes 
rejoins—" I shall begin with observing, that there 
is an evident absurdity in pretending to demon- 
strate a matter of fact, or to prove it by ar- 
guments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, un- 
less the contrary implies a contradiction." And 
so he goes on; attacking Demerits actual argu- 
ment " from effects to causes," as if it were the 
ancient abstract argument first mentioned. Now 
it is only by duly apprehending and recollecting 
the distinction between the ancient and the mo- 
dern argument of the same name, that the reader 
of Mr Hume can be aware of the substitution 



246 



SECTION V. 



of one thing for another, which is constantly 
taking place in the course of the discussion. In 
fact, we are here presented with an exquisite 
specimen of that intellectual juggling, which is 
so often played off, in the philosophical writings 
of this great master of the dialectic art. Did he 
know the distinction, or was he deceived by his 
own dexterity? I am unwilling to suppose that 
he intended to mislead his readers. 

We are led by the distinction which has been 
drawn between the ancient and the modern ar- 
gument a priori, together with Lord Brougham's 
strictures on Dr Clarke's reasoning, to the in- 
quiry, whether Dr Clarke considered that he was, 
from the very outset, using the pure argument 
a priori. It is clear that he had no such no- 
tion. To a correspondent, who had objected to 
" arguing at all a priori? he replied, that " the 
argument a posteriori is by far the most gene- 
rally useful, and ought always to be distinctly 
insisted upon but that, " forasmuch as Athe- 
istical writers have sometimes opposed the being 
and attributes of God, by such metaphysical rea- 
sonings, as can no otherwise be obviated, than by 
arguing a priori, therefore this manner of arguing 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



247 



also is useful and necessary in its proper place"* 
In allusion moreover to the first proposition of 
his argument, he informs another correspondent 
that " when once a thing is known, by reasoning 
a posteriori, to be certain, it unavoidably follows 
that there is in nature a reason a priori (whether 
we can discover it or not) of the existence of 
that which we know cannot but exist." t Besides 
these, there are many indications that Lord 
Brougham has not pointed out what was un- 
known to Dr Clarke. But it is now time to 
attend to His Lordship's remarks, upon Dr 
Clarke's argument, which are thus offered: 

" Dr Clarke is the chief patron of this kind of demon- 
stration, as he terms it; and though his book contains 
it more at large, the statement of his fundamental argu- 
ment is perhaps to be found most distinctly given in the 
letters subjoined to that celebrated work. The funda- 
mental propositions in the discourse itself are, That some- 
thing must have existed from all eternity, and That this 
something must have been a being independent and self- 
existent. In the letters he condenses, perhaps explains, 
certainly illustrates, these propositions (see Answers to 
Letters 3, 4 and 5) by arguing that the existence of space 

* Answer to a seventh letter, at the end of his work On the Being 
and Attributes of God. 

t Answer to a sixth letter, as before, 



248 



SECTION V. 



and time (or, as he terms it, duration) proves the exist- 
ence of something whereof these are qualities, for they 
are not themselves substances ; he cites the celebrated 
Scholium Generate of the Principia ; and he concludes 
that the Deity must be the infinite being of whom they 
are qualities." (pp. 83, 84.) 

The Noble Author, then, has stated, in print, 
his conception that, in the answers to letters 
3, 4 and 5, the two propositions, which he has 
enunciated, are condensed, perhaps explained, cer- 
tainly illustrated. This is extraordinary; for the 
unquestionable fact is that those propositions form 
the first, second and third propositions of Dr 
Clarke's Discourse — while the subject discussed 
in the letters is the siocth proposition of the Dis- 
course. In other words, we find in the Discourse, 

1 . That something has existed from eternity ; 

2. That that something is an immutable and in- 
dependent Being; 3. That that Being is self- 
existent: — we find in the letters, Prop. 6. That 
that Being is infinite and omnipresent. So that 
it is assumed, in the letters, that there is an 
eternal, immutable, self-existent Being; and new 
principles — namely, the existence of space and 
time — are introduced, to prove the infinity and 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 249 

omnipresence of the same Being. So far are the 
letters from presenting a restatement of the fun- 
damental argument. His Lordship, however, may- 
have the satisfaction of thinking that Mr Dugald 
Stewart has taken the same erroneous view of 
the matter. It was, indeed, as I strongly sus- 
pect, that learned metaphysician who led His 
Lordship into the mistake. Thus writes Mr 
Stewart : 

" Proceeding on these principles, Dr Clarke argued, 
that, as immensity and eternity are not substances but at- 
tributes, the immense and eternal Being, whose attributes 
they are, must exist of necessity also. The existence of 
God therefore, according to Clarke, is a truth that follows 
with demonstrative evidence, from those conceptions of 
space and time which are inseparable from the human 
mind."* 

How any person, who had ever read T)r 
Clarke's sixth proposition, could arrive at such 
a conclusion as this — is to me quite inexplicable. 
Instead of the immensity being taken, to prove 
the existence, as Mr Stewart and Lord Brougham 
suppose — the existence is assumed as certain, to 
prove the immensity. I know not whether any 



* Dissertation on Metaphysical Science, Part n. p. 67. 



250 



SECTION V. 



one has before noticed this remarkable misappre- 
hension of Dr Clarke's meaning.* 

The Noble Author next advances some spe- 
cific objections to Dr Clarke's argument; but I 
think it no illegitimate inference, from his Lord- 
ship's mistake respecting the scope of the argu- 
ment, to say that there may very possibly be 
far more in the substance of the argument, than 
he has discovered. This, indeed, is not the place 
to discuss the merits of an abstruse method of 
reasoning ; nor am I concerned to defend the 
validity of the reasoning adopted by Dr Clarke. 
On Lord Brougham's objections, therefore, I shall 
trouble the reader with but few observations. 

Dr Clarke's argument depends upon the reality 
of space and time. Lord Brougham denies that 
reality. " What is time," he asks, " but the 
succession of ideas, and the consciousness and the 
recollection which we have of that succession?" 
From this may be collected his Lordship's notion 
of space. In these opinions he follows certain 

* Butler, in his correspondence with Dr Clarke, understood the 
matter. " In your Demonstration, Prop, vi." (he writes) "you pro- 
pose to prove the infinity or omnipresence of the self-existent Being." 
It may be worth notice that Butler appears 1o have been satisfied 
with the argument as far as Prop. vi. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



251 



continental philosophers. Thus Leibnitz — " Space 
is nothing but the order of things co-existing, 
and time nothing but the order of things suc- 
cessive — so also D'Alembert, but with less de- 
cision : §Til rcy avoit point de corps et de suc- 
cession, Vespace et le temps seroient possible, mais 
Us rt existeroient pas. For my own part, I am 
content to follow Locke and Newton, in believ- 
ing the reality of space and of time. I cannot 
persuade myself that the co-existence of things 
constitutes space, or that their succession consti- 
tutes time ; but I can well understand that the 
co-existence of things enables us to measure space, 
and their succession to estimate time. Mr Dugald 
Stewart declares that he " cannot even form a 
conception of the proposition contended for by 
Leibnitz acknowledges that space must always 
appear something real to him, "while the frame 
of his understanding remains unaltered and 
asks, " Of what data is human reason possessed, 
from which it is entitled to argue in opposition 
to truths, the contrary of which it is impossible 
not only to prove, but to express in terms com- 
prehensible by our faculties?"''" 

t See Dissertation on Metaphysical Science, Part ri, p. 69. 



252 



SECTION V. 



In considering Dr Clarke's sixth proposition, 
the real difficulty is to satisfy the mind respecting 
the notion that space and time are attributes of 
the self-existent Being; on which point no one 
who has not studied, with the closest attention, 
the correspondence between Butler and Clarke, can 
be capable of forming any judgement. To that 
correspondence, therefore, I refer the reader, who 
has any curiosity on the subject. To one ob- 
jection however, much enlarged upon by Lord 
Brougham, I will just advert. 

"If space be deemed a quality, and if infinite space 
be the quality of an infinite being, finite space must also 
be a quality, and must, by parity of reason, be the quality 
of a finite being. Of what being ? Here is a cube of one 
foot within an exhausted receiver, or a cylinder of half an 
inch diameter and three inches high in the Torricellian 
vacuum. What is the being of whom that square and 
that cylindrical space are to be deemed as qualities?" 
(p. 85.) 

To this it may be replied, that Omnipre- 
sence is not locality; and that, to the Being 
who exists everywhere, space must appertain in 
a manner altogether different from that in which 
it belongs to whatever may be (as every thing 
finite may be) successively in different parts of 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI, 



253 



space. The modes of existence with relation to 
space are entirely dissimilar; and there is no 
"parity of reason" which is applicable to the 
cases under consideration. All that I mean to 
assert is, that, whether Dr Clarke's view of the 
matter be right or wrong, Lord Brougham's ar- 
gument is inconclusive. 

Lord Brougham's next object is to give a kind 
of general view of Dr Clarke's Demonstration, 
from beginning to end ; which he does in the 
following terms : 

"It is truly astonishing to find so profound a thinker, 
and, generally speaking, so accurate a reasoner [as Dr 
Clarke] actually supposing that he can deduce from the 
proposition, That a self-existent Being must have existed 
from all time, this other proposition, that therefore this 
Being must be infinitely wise (Prop, xi.j and that 'he 
must of necessity he a Being of infinite goodness, justice 
and truth, and all other moral perfections such as would 
become the governor and judge of the world.' (Prop, xn.) 
With the general texture of this argument we have at 
present nothing to do, further than to show how little it 
can by possibility deserve the name either of an argu- 
ment & priori, or be regarded as the demonstration of a 
necessary truth. For surely, prior to all experience, no 
one could ever know that there were such things as either 
judges or governors; and without the previous idea of a 
finite or worldly ruler and judge, we could never gain 



254 



SECTION V. 



any idea of an eternal and infinitely just ruler and judge; 
and equally certain it is that this demonstration, if it 
proves the existence of an infinite and eternal ruler and 
judge to be a necessary and not a contingent truth (which 
is Dr Clarke's whole argument), would just as strictly 
prove the existence of finite rulers and judges to be a 
necessary and not a contingent truth; or, in other words, 
it would follow, that the existence of governors and judges 
in the world is a necessary truth, like the equality of 
the three angles of a triangle to two right angles; and 
that it would be a contradiction in terms, and so an 
impossibility, to conceive the world existing without go- 
vernors and judges." (pp. 88, 89.) 

Every one who has read the preceding para- 
graph will, of course, conclude that Dr Clarke 
must have immediately inferred that the self- 
existent Being is of necessity infinitely wise. Let 
us, then, trace Dr Clarke^ argument in its pro- 
gress. The sixth proposition, as we have seen, 
is intended to prove that the Self-existent Being 
is omnipresent ; the seventh, that the same Being 
is but One; and the eighth, that the Self-existent 
Being, and original cause of all things, must be 
an intelligent Being. Here, as I have already 
(p. 107-) had occasion to remark, is discussed 
" the main question between us and the atheists;*" 
and here we see the Self-existent Being described 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



255 



as the Creator of "the things that do appear" 
Dr Clarke, moreover, distinctly declares that, to 
establish the Intelligence of the Self-existent Being, 
we must have recourse to the phenomena of the 
world ; with which view he occupies nearly twelve 
closely-printed octavo pages in pointing out the 
indications of intelligence with which the world 
abounds. The ninth proposition is to prove that 
the Self-existent and original Cause of all things 
is a Being endued with liberty and choice ; which 
is proved both from what has gone before, and 
also by an appeal to the disposition of things in 
the world — from final causes — and from the na- 
ture of created beings. The proof of the tenth 
proposition — That the Self-existent Being, the 
Supreme Cause of all things, must have infinite 
power — mainly depends upon the actual consti- 
tution of things, as ascertained by perception and 
consciousness. After this apparatus, comes the 
eleventh proposition — adduced by Lord Brougham 
— That the Supreme Cause and Author of all 
things must of necessity be infinitely wise. And 
here, after availing himself of the information 
afforded by the foregoing propositions — proved 
as well by reference to the phenomena of the 



256 



SECTION V. 



universe, as by abstract reasoning — Dr Clarke 
again dwells upon " the wisdom and perfection 
of the works of God, evidenced more illustri- 
ously in the late discoveries in Astronomy and 
Natural Philosophy " — at the same time recom- 
mending the writings of Galen and Cicero, among 
the ancients — and Boyle, Ray and Derham, 
among the moderns, in confirmation of his views. 
It would be an ill compliment to the reader's 
penetration to suppose that anything more can 
be wanted, to enable him to estimate the cor- 
rectness of Lord Brougham's representation — 
that "from the proposition — that a self-existent 
being has existed from all time" — Dr Clarke has 
deduced, " that therefore this being must be in- 
finitely wise " But, according to the Noble 

Author, Dr Clarke has, from the same premises, 
also deduced "the infinite goodness, justice and 
truth" of the same being, together with " all 
other moral perfections, such as become the Su- 
preme Governor and Judge of the world the 
point which remains finally to be considered. 
Our attention, indeed, is now called to Dr Clarke's 
closing proposition. It was shown, in the pro- 
positions immediately preceding — not solely, the 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI, 



25? 



reader will recollect, by abstract reasoning, but 
also by the evidence of the world around us — 
that the Supreme Being possesses infinite know- 
ledge and the perfection of wisdom — and is abso- 
lutely independent and omnipotent. Now, "all 
evil,"" Dr Clarkes argues, "and all imperfections 
whatsoever, arise either from shortness of under- 
standing, defect of power, or faultiness of will; 
from all which, it being manifest that the Su- 
preme Cause and Author of all things cannot 
but be infinitely removed— -it follows undeniably 
that he must of necessity be a Being of infi- 
nite goodness, justice and truth, and all other 
moral perfections. 11 The importance of some rea- 
soning on the divine benevolence and moral at- 
tributes, previous to the examination of such 
appearances of good or evil as may be found in 
the world, was strongly felt by Mr Dugald 
Stewart. " It is difficult, 11 he observes, " to con- 
■ ceive what other motive [than that of benevo- 
lence] could have induced a Being completely 
and independently happy, to have called his crea- 
tures into existence. — In this manner, without 
any examination of the fact, we have a strong 
presumption for the goodness of the Deity ; and 

R 



SECTION V. 



it is only after establishing this presumption 
a priori, that we can proceed to examine the 
fact with safety."* Here is a sentence, weighty 
with truth, and momentous in its bearings. In 
this manner, we are prepared to contemplate, to 
the best purpose, the providential arrangements 
and moral tendencies of the system of things pre- 
sented to our view. More, than what has now 
been adduced, cannot be required to vindicate the 
reasoning here adopted by Dr Clarke. At all 
events, with regard to the statement — that there 
is, as it were, but one step, between the suppo- 
sition of a Self-existent Being and the proof of 
a Being of infinite goodness, justice and truth — 
we now see how many important propositions are 
interposed, and consequently how little the state- 
ment is borne out by fact. Indeed, I can scarcely 
conceive how any one, intent on sketching an 
object placed before him, could possibly have pro- 
duced a picture more unlike the reality, than 
Lord Brougham's description is, in all its parts, 
to Dr Clarke's original .... I have now redeemed 
the pledge which was given in the 236th page 
The Noble Author's observations, respecting " the 

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 190. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORL 



259 



existence of governors and judges in the world 
being a necessary truth, like the equality of the 
three angles of a triangle to two right angles,'" 
can have arisen solely from a total misapprehen- 
sion of Dr Clarke's method of reasoning. There 
are, however, other reasons, which induce me to 
lament that the latter part of the paragraph 
should ever have been published . , . . Why His 
Lordship should have taken so much trouble, with 
regard to Dr Clarke's labours, does not appear; 
but, in addition to all the objections alleged against 
the substance and validity of the general argument, 
we find some strictures, on its originality, which 
cannot be allowed to pass without examination. 

Lord Brougham's language tends to leave, 
upon the reader's mind, an impression that Clarke's 
argument was derived from Locke's Essay on 
Human Understanding. His Lordship gives the 
preference to Locke's argument. I have no wish 
to arbitrate between Locke and Clarke ; although 
several matters are alleged, which are well en- 
titled to consideration. It is, however, beyond 
doubt that the primary position of Locke "does 
not materially differ" from that of Clarke; and 
in fact, this primary position had been taken ad- 
r 2 



260 



SECTION V. 



vantage of, long before the time either of Clarke 
or of Locke*. But as to any appropriation, of 
any part of Locke's Essay, I can state that, in 
the Preface to the Evidences of Natural and Re- 
vealed Religion, Clarke had occasion to notice 
some abusive remarks (by a Cartesian) upon his 
work, On the Being and Attributes of God; on 
which occasion he thus wrote : " The rest of the 
book is all either an indecent and unreasonable 
reviling of the learned Mr Locke : from whom 
I neither cited any passage, nor (that I know 
of) borrowed any argument from him : and there- 
fore is altogether impertinent." Believing that, 
on this point, Dr Clarke's word ought to go 
farther than any other person's surmise, I pro- 
ceed to the next charge of plagiarism which has 
been advanced. 

Mr Dugald Stewart's mistake — in supposing 
that Dr Clarke intended, from the nature of 
space and time, to prove the existence of God, 
when he really was proving the omnipresence — 
has been pointed out. While discussing that 
subject, Mr Stewart made use of the following 
language — "An argument, substantially the same 

* See the quotation from Cudworth, pp. 241 — 243. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



261 



with this, for the existence of God, is hinted at 
very distinctly by Cudworth, Intellectual System, 
Chap. V. Sect. 3, 4."* From this suggestion, I 
believe — for it is not expressly so stated — Lord 
Brougham concluded that Dr Clarke probably 
took his own argument from Dr Cudworth. The 
Noble Author thus writes : 

" Dr Cudworth, in the fifth chapter of his great work, 
has, in answering the Democritic arguments, so plainly 
anticipated Dr Clarke, that it is hardly possible to con- 
ceive how the latter should have avoided referring to it, 
' If space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and 
a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it 
undeniably follow, from this very principle of theirs, that 
there must be incorporeal space [substance] and (this 
space being supposed by them to be infinite) an infinite 
incorporeal Deity.' " (p. 92.) 

It is clear from the structure of the sentence 
from Cudworth, more especially from the words 
in Italics, which Lord Brougham by some acci- 
dent omitted in transcribing — as well as from 
other parts of the Intellectual System — that the 
argument was intended for a confutation of the 
followers of Democritus, on their own principles. 
There is no reason to conclude that Cudworth 

* Dissertation on Metaphysical Philosophy, Part u. p. 67. n. 



262 



SECTION V. 



would have stood by the argument, in any other 

point of view, His Lordship, however, has quoted 

another passage ; and so much of it as may throw 

light upon the present question, I will extract : 

"We conclude, therefore, that from this very hypothesis 
of the Democritic and Epicurean atheists, that space is 
of a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it 
follows undeniably that there must be some incorporeal 
substance whose affection its extension is; and because 
there can be nothing infinite but only the Deity, that 
it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity ; just 
as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted" 
(p. 93, or Cudworth, p. 769.) 

The concluding words, here printed in Italics 
— which also Lord Brougham accidentally omitted 
in transcribing — show that such notions of space 
were at that time well known to " learned Theists 
and Incorporealists with whose writings Dr 
Clarke, as well as Dr Cudworth, may have been 
acquainted*. . . . The truth is that, prior to the 
time of Dr Clarke, there had been much abstract 

* Since the preceding remarks on the passages from Cudworth 
were written, I find that Mosheim, in his Latin Translation of the 
Intellectual System agrees with me in my view of the argument. 
" Ad hominem, ut in scholis loqui solent, hie disputat vir longe doc- 
tissimus, et ex ipsis eorum, qui cum Democrito et Epicuro faciunt, 
de natura spatii decretis argumentum eorum adversus Deum corpore 
vacantem evertit." p. 1007. ed. 1733. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



263 



speculation, on the proof of the being and attri- 
butes of God ; and he had read, I have no doubt, 
every thing of the kind, that was worth reading. 
But when he sat down to write, it was no crude 
information that he had to communicate. Every 
thing bore the impression of his own mind. By 
continued meditation, his knowledge had acquired 
the form and coherence of system — In former 
days, he seems to have been more justly esti- 
mated. Bentley and Clarke appear to have been 
associated in the mind of Johnson. The great 
moralist, when asked whether some one studied 
hard, replied, " No, Sir. I do not believe he 
studied hard. I never knew a man who studied 
hard. I conclude, indeed, from the effects, that 
some men have studied hard, as Bentley and 
Clarke." On another occasion, " Snatches of 
reading," he said, " will not make a Bentley or 

a Clarke."* These are not the men to be 

placed on their trial for literary larceny. 

There is, indeed, another author, besides Cud- 
worth, from whom Lord Brougham supposes Dr 
Clarke's abstract argument to have been derived; 

* Boswell's Life of Johnson, Vol. i. p. 47, and Vol, iv. p. 20, 
ed. 1807, 



264 



SECTION V. 



namely, Sir Isaac Newton. In page 90, His 
Lordship adverts to the Scholium Generate, at the 
end of the Principia, 'which, he says, " is thought 
to have suggested it;" and again in page 150, to 
that " celebrated Scholium, upon which Dr Clarke's 
argument a priori for the existence of a Deity is 
built." Here, likewise, I take it for granted that 
Lord Brougham directs his course, as Mr Dugald 
Stewart points the way. This latter gentleman, 
in his Dissertation so frequently quoted, men- 
tions Newton's Scholium as " the germ" of Clarke's 
" celebrated argument a priori ;" gives an anec- 
dote of Clarke, from which it appears that, even 
while yet a boy, he had a clear conviction of 
the absolute and independent existence of space; 
and then goes on — " With this early and deep 
impression on his mind, it is easy to conceive 
how Newton's Scholium should have encouraged 
him to resume the musings of his boyish days, 
concerning the necessary existence of space; and 
to trace, as far as he could, its connexion with 

the principles of Natural Theology."* This is 

so delightful a vision, that one is almost afraid 
to move or breathe, lest it should vanish into 

* Dissertation, p. 69. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 26'5 



air ; but the dull reality is, that Dr Clarke's work 
came out in 1704 — and "the celebrated Scho- 
lium'''' first made its appearance in 1713, when 
the second edition of the Principia was published ! 
Such is the value of refined speculation, in mat- 
ters of this kind. Mr Stewart's mistake is the 
more remarkable, because he has himself recorded 
that 66 the Scholium first appeared at the end of 
the second edition of the Principia, printed at 
Cambridge in 1713; the former edition, published 
at London in 1687, having no Scholium annexed 

to it." Having mentioned this inaccuracy, I 

may, without in the least detracting from the 
merits of Mr Stewart as a philosophical writer, 
observe — that his literary notices are by no means 
to be depended upon. From several instances 
which might be adduced, I will select one; and 
as it has no relation to the subject now discussed, 
the reader will find it given in a note, at the 

end of the present section After all, Mr 

Stewart may, in this instance, have been misled 
by the circumstance that, in Clarke's fifth letter 
to Butler (at the end of the Demonstration), the 
Scholium is quoted in the margin. The letter, 
however, bears date April 8, 1714, and therefore 



266 



SECTION V. 



was written after the publication of the second 
edition of the Principia. It appears also that 
Dr Clarke was in the habit of adding marginal 
notes, in the successive editions of his work, on 
the Being and Attributes of God. 

There is, to my mind, something unaccount- 
able in these modern attempts to lower the cha- 
racter of Dr Clarke. He opposed not the usual 
mode of proof : on the contrary, a reference to 
the 109th page of this volume will show how 
highly he estimated the indications, of the Divine 
being and perfections, presented by the material, 
the moral and the intellectual worlds. With Dr 
Cudworth, he seems " neither to have had any 
mind to quarrel with other men's arguments pro 
Deo, nor yet to be thought to lay stress upon 
anything which is not every way solid and sub- 
stantial."* Mr Winston has given an anecdote, 
respecting Dr Clarke and his Discourses at Boyle's 
Lecture, which I trust will be interesting to 
every reader: 

44 After this, a. d. 1704, and 1705, Mr. Clarke preached, 
and soon after published his sixteen Sermons at Mr Boyle's 
Lecture, in two Volumes ; containing 1 Discourses concern- 

* Intellectual System., p, 721 1 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



267 



ing the Being and Attributes of God ; the Obligations of 
Natural Religion; and the Truth and Certainty of the 
Christian Revelation.' And I have been informed, that 
Dr Smalridge said, of one or both of those volumes, ' It 
was the best book on those subjects that had been written 
in any language.' When Mr Clarke brought me his 
book — it was the first volume, I suppose — I was in my 
garden over against St Peter's College in Cambridge, where 
I then lived. Now I perceived that in these Sermons he 
had dealt a great deal in abstract and metaphysic rea- 
sonings. I therefore asked him how he ventured into 
such subtilties, which I never durst meddle with? And 
showing him a nettle, or the like contemptible weed in 
my garden, I told him, ' That weed contained better ar- 
guments for the Being and Attributes of God than all 
his Metaphysics.' Mr Clarke confessed it to be so; but 
alleged for himself, 'That since such Philosophers as 
Hobbes and Spinoza had made use of those kind of sub- 
tilties against, he thought proper to shew that the like 
way of reasoning might be made better use of on the 
side of Religion.' Which reason or excuse I allowed not 
to be inconsiderable."* 

My inference, from all this, is — that whatever 
objections, are brought against the writings of 
Dr Clarke, ought to bear the marks of deliberate 
inquiry, and indicate respect for the character of 
a great man ; and I am the more confirmed in 
my conclusion, on finding Lord Brougham at last 

* Whiston's Memoirs of Dr Clarke, pp. 7, 8, 



'268 



SECTION V. 



adopting a considerable portion of the following 
sentiments from the pen of Mr Dugald Stewart : 

"Although the argument, as stated by Dr Clarke, does 
not carry complete satisfaction to my mind, I think it must 
be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful 
and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity 
and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish 
from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own 
existence. Nay, further, I think that these conceptions 
are intimately connected with the fundamental principles 
of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, 
from the evidences of design everywhere manifested around 
us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause, 
we are unavoidably led to apply to this cause our con- 
ceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive Him 
as filling the infinite extent of both with his presence 
and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea 
of God those awful impressions which are naturally pro- 
duced by the idea of infinite space and perhaps still 
more by the idea of infinite duration. Nor is this all. 
It is from the immensity of space that the notion of in- 
finity is originally derived ; and it is hence that we transfer 
the expression, by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. 
When we speak, therefore, of infinite power, wisdom 
and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from 
space, are at least greatly aided by this analogy; so 
that the conceptions of Immensity and Eternity, if they 
do not of themselves demonstrate the existence of God, 
yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature 
and attributes."* 

* Dissertation, &c. p. 67. 



ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 



269 



Something of the misapprehension already 
pointed out, respecting the object of Dr Clarke's 
sixth proposition, pervades the whole of the 
preceding extract. Had Mr Stewart perceived 
the real import of the proposition, he would 
have more distinctly seen how greatly it may 
assist the mind, in forming those sublime con- 
ceptions of the Deity, on which he has expa- 
tiated with so much eloquence. Of that elo- 
quence I would not weaken the effect. I despair, 
indeed of closing the section more happily, than 
by means of a sentence which I have just met 
with. It suits the present train of thought; and 
Lord Brougham will agree with me, in not 
liking it the less, because it was written by a 
learned non-conformist. " The consideration of 
the infinite distance between God and the crea- 
ture, which strongly appears upon reading such 
a book as Dr Clarke's, directly tends to promote 
humility, perfect resignation, and all those other 
dispositions, which ought to be constantly preva- 
lent in our bosoms, towards our Great Creator, 
in whom we live and move and have our 
being?'' 



270 



.SECTION V. 



Note referred to p. 265. 
There are, in the Letters of Junius, some 
verses, cited by Mr Home, as the words of his 
" ancient monitor.' 1 The same verses also are thus 
cited by Mr Dugald Stewart : " In the following 
rude lines of Churchill, which Mr [Home] Tooke's 
Letter to Junius has made familiar to every ear, 
the feelings which give to the stone arch its pe- 
culiar character of grandeur are painted with 
equal justness and spirit: 

— — Tis the last key-stone 
That makes the arch; the rest that there were put 
Are nothing till that comes to bind and shut. 
Then stands it a triumphant mark : then men 
Observe the strength, the height, the why and when 
It was erected ; and still, walking under, 
Meet some new matter to look up and wonder." * 

Now the difficulty here is, to imagine how 
any one could have failed to perceive that these 
lines must have been written at least a century 
prior to the time of Churchill. In fact, they 
are Ben Jonson's; and form part of An Epistle 
to Sir Edward Sackville, Earl of Dorset, to be 
found in the Underwoods, Home's Letter, of 
which the preceding verses form the conclusion, 
is the 51st of the series; and we find a quotation 
from the same poem in the 53d letter. 

* Stewart's Philosophical Essays, p. 412. ed. 2, 1816. 



271 



SECTION VI. 

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 

(Discourse, Notes, pp. 263—280.) 

This subject is introduced by Lord Brougham, 
primarily in confirmation of his views of Natural 
Theology ; and in the next place, on account 
of its bearing upon the doctrines of Bishop War- 
burton, yet to be discussed. The opinions in 
question relate, 1. to mind; 2. to The Deity and 
matter ; and 3. to the immortality of the soul. 
On each of these I shall offer my remarks with 
all possible brevity. 

1. Ancient opinions respecting mind. Notwith- 
standing much discrepancy of sentiment on topics of 
this nature, there was a very general belief of the 
immateriality of the soul. Lord Brougham quotes 
Plato and Aristotle, as holding nearly the same 
language on the subject. " Plato," he observes, 
" speaks of the ovcria aetofxaTos /cat vonr*}? [it 
ought to be ovcria dcrw^aro^ kcu vorjTtj.'j — a bodi- 



272 



SECTION VI. 



less and intelligent being?. . . Now, voy\ty\ is not in- 
telligent, but intelligible; that is, perceivable ; or 
conceivable, by the understanding. If intelligent 
had been the meaning, intended to be conveyed, 
vovTiKrj would have been the word. Cudworth 
observes that Plato <c uses the expression ovala 
vorjrrj intelligible substance, in opposition to the 
other, which he calls ovaia alcr6r}Ti] sensible," or 
perceptible by the senses.* And this correction is 
the more important , because there is some reason 
to think the ovor'ia vorjrrj refers to Plato^ notion 
of ideas, or the forms of things ; to which also the 
passage next quoted by Lord Brougham — and, as 
it happens, the next, by Cudworth — may equally 
relate : to. dawiuara, KaWiara ovtol Kal [xeyicrTa, 

* See Cudworth's Intellectual System, Chap. i. Sect. 19. Mo- 
sheim, in his translation, has completely misunderstood the pas- 
sage ; as the following version will convince the learned reader : 
" overlay vor\Ti)v, substantiam intelligentem [appellat] ut discrimen 
earum ab altero illo rerum ordine indicaret, quas ovo-ias aicrdriTr]?, 
substantia sentientis nomine sigjiificat." These are strange mistakes 
for Mosheim to have made — extending not only to Plato's Greek 
but to Cudworth's English. A history of mistakes, in any depart- 
ment of literature, would be a curious document. Olympiodorus, 
an old Greek commentator, wished to give vovTt) an active sig- 
nification, although against the rule, as he observed. But Proclus, 
better acquainted with the Platonic philosophy, assigned to the 
word its ordinary meaning. 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



273 



\6yip fxovov, a\\o) Se ovSevl, Gcxpws ielnvvTcti—— 
things incorporeal, being the most excellent and 
greatest of all, are made manifest, or discovered, 
by reason alone, and no otherwise. Lord Broug- 
ham goes on to cite a passage from Plato, for the 
purpose of representing the body as the prison of 
the soul; but it is given so incorrectly — eiKova 
Seo'ju.LOTqpiov eivai ovv ty}<$ ^vyris avTo ew$ ijv 
rot o<pei\ojueva to aoo^xa — as to be divested of 
all meaning. In the Cratylus (s. 38.) we find 
the following: tovtov <5e weptftoXov Gyjeiv, 'iva 
croo^rat, ieatxwTripiov eiKova' elvai ovv Trj<$ 
\|/i/^>79 tovto, irep civ to ovofj.ct'CeTai, ecu? ctv 
eKTiarj to. 6(pei\6/ULeva, to aw/ua, kclI ovSev 
Seiv Trapctyeiv ovSe ypdfxjuLa' intimating that, 
as a punishment till its debts are paid, or faults 
expiated, the soul is imprisoned within the 
body; which, on account of thus keeping the 
soul in custody, is called o-wjua His Lord- 
ship then quotes an expression of Aristotle — 
ovcr'ta ^wpiaTri kcu Ke^oopiafievv] twv aio-QtjTwi; — 
to show that philosopher's belief in a substance 
separable and separated from things perceivable by 

the senses. It is employed by Cudworth (p. 19, 

. s 



274 



SECTION VI. 



as before) with the same view .... The two subse- 
quent passages, also from Aristotle — adduced 
with the design of proving that philosopher's 
opinion to be, that the soul (thereby meaning 
the highest intellectual power) is always con- 
nected with matter of some kind or other — are 
entirely misunderstood. We have first a passage 
from the treatise de generatione animalium (ii. 4.), 
which will be sufficiently intelligible to the learned 
reader : earn Se to fxeu acojaa e/c tov O^Xeos, y) $e 
^vyji e/c tou appevos' rj yap ^v^rj oua'ia aoofxa- 
T09 twos ecrTiv. Lord Brougham gives only the 
latter part of the sentence. The whole would 
have shown that Aristotle was probably writing, 
as he really was, not of the animus peculiar to 
man, but of the anima which is common to 

men and animals The next passage, from 

the treatise de anima (ii. 2), is very imperfectly 
transcribed ; and, as in the preceding case, does 
not refer to the vov?. Aristotle is here discus- 
sing the ^vyji, the perishable anima, belonging 
to plants and animals, in general. His words 
are these : /cat $ta tovto koXws v7ro\a/a/3dvovcni> 
oi<z dotcei . /urjT avev cw/xaros eivai fir}re awua 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



275 



ti rj ^vyji' ado/uia /uev yap ovk ecrTi, (Tw/uaTos 
$e n : in Lord Brougham's version — Those there- 
fore rightly hold who think that the soul cannot 
exist without the body, and yet that it is not 
body ; it is not the body, but somewhat of the 
body. To what senses the word ^v-^ was 
to be considered as extending, is sufficiently 
clear from the whole tenor of the discussion; 
but to prevent mistakes, Aristotle, not many 
lines before, had positively stated that he did 
not include the understanding — that being capa- 
ble of separation from the body — the eternal 
from the corruptible: Trepl $e rod vov kcli Trjs 
OeoprjTiKrjs Suvajuecos ovSev it to (pavepov, aW eoiKe 
^/vyji's yevos erepou elvai, koI tovto fxovov evSe- 
^erat yiop'i(e<j9ai, KaOdirep to ai^iov tov (p6ap- 
rov. These quotations from Aristotle, therefore, 
have no connexion with the subject which they 
were designed to illustrate .... A passage from 
Plato (de legg. x. 12) here adduced — ewei Se det 
^vyrj (TWTerayiJ.€vr] aw/mari, Tore fxeu aXXay 
Tore $e aWip, since the soul is always annexed 
to a body, sometimes to one and sometimes to 
another — is more to the purpose; for although 
s 2 



276 



SECTION VI. 



it does not indicate any impossibility of the 
existence of the soul apart from the body, yet, 
by referring to the transmigration of the soul, 
it involves the distinction between the soul and 

the body The next appeal to antiquity will 

require more attention. I give the paragraph as 
I find it : 

" This corporeal connexion is stated by Plutarch, in the 
Qucest. Platon., still more plainly to have been the Platonic 
doctrine — v/xtn^i/ TrpecrfSvrepav rov o-to/xaros, ctiTiav re 
Trj? €K€ivou y€ve<r€(o<: Kai apyt]v % ovk a yeveadat ypv^t]u 
avev crto/xaTo? ovde vow avev v// - ^^?, a\\a \J/v%r]v fxeu 
ev a-wpari, vow Be ev rrj \lsu%r]. The soul is older than 
the body, and the cause and origin of its existence ; not 
that the soul exists without the body, or the understand- 
ing without the soul; but that the soul is in the body, 
and the understanding in the soul" (p. 265.) 

I am surprised that the Noble Author was 
not here aware that the stream of thought did 
not exactly "run smooth." For, not to mention 
other points, What is the meaning of the soul 
being "the cause and origin" of the body's ex- 
istence? The fact is — Plutarch is writing on a 
totally different subject; namely, the formation 
of the world; as the passage, when fairly laid 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



277 



before the reader, will abundantly testify : "rt 
&7 7roT€ rrjv \fsvxrjv del irpecrfivrepav a7ro<pai- 
vu)v too aco/j.aros 9 a it lav Se Trjs eKeivov yeve- 
aews Kal dpyj\v^ iraXiv (prjaiv ovk dv yevecrOai 
YV)(r]V avev o~co/u.aTos 9 ovde vow avev y v X^9 
aXXa ^v^rjv fxev ev crto/uaTi, vovv Se ev Trj ^w^r/, 
— So^ei yap to (Ttojua teal elvai Kal /txr) elvai, 
avvvirdpy^ov dfxa Trj ^u^rj, Kal yevwfxevov vwo 
Trj<s "v//f^>79. tj to 7roXXa/a? v<p* rjfxwv Xeydfxe- 
vov aXfjOes eo~Tiv ; tj fxev yap avovs ^v^rj 
to d/xop(j)ov (jwfxa uvvvirrjp^ov aXXrjXots del, 
Kal ovSeTepov avTwv yeveaiv ecr^ev ovie dp^rjv' 
eirel <5e r] ^v^r} vod /ueTeXafte Kal dp/Jiov'ias, 
Kal yevofxevr] Sid avvcpwv'ias efxcppwv, /xeTafioXrjs 
aWia yeyove Trj vXy, Kal KpaTqo~ao~a Tats avTrjs 
Kivr\Geo~i ret? eKe'ivrfs eireo"KaGaTo Kal eweaTpe- 
\f/ev, ovtco to arwjua tov koct/uov yeveciv eo~^ev 
V7r6 r>79 ^v-^rj^. Plutarch here notices an ap- 
parent discrepancy in the language of Plato; in 
writing, as he does, on soul being older than 
body, and the cause and origin of its existence, 
and yet that neither does soul exist without body, 
nor understanding without soul ; but soul in 



278 



SECTION VI. 



body, and understanding in soul; — so that body 
appears to be and not to be at the same time — 
to exist along with soul, and yet to be formed 
by it. He solves the difficulty by supposing that 
soul without understanding, and body without 
form, always co-existed — without cause or origin ; 
but that when soul acquired understanding and 
harmony, and thus became wise, it produced a 
change in matter, and by the potency of its own 
operations, controuled and directed the motions 
of matter. And so the body of the world had 
its origin in mind.* .... Enough has now been 
given, to show the Noble Authors misapprehen- 
sion on the subject .... From the extracts from 
Plato and Plutarch, His Lordship draws the fol- 
lowing inferences; which, whether true or not, 
are certainly not established by evidence : "Ac- 
cording to these representations and quotations 
taken together, Plato held the soul to be an 
immaterial substance, separable from any given 
body, but incapable of existing without some 
body or other ; and the mind or understanding 
to be a part of the soul." 



* Plut. Op. Xyland, Vol, u. p. 1002, 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



279 



After a quotation from Plato, indicating that 
the soul is a self-moving substance, we find a 
well-known declaration of Epictetus, stating that 
the human soul is actually a part of the divine 
substance; and then another extract from Plu- 
tarch, also appearing to affirm that the soul is 
a portion severed from the substance of the 
Deity. This last passage has been adduced by 
various learned persons, besides Lord Brougham 
— Warburton is in the number — under the im- 
pression that it relates to the human soul; 
whereas it is as far from being connected with 
that subject as I have shown the preceding pas- 
sage from Plutarch to be. In the incomplete 
shape, indeed, in which it is presented by His 
Lordship, there is nothing about it tending to 
excite any suspicion of mistake : " rj $e ^v^rj 
ovk epyov earl [xovov, dWd k<x\ fiepos' ov&' vw 
avTou aXX air avTov Kai ej£ clvtov yeyovev——* 
the soul is not only his work, but a part of 
himself; it was not created by him, but from 
him, and out of him? 

The real passage however, with a little of the 
context, will evince the error of supposing that 
this sentence affirms anything with regard to the 



280 



SECTION VI. 



human soul : tovtoov fxaXio'Ta Ttj$ YlXdrcovos 

a7TTOfl6VUi)V ^of^9, €TTL(JTr)GOV €l KCLK.61VO. Xe^O^Ore- 

tcu TriOavws, oti ^volv ovtoiv cov 6 koct/ulos 
avveaTrjKe, croj/xaro? Kal ^t^S) rd /uev ovk eyev- 
vtjcre 0eos, aXXd tj}? vXrjs 7rapao")(oiu.€vri$ 9 ejixdp- 
(pcoae kg. l avv^p!JLoae f 7repao~iv oiKelois Kal o")0- 
fxacri extras' Kal oplaas to direipov' r\ ^vyji 
[vov nxeTaa^ovaa Kal Xoyic^ov Kal dpiuLOviaf\ ovk 
epyov earl tov Oeov julovov, aXXd Kal fxepos' ovd" 
V7T aurou, dXX' air avTov, Kal e£ avTov yeyovev* 
From this, it appears that Plutarch wished the 
reader to consider the correctness of some opi- 
nions connected with those of Plato : namely, 
that there were two things, body and soul, from 
which God composed the world: the former 
[body] God did not create, but taking the bound- 
less, shapeless matter that was presented, gave it 
form and symmetry; while the latter, the soul 
before mentioned, partaking of understanding and 
reason and harmony, was not only the work of 
God — but part of himself — from himself and out 

of himself The long continued mistake, of be^ 

lieving that any doctrine respecting the human 

* Plutarch, p. 1001. 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



281 



soul was laid down in this passage of Plutarch, is 
now sufficiently exposed. This passage, and the 
preceding one from the same writer, throw light 
upon each other; and I will only observe farther 
upon it, that if, in quoting the latter part of the 
sentence, the words which I have enclosed within 
brackets had not been omitted, an inquirer, anxious 
to know the truth of things, would have been led by 
them to examine the original, and judge for himself. 

Having now gone through Lord Brougham's 
quotations and observations under the first head, 
I may observe, in conclusion, that but little 
has really been made out. At the same time, 
it is but right to state that I have no wish to 
gainsay the inferences which His Lordship would 
draw from the whole. My notion is, that some 
slight intimations have been afforded, of what 
might be distinctly shown by a copious induc- 
tion of particulars; namely, that, in the schools 
of ancient philosophy, an opinion very generally 
prevailed that the human soul was originally a 
portion severed from the divine substance, and 
therefore by nature immortal — and that it was 
destined — after a series of migrations from one 
body to another — according to Plato, for moral 



282 



SECTION VL 



purposes, as punishment, reward and purification 
— to constitute, once more, a part of the divine 
substance — the individual existence being lost in 
the existence of the Deity. 

2. Ancient opinions respecting the Deity and 
matter. Lord Brougham appears to think more 
highly, of the ancient opinions respecting the 
Deity, than he is warranted in doing by the evi- 
dence adduced on the subject. The note now to 
be considered opens thus: 

"The notions of the Supreme Being entertained by 
the ancient philosophers were more simple and consistent 
than their theory of the soul ; and but for the belief, which 
they never shook off, in the eternity of matter, would very 
nearly have coincided with our own. They give him the 
very same names, and clothe him apparently in the like at- 
tributes. He is not only a6avaro<; y c«pdapTo<;, avooXeOpos, 

immortal, incorruptible, indestructible — but ccyivrjros, 

avroyevr]?, avro(pvt]<;, avdvirocrrciTos — uncreated, self- 
made, self -originating, self-existing. Zmov iraa-av e-^ov 
fxaKapiorrjTa p.€T acpdapvias, says Epicurus — A being 
having all happiness, with an incorruptible nature. Again, 
he is TravTOKparwp, Tra^KpaTr}^ — omnipotent, all-powerful ; 
hwarai yap aitavTa, says Homer (Odyss. f) — He has 
power over all things. The creative power is also in words 
at least ascribed to him. — koo-^otto^t^?, ZriiAiovpyos — 
the maker of the world, the great artificer," (pp. 2*J6, 267.) 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



283 



The preceding paragraph was, I have no doubt, 
suggested by a passage in Cud worth's Intellectual 
System; the remarks, however, of that learned 
writer show the necessity of caution in drawing 
inferences, of the kind intended by Lord Brougham, 
from many of the expressions enumerated by His 
Lordship. I cannot but think the matter of suffi- 
cient consequence to warrant my requesting that 
the sentiments of Cudworth may be compared 
with those of the Noble Author. 

" Even the Atheists readily acknowledge it for an in- 
dubitable truth, that there must be something dyevrjrov, 
something which was never made or produced, and which 
therefore is the cause of those other things that are made; 
something avrocpves and avOviroarraTov, that was self- 
originated and self-existing ; and which is as well aW- 
Aedpov and atpQaprov as dyei'rjrov, incorruptible and un- 
destroyable as ingenerable ; whose existence therefore must 
needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have 
happened by chance to have existed from eternity, then 
it might as well happen again to cease to be. Where- 
fore all the question now is, what is this d^kvr\rov and 
ducoXedpov, avTO(pve<5 and avdviroo-raTov, or, this ingene- 
rable and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent 
thing, which is the cause of all other things that are 
made?"* 

* Intellectual System, C iv. Sec. 3. p. 194. 



284 



SECTION VI. 



The fact thus recorded by Cudworth — that 
the Atheists had no hesitation in applying, to 
the Cause of all things, the epithets ayevr}Toi', 
a(pOafjrov, and so on — shows how little can be 
deduced, from Lord Brougham's premises, in fa- 
vour of the ancient creed on this important point. 
On a matter so evident, it would be a waste 
of time to dwell ; and therefore I proceed to 
His Lordship's quotation from Epicurus — whose 
disposition to allow a Deity in name, provided 
that he removed the reality, has been long ago 
celebrated by Cicero. Epicurus then, according 
to the Noble Author, describes the First Cause, 
as ^woc Traaav e^ov /uaKapiortjTa /mer' dcj)8apcrla<$ 
— a being having all happiness with an incor- 
ruptible nature. Now when I consider that this 
expression of Epicurus occurs in Cudworth, within 
a few pages of the preceding extract, I cannot 
but suppose that it was derived from that source ; 
on which supposition, it is to be lamented that 
the dictum of the old philosopher, if extracted 
at all, should have been given without some of 
Cudworth's remarks. Let me therefore supply 
the omission. 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



285 



" Now, of all those, whosoever they were, who thus 
maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, 
we may pronounce universally that they were neither better 
nor worse than a kind of imperfect Theists. They had a 
certain notion, or idea, of God, such as it was; which 
seems to be the very same with that expressed in Arts-* 
totle, "Cfiov apia-rov diBtov, an animal, the best, eternal; 
and represented also by Epicurus in this manner, £wov 
iraaav e^ov /j.aKapi6rrjTa /j.€t acpdapcr'ias, an animal 
that hath all happiness with incorruptibility. Wherein 
it was acknowledged by them that, besides senseless mat- 
ter, there was an animalish, and conscious or perceptive 
nature, self-existent from eternity."* 

We can now understand the kind of Theism 
indicated by the expression of Epicurus ; a Theism 
which we find in great abundance amongst the 
philosophers of ancient times. Asserting, as they 
did, the eternity of matter, they had no scruple 
in allowing the eternity and incorruptibility of 
a sentient principle, distinct from matter. This 
they endowed, in their imaginations, with the 
most excellent qualities which they supposed it 
capable of possessing; calling it apiarou teal ima- 
KapiivTcirov, the best and most happy. Beyond 
this, many of the philosophers did not go; while 
pthers exalted their minds to the idea of a Su- 
* Intellectual System, C. iv. Sec. 7. p. 198. 



286 SECTION VI. 

preme Intelligence or Understanding, not creating 
matter, which they also believed to be eternal — 
but moulding it into all its varied forms, and 
giving order and stability to the universal fa- 
brick : — hence the names SritMovpyos, iravroKpa- 
Td)p 9 indicating the boundless power of the Deity, 
as the maker and governor of the world. Plu- 
tarch has recorded his approbation of Plato's 
doctrine, on this subject, in a passage quoted by 
Cud worth and Lord Brougham. After stating 
the opinions of Heraclitus, Plutarch prefers those 
of Plato in the following terms : <( BeXnov ovv 

UXa.TWPl 7T6l6otJl€VOVS TOV (X€V KOGfXOV VTTO 0€OV 

yeyovevai Xeyeiv /cat a^eiv' 6 fj.ev yap KaXXio~To$ 
tcov yeyovoTtov, 6 Se dpio~To<s twv aWiwv' ty\v 
$e ovGiav /cat vXqv e£ j}? yeyovev, ov yevoimevviv, 
dXXci v7roK€ifj.€i'f}v del tw Srjfxiovpyw ets SidOecriv 
Kctl Ta^tv avTrjs, /cat 7rp6s avrov e(*0(JLol(x)(Tiv 9 ws 
Svvcltov rjv TrapaG^eiv' ov ydp e/c rod jurj ovros 
v] yeveais, a\\' e/c tov fxr} KctXcHs nqo" iKctvws 
e^o^Tos, cos ot/cta? /cat \[ixaTiov /cat dv^pidvros. 
It is therefore better for us to follow Plato, (than 
Heraclitus) and loudly to declare that the world was 
made by God. For as the world is the best of 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



287 



all works, so is God the best of all causes. Never- 
theless the substance or matter, out of which the 
world was made, was not itself made; but 
always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer 
to be ordered and disposed by him. For the 
making of the world was not the production of 
it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad 
and disorderly state, like the making of an house, 
garment or statue?* 

Several passages from Aristotle, which Lord 
Brougham has quoted with great propriety, indi- 
cate a similar opinion on the part of that most 
acute philosopher. The doctrine moreover, that 
no substance could be created or destroyed, was 
applied to the soul as well as to matter; and the 
philosophical writings of those ages abound in 
speculations on the subject. On the pre-existence 
of the soul, implied in its derivation from the di- 
vine essence — its natural immortality — and its 
ultimate restoration to its primary source — a few 
observations were offered under the preceding head. 
This very prevalent doctrine of ancient times is, 
as the Noble Author has stated, " most unsatis- 

* Intellectual System, C. iv. Sec. 6. p. 197. I have given Cud- 
worth'? translation. 



288 



SECTION VI. 



factory and has, in a moral point of view, some 
important consequences which will by and by re- 
quire consideration .... Under the present head, 
I need only farther observe, that Lord Brougham 
has fairly stated the difference of sentiment amongst 
the philosophers, respecting a divine providence ; 
exemplifying his remarks by referring to the 
Epicureans on the one hand, and Plato on the 
other: — for while the Epicureans held that the 
Gods were altogether indifferent to the affairs of 
men — Plato opposed the tenet, in the strongest 
language of condemnation. 

3. Ancient opinions respecting the immortality 
of the soul. Much of what has been advanced 
under the two preceding heads, if not equally ap- 
plicable to the present topic, undoubtedly bears 
upon it with great force. Aristotle, as Cudworth 
has truly remarked, asserts that " the ancient 
philosophers were afraid of nothing more than 
this one thing, that anything should be made out 
of nothing pre-existent? Hence their derivation 
of the rational soul from the substance of the 
Deity. The soul, moreover, thus being, in their 
estimation a part of the Deity, was by its very 
nature immortal. They therefore held it to be, 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, 



289 



like the Divinity himself, dtpQaproi' Kal dvwXe- 
0poi> 9 something' incorruptible and indestructible. 
To that effect writes Plato, as cited by Lord 
Brougham : oVoVe c)rj to dQdvarov Kal a$id<p0o- 
pdv €(ttlv 9 aXXo ti ^vyri 9 rj, ei dOdvaros Tuy^dvei 
ovcra, Kal dvcoXeOpos dv eirj ; arguing, from the 
general principle, that whatever is immortal must 
be incorruptible, that the soul, being immortal, 
must also be indestructible. Their belief, then, 
was, that the soul did not begin to be, along 
with the individual body which it informed. 
It pre-existed. So firm, indeed, and so widely 
spread were their sentiments on this subject, that 
there is reason to doubt whether any one of the 
ancients, before Christianity, ever believed the 
soul to survive after death, who did not also be- 
lieve that it had pre-existed. * This pre-existence, 
moreover, of itself led them to the notion of 
post-existence. Such is the view of the matter 
taken by Plato, in a passage adduced by the 
Noble Lord: r\v 7rov r/fxwv r\ ^v^rj irplv ev TcoSe 
Tto dvOptowlvu) €$€i yeveaOai, (vcttc Kal raJr^ 
dOdvaTov ti €oik€v r\ ^/vyji elvai, Our soul was 

See Intellectual System, C. i. Sec. 31. p. 38. 
T 



200 



SECTION VI. 



somewhere, before it began to exist in this present 
human form ; and so on that account the soul also 
appears to be something immortal*. . . With regard 
to the manner of existence, we have seen, under 
the first head of the present section, that, accord- 
ing to the same philosopher, the soul was always 
connected with some body, or other; its final 
destination, after the allotted number of migra- 
tions, being — a re-union with the Deity. Such, 

* Lord Brougham gives an indistinct reference to the Timezus of 
Plato. Nearly the same words occur in the Phcedo, c. 18. His 
Lordship has quoted the passage in p. 271, and again in p. 274 ; 
giving a somewhat different version in each instance. The latter 
clause, uian-e Kal ravT-n, k.t. e. is, in the first instance, rendered— 
as also it seems to be immortal afterwards ; and, in the second, so it 
seems to be immortal also. The illative import of the word TavTy 
being in each case neglected. In the next page another passage is 
quoted from Plato (Phcedo 47.) ; which, being of no great conse- 
quence to the subject discussed, I notice in this place, merely to 
correct an oversight: — dXXd yap dv cpaujv eKaarnv t<Zv ^ux<«f 
iroXXd (TutfxaTa KaTaTpifieiv, d.XXoj's -re tcqv TtoXXd eV?j : which 
Lord Brougham thus translates— But I should rather say that each 
of our souls wears out many bodies, though these should live many 
years. Here are two mistakes : (3ta> refers to eicda-rri twv xfrvx^v, 
or rather to ^uxn, and not to awixaTa-— and aXXcos -re Kal means 
especially and not though, as His Lordship has imagined. Plato 
writes of the soul living many years, in the sense in which every 
one would acknowledge it to be living, I should say that the 
soul wears out many bodies, especially if it should live many years ; 
and he farther explains his meaning by the mention of the constant 
change and repeated renovation to which the body is subject. 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, 



in brief, was the leading philosophical doctrine 
of ancient times. 

There are some circumstances, which ought now 
to be considered, with reference to the preceding 
account. Every reader will be aware that, during 
the time when those abstruse speculations, re- 
specting the Deity and mind and matter, were 
in progress, there existed a popular creed — which 
required the acknowledgement of many Gods, 
and impressed the imagination with notions of 
rewards and punishments in a future life. Now, 
it is clear that the conclusions of the philoso- 
phers were inconsistent with what may be called 
the established religion of their country. If the 
philosophers believed in One God, they could not 
easily be polytheists : if they held the already- 
described doctrine of the soul, they must have 
rejected the vulgar apprehensions of retributive 
justice in the realms below. What, then, shall 
be said of Plato, for example, who in his va- 
rious works usually writes of The Gods — and, 
what is more, on some occasions seems to main- 
tain the doctrine of a separate existence of the 
soul after death, and a future state of rewards 
and punishments ? Lord Brougham, indeed, men- 
t 2 



292 



SECTION 



tions no difficulty in the case. He thus notices 
the fact: 

" It must be admitted that the belief of the ancients 
was more firm and more sound than their reasons were 
cogent. The whole tenor of the doctrine in the Phcedo 
refers to the renewal or continuation of the soul as a se- 
parate and individual existence, after the dissolution of 
the body, and with a complete consciousness of personal 
identity — in short, to a continuance of the same rational 
being's existence after death. The liberation from the 
body is treated as the beginning of a new and more per- 
fect life — Tore jap avTtj KOtO' avTrjv tj \pvyrj ea-Tai 
^fopk tov crco/jLCtTcx;' irporepov 3' <>u." (p. 276). 

After this, we have from the Phado — which, 
as His Lordship justly observes, presents "a some- 
what fanciful picture of the next world" — two 
or three short extracts, in proof of the belief of 
a future state; and a passage, from the twelfth 
book Of Laws, the purport of which is worth 
notice. Plato, after stating that every one (to 
adopt Lord Brougham's version) shall go to other 
Gods (or Gods in another world) to render an 
account (trapa Oeovs aWovs airievai Suhjovto. \6- 
yov) immediately adds, as the laws of the state 
declare (KaOawep 6 vo/jlos 6 irarpios \eyei). Now 
without meaning to infer from this passage, that 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 293 

Plato held " the laws of the state" to be the sole 
ground for the notion of a future account, there 
is something in the phrase, which, when con- 
nected with his philosophical opinions, may war- 
rant a request that the turn of thought may be 
borne in mind — when the subject is more fully 
discussed in the next section. 

In farther illustration of the strenuous belief 
of the ancients, Lord Brougham adduces a pas- 
sage from Xenophon's Cyropsedia (viii. 7-)? con - 
taining part of Cyrus's address to his children, 
when on his death-bed ; and subjoins Cicero's 
beautiful translation of the same passage.* We 
there find the superiority of the intellectual to 
the corporeal nature of man pleasingly described, 
and the liberation of the soul from the body 
mentioned as a happy event. His Lordship, how- 
ever, would have done greater justice to his sub- 
ject, if he had gone on with his quotation .... 
Cyrus, after pointing out the similarity between 
death and sleep, and observing that in sleep the 

* " Mihi quidem nunquam persuaded potuit, animos, dum in 
corporibus essent mortalibus, vivere ; quum exissent ex iis, emori ; 
nec verotum animum esse insipientem, quum ex animo insipienti 
evasisset ; sed quum omni admixtione corporis liberatus, purus et 
integer esse coepisset, turn esse sapientem." Cic. de Senect. c. 22. 



294 



SECTION VI. 



soul especially manifests its own divinity, thus 
proceeds — " Wherefore, if these things be so, 
reverence me as a God ; but if the mind perish 
with the body, yet will you, fearing the Gods 
who preserve and govern the world, preserve my 
memory inviolate.' 1 * Here we may first remark 
the extreme uncertainty of the speaker — instead 
of that firm belief, which Lord Brougham sup- 
poses this address to indicate; secondly s, the no- 
tion which was entertained of the soul, supposing 
it to survive — namely, that it was a portion of 
the divine substance, and so to be considered as 
a deity ; and thirdly, that the sentiments, attri- 
buted to Cyrus, appear to be adopted by Cicero. 
In the Somnium Scipionis, indeed, the same con- 
ception of the soul may be noticed — " Deum te 
igitur scito esse and, in this very treatise de 
Senectute already quoted, death is represented as 
an event to be disregarded, if it extinguish the 
soul — to be wished, if the soul is eternal: no 
third state could be devisedf. So imperfect were 

* " Quare, si heec ita sunt, sic me colitote ut deum : sin una 
est interiturus animus cum corpore, vos tamen deos verentes, qui 
hanc omnem pulchritudinem tuentur et regunt, memoriam nostri 
pie inviolateque servabitis." 

+ " Deum te igitur scito esse ; siquidem Deus est, qui viget, 

qui 



ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 



295 



the notions even of Cicero, respecting a future 
state of retribution. Undoubtedly, the works of 
this great philosopher present several very striking 
representations of heroes and lawgivers and other 
great benefactors of mankind, associated in the 
enjoyment of supreme felicity in another world ; 
and Lord Brougham has very properly made use 
of such representations, in his disquisition on an- 
cient opinions. His Lordship, however, seems 
not to have taken the trouble to trace the con- 
nexion between those lofty speculations, and the 
avowed doctrines respecting the origin and desti- 
nation of the human soul. Had this connexion 
been carefully considered, and the expressions of 
doubt — perhaps more than doubt — which are 
found in the productions of those early ages, 
been duly taken into account, His Lordship's 
decisions would have been invested with much 
more of the judicial character than they can at 
present be allowed to exhibit. 

qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur, 
et movet id corpus, cui propositus est, quam hunc mundum ille 
princeps Deus : et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse 
Deus asternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet." Som- 

nium Scipionis. 

" Mors aut plane negligenda est, si omnino extinguit animum, 
aut etiam optanda, si aliquo eum deducit, ubi sit futurus aeternus. 
Atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest." de Senect. c. 19. 



296 



SECTION VI. 



To express my view of the matter in few 
words. There is an apparent contradiction be- 
tween the philosophy and the religion of those 
ancient times. It ought, then, to be shown 
either that the apparent, is not a real contradic- 
tion ; or that the sages in question fairly aban- 
doned their philosophy, and adhered to their reli- 
gion. Something at least of this kind ought to 
be done, before any one can justly infer the 
"firm and sound belief," of those old philoso- 
phers, in a future state. 



297 



SECTION VII. 

WARBURTON. 

(Discourse, Notes, pp. 281—296). 

About this time Warburton began to make bis appearance in 
the first ranks of learning. He was a man of vigorous faculties, 
a mind fervid and vehement, supplied, by incessant and unlimited 
inquiry, with wonderful extent and variety of knowledge ; which 
yet had not oppressed his imagination, nor clouded his perspicacity. 
To every work he brought a memory full fraught, together with 
a fancy fertile of original combinations ; and at once exerted the 
powers of the scholar, the reasoner, and the wit. — Johnson. 

The first impression of the character of War- 
burton, upon the mind of Johnson, is here pre- 
sented, for the purpose of fixing the reader's at- 
tention, at the opening of the section, upon the 
intellectual qualities of the individual, some of 
whose opinions are about to be considered. An 
interest in the subject may thus be excited and 
sustained; for, to confess the truth, it would not 
be easy to infer, from the tenor of Lord Brougham's 
observations, that the author of The Divine Lega- 
tion of Moses demonstrated had ever drawn forth 
such language, from the great biographer. 



298 



SECTION VII. 



Should any one, on the opening of the vo- 
lume, be attracted to the present section by the 
name of Warburton, it may be useful to observe 
that the subjects here considered are dependent 
upon those discussed in the preceding section ; 
which therefore is, in the first instance, recom- 
mended to the reader's perusal. The sentiments 
of the ancient philosophers, there detailed, will 
form an excellent introduction to the following 
paragraph from the pen of Lord Brougham : 

" To any one who had read the extracts in the last note, 
but still more to one who was familiar with the ancient 
writers from whose works they are taken, it might appear 
quite impossible that a question should ever be raised upon 
the general belief of antiquity in a future state, and the 
belief of some of the most eminent of the philosophers, at 
least, in a state of rewards and punishments. Nevertheless 
as there is nothing so plain to which the influence of a pre- 
conceived opinion and the desire of furthering a favourite 
hypothesis will not blind men, and as their blindness in 
such cases bears even a proportion to their learning and 
ingenuity, it has thus fared with the point in question ; 
and Bishop Warburton has denied that any of the an- 
cients except Socrates really believed in a future state of 
the soul individually, and subject to reward or punishment. 
He took up this argument because it seemed to strengthen 
his extraordinary reasoning upon the Legation of Moses." 
(p. 281.) 



WARBURTON. 



299 



On the contrary, the difficulty seems to be, 
to reconcile such a belief, of a future state, as 
His Lordship attributes to those old philosophers, 
with those very extracts which he had himself 
previously given from their works. As to War- 
burton, the real question is, whether — when he 
employed the argument alluded to, in aid of his 
reasoning upon the Legation of Moses — he had 
grounds for so doing, which would justify an 
honest and learned inquirer. Language is pliable ; 
and even with reference to the opinion — that the 
ancient philosophers did believe in a future state 
of retribution — an adversary might allege that 
Lord Brougham " took up the argument because 
it seemed to strengthen his own notions of Na- 
tural Religion." Remarks of this kind I should 
decidedly condemn in His Lordship's case ; and 
I am equally adverse to them in the case of 
Warburton. We have little or nothing to do 
with the question, why Warburton 44 took up the 
argument the great object ought to be, to as- 
certain whether or not the argument is valid, 
The Noble Author, indeed, has proceeded to show., 
in the first place, how Warburton's estimate of 
the creed of the philosophers bears upon the rea- 
soning of his great work. 



300 



SECTION VII. 



" His reasoning is this. The inculcating of a future 
state of retribution is necessary to the well being of so- 
ciety. All men, and especially all the wisest nations of 
antiquity, have agreed in holding such a doctrine neces- 
sary to be inculcated. But there is nothing of the kind 
to be found in the Mosaic dispensation. And here he 
pauses to observe that these propositions seem too clear 
to require any proof. Nevertheless his whole work is 
consumed in proving them; and the conclusion from the 
whole, that therefore the Mosaic law is of Divine original, 
is left for another work which never appeared; and yet 
this is the very position which all, or almost all who 
may read the book, and even yield their assent to it, 
are the most inclined to reject. Indeed it may well be 
doubted if this work, learned and acute as it is, and 
showing the author to be both well read and well fitted 
for controversy, ever satisfied any one except perhaps 
Bishop Hurd, or ever can demonstrate anything so well, 
as it proves the preposterous and perverted ingenuity of 
an able and industrious man. 1 ' (p. 282.) 

The propositions — respecting the necessity of 
a belief in a future state to the well being of 
society, the agreement amongst the wisest na- 
tions of antiquity in inculcating such a belief, 
and the want of such a doctrine in the Mosaic 
Law — although plain to Warburton, had yet been 
frequently placed in so different a light from that 
in which he viewed them, that, as he soon found, 
their " full elucidation' 1 required " a severe search 



WARBURTON. 



301 



into the civil policy, religion, and philosophy of 
ancient times' 1 — as well as "a detailed account 
of the nature and genius of the Jewish dispen- 
sation." Warburton gives us this information at 
the beginning of his work ; and I know not that 
there is anything in the information to call either 
for censure or defence. Lord Brougham's objec- 
tion—that the proof that "the Mosaic Law is of 
Divine original, was left for a further work, which 
never appeared" — may perhaps be not improperly 
met by the following statement. The first volume 
of the Divine Legation, as originally published, 
contained the first three Books ; in which were 
discyssed the necessity that exists, and the neces- 
sity that was in ancient times felt to exist, for 
the belief of a future state, to the well-being of 
society. The second volume, comprising Books 
iv. v. and vi, was intended to show that the 
doctrine of a future state was not inculcated in 
the Mosaic Law. These were the premises to 
be established ; and from these premises, together 
with all their bearings, Warburton believed that 
the conclusion followed of course — namely, that 
the Law of Moses is of Divine original. Why, 
then, was another volume promised ? Warburton 



302 



SECTION VII. 



has answered the question. " It was promised — 
to remove all conceivable objections against the 
conclusion^ and to throw in additional light upon 
the premises? In fact, the seventh book was 
intended to unfold the progress of religious opi- 
nions amongst the Jews, from the time of the 
earlier Prophets to the time of the Maccabees, 
when the doctrine of a future state of rewards 
and punishments became national; the eighth 
book, to pourtray the character of Moses as a 
Law-giver; and the ninth, that is, the last book, 
to explain the nature and genius of the Christian 
Dispensation*. .. Amongst Warburton's numerous 
assailants during his life-time, was no less a per- 
sonage than that most acute, eloquent, philoso- 
phical, inaccurate and versatile Nobleman, Lord 
Bolingbroke; and although he does not appear 
to have joined in the censure, respecting an un- 
finished undertaking, then expressed by some, 
and now advanced in the 4 Discourse of Natural 
Theology', yet the following remarks, by the 
author of the Divine Legation, cannot be duly 
estimated, without recollecting the part taken in 
the controversy by that eccentric statesman. 

* Divine Legation, vi. 6. near the end. 



WAR BURTON. 



303 



"This is the plain and simple argument of the Di- 
vine Legation; which the first and the second volumes 
of that work are employed to explain and illustrate. 
And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its 
force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. 
This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others 
have understood so little of the argument, as to imagine 
that the two first volumes had left it unfinished; and 
that the third was to complete the syllogism; though 
the author had told us, more than once, that the pur- 
pose of the last volume was only to enforce the various 
parts of the foregoing argument, by many new consider- 
ations."* 

The reader is now sufficiently aware of the 
objects of that "further work," of Warburton, 
" which never appeared.". . . Lord Brougham, more- 
over, intimates a doubt whether any one, ex- 
cept perhaps Bishop Hurd, was ever satisfied 
with the Divine Legation. Now, whatever I 
may be endeavouring to elucidate, it is not my 
plan to produce names, without at the same 
time producing the opinions or statements for 
which they are intended to vouch ; and therefore 
conceiving myself to be, on this occasion, re- 
stricted to the mention of but few individuals, 

* View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, Letter rv. near the 
beginning: or Warburton's Works, Vol. xn. p. 244, 



304 



SECTION VII. 



the first shall be neither a Bishop nor even a 
Churchman — but a Non-conformist, whose learn- 
ing and judgement entitle him to attention. 
Thus, then, writes Dr Doddridge in the notes 
to his Family Expositor: 

Luke xv i. 31. "It is true, Moses no where expressly 
mentions a future state of rewards and punishments; yet 
the facts recorded by him strongly enforce the natural 

arguments in proof of it." Again, 2 Tim. i. 10. " Life 

and immortality is put by a usual Hebraism for immortal 
life, as Archbishop Tillotson well observes in his discourse 
on these words, in which he has shown how uncertain the 
heathens were as to the doctrines of a future state of retri- 
bution; and the comparative obscurity of that light in 
which it was placed in the Old Testament. But what 
Mr Warburton has written upon this subject in his Divine 
Legation, and what is said upon it in the last edition 
of the Critical Inquiry into the opinions of the ancient 
philosophers, has done abundantly more than anything 
else to vindicate the propriety of this expression." — Finally, 
Rom. i. 21. "I think what Paul charges upon the philo- 
sophers is, that though they actually knew there was one 
Supreme God, they neglected him, to conform (for low and 
base considerations) to the established idolatry, which was 
really the case, to their aggravated guilt and condemna- 
tion, as appears from most of the passages in which the 
Pagan writers bear testimony to the doctrine of the Unity y 

There is only another individual whose senti- 
ments I shall here record. He is, indeed, a 



WARBURTON. 



305 



Churchman ; but at the same time a Churchman 
as unlikely to be misled by the name of War- 
burton, as can possibly be imagined. Having 
already produced this person's opinion in favour of 
Natural Religion, I shall now be enabled to show 
how compatible are such opinions with the be- 
lief that those ancient sages, after they had aban- 
doned the road to religion, were speedily lost 
amidst the mazes of a heartless philosophy. 

"The learned reader will soon satisfy himself, from 
Cicero de senectute and his Tusculan Disputations, that 
this proud atheistic system was really the creed of the 
philosophers. We are easily dazzled by the glare of some 
luminous sentences, considered in a detached point of view, 
to suppose them to have been much nearer Christian truth 
than the Pagan vulgar. But their notions, reduced to a 
whole, do really appear to have been still more remote 
from the Gospel. Bishop Warburton has, I -think, amply 
proved the point before us. It is worth any man's while 
to peruse him, in order to gain a clear insight into that 
text, the world by wisdom knew not God."* 

The approbation therefore, of the Divine Le- 
gation, was confined neither to Bishop Hurd, nor 
yet to the Church to which he belonged .... I was 
glad to transcribe the closing sentence of Lord 

* Milner's Answer to Gibbon, p. 113. The author, of course, 
refers to the third book of the Divine Legation. 

U 



306 



SECTION VII 



Brougham^ observations, last presented, on ac- 
count of the praise of Warburton which it in- 
volves:— -not that I think the idea of "an able 
and industrious man, well read and well fitted 
for controversy bears any striking resemblance 
to Johnsons Warburton f . . . . After a paragraph, 
(pp. 282 — 283) on which I deem it needless to 
offer any remarks, the Noble Author indulges 
in the following strain of animadversion : 

" The two things which the author always overlooked 
were the possibility of a human lawgiver making an imper- 
fect system, and of sceptics holding the want of the sanction 
in question to be no argument for the divine origin of the 
Mosaic law, but rather a proof of its flowing from a hu- 
man and fallible source. As these ' mere possibilities are 
wholly independent of the admission that every word in the 
book is correct, and all the positions are demonstrated, and 
as nothing whatever is said to exclude such suppositions* 
it is manifest that a more useless and absurd argument 
never was maintained upon any grave and important sub- 
ject." (p. 283.) 

This, I rather think, is strong language; to 
which I shall, as usual, endeavour to reply, by 
detailing, with all possible plainness, the circum- 
stances of the case Much that has been written, 

respecting the argument of the Divine Legation, 
from the time of its publication to the present, 



WARBURTON. 



307 



naturally leads to this conclusion — that the au- 
thor, fancying that he had discovered for him- 
self that the retribution of a future state had 
not been enforced in the Law of Moses, had, 
from the mere love of paradox, employed the 
supposed fact, as an argument for the truth of 
the Jewish Dispensation, Lord Brougham's re- 
marks upon the subject, in the beginning of the 
foregoing paragraph, appear to confirm that no- 
tion. Now although the current of thought — 
perhaps from want of an especial consideration 
of the subject — had flowed in a contrary direc- 
tion, yet there were persons, and those too of 
great name, who had maintained the opinion 
adopted by Warburton. Grotius, Episcopius and 
Bishop Bull may be mentioned in this point of 
view. Their sentiments on the matter will be 
found in the note*. Moreover, immediately prior 

* Grotius: "Moses in Religionis Judaicas Institutione, si di- 
serta Legis respicimus, nihil promisit supra hujus vitaa bona, terram 
uberern, penum copiosum, victoriam de hostibus, longam et va- 
lentem senectutem, posteros cum bona spe superstates. Nam, si 
quid est ultra, in umbris obtegitur, aut sapienti ac difficili ratioei- 
natione colligendum est.". ... Episcopius : <c In tota Lege Mo- 
saica nullum vitae aeter naj premium, ac ne aeterni quidem praemii 
indicium vel vestigium extat." . . . . But t. : "Lex enim promissa 
habuit terrena et terrena tantum." 

U2 



308 



SECTION VII. 



to the time when Warburton fixed his attention 
on Theological inquiries, Deistical writers had 
strongly urged the omission of the sanction of 
a future state in the Law of Moses, as a proof 
that the Jewish economy could not be of divine 
origin. Is it, then, likely that Warburton, in 
the immensity of his reading, should be igno- 
rant of all these circumstances ? But not to 
dwell upon the probabilities of things, we have 
his own evidence to appeal to. At the end of the 
fourth section of the sixth book, he has quoted 
at length, the passages of Grotius, Episcopius and 
Bull, from which I have given extracts; for the 
purpose of showing that the doctrine he held 
was not of his own invention. Nay, the very 
title-page of the work, which called forth the 
kind of criticism now under notice, might have 
shown the authors of such criticism how wide 
it was of the mark. In the title-page we read 
as follows : The Divine Legation of Moses de- 
monstrated ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A RELIGIOUS DEIST, 

from the omission of the doctrine of a future 
state of reward and punishment, in the Jewish 
Dispensation. So far, indeed, was Warburton 
from having " always overlooked the possibility 



WARBURTON. 



309 



of sceptics holding the want of the sanction in 
question to be no argument for the divine origin 
of the Mosaic Law, but rather a proof of its 
flowing from a human and fallible source" — that 
his work bears upon its front an indelible mark 
that it was written in designed opposition to 
such sceptical conclusions. Again, in the first 
section of the first book, we find this declaration 
from the pen of Warburton: "Why I choose 
this medium, namely, the omission of a future 
state in the Jewish Dispensation, to prove its 
divine original, is, first, for the sake of the 
Deists : being enabled hereby to show them, 
That this very circumstance of omission, which 
they pretend to be such an imperfection as makes 
the dispensation unworthy the Author to whom 
we ascribe it, is, in truth, a demonstration that 

God only could give it." And finally, not to 

mention many other instances in which War- 
burton has opposed the sceptical inferences from 
the omission, and vindicated his own — to the 
fifth book he has added an Appendix, consist- 
ing of more than forty closely printed pages, 
in which Lord Bolingbroke's arguments on the 
subject, as the most important he could dis- 



.310 SECTION VII. 

cover, are formally taken into consideration. 
On the whole, so copious is the evidence of 
Warburton's attention to the objections that 
were advanced against his system, that when 
Lord Brougham alludes to such objections, as 
having been overlooked, I am at a loss to ima- 
gine in what manner he can have read the 
Divine Legation. The indications indeed, of a 
thorough acquaintance with the purport and exe- 
cution of the work, are hitherto so faint, that 
there will be, to most people, an appearance of 
something premature in His Lordship's judge- 
ment — "that a more useless and absurd argu- 
ment was never maintained upon any grave and 
important subject" When the Deists had once 
pressed the omission of a future state as fatal 
to the belief of the divine origin of the Jewish 
Polity — there were but two courses for the ad- 
vocates of Revelation to pursue: — either to show 
that there was no such omission, or to trace 
out the consequences of the omission, supposing 
it to be granted. The former was considered as 
the safe course; but it evinced rather the good 
intentions than the success of those who adopted 
it. Warburton took the latter; and by com- 



WARBURTON. 



311 



bining the omission of a future state with the 
Theocratic government under which the Israelites 
were placed— the retributive providence to which 
they were subjected in this life — and the sin- 
gular character and condition of the people them- 
selves — he framed an argument, for the divine 
origin of the dispensation, which it was easy to 
censure as paradoxical, and difficult to prove to 
be unsound. The presumption of Warburton, 
however, in taking what was deemed the wrong 
course, was an offence not to be forgiven. He 
was, therefore, assailed with a violence of invec- 
tive, which, as he said, could scarcely have been 
susceptible of increase, if he had attempted to 
demonstrate the Divine Legation of Mahomet. 
What *was the consequence ? Disdaining to soften 
that malignity which he did not dread, he em- 
ployed the language of contempt. I lament that 
he did so, but I do not wonder at it. The 
provocation was great; and I have seen the lan- 
guage of contempt employed, in cases in which 
I could discover no provocation whatsoever. It 
may, I think, be observed that what has been 
clamorously censured or unreasonably applauded 
has for the most part afterwards experienced an 



312 



SECTION VII. 



interval of unmerited neglect. Something of this 
kind appears to have befallen the Divine Le- 
gation ; and although I have ventured to offer 
a few remarks on the subject, I am fully aware 
that the time is not yet come for duly estimat- 
ing the labours of — Warburton. 

My object, in placing the following senti- 
ments of Lord Brougham before the reader, is 
not so much to state any objections to them — 
as to have an opportunity of mentioning a cir- 
cumstance in the highest degree honourable to 
the personal character of the Historian of the 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 

"The merit of the Divine Legation lies in its learning 
and in its collateral argument ; indeed nearly the whole is 
collateral, and unconnected with the purpose of the rea- 
soning. But much even of that collateral matter is fanciful 
and unsound. The fancy that the descent of iEneas to 
hell in the sixth book of the ^neid is a veiled account of 
the Eleusinian Mysteries, has probably made as few pro- 
selytes as the main body of the 'Demonstration ; and if 
any one has lent his ear to the theory that the ancients 
had no belief in a future state of retribution, it can only 
be from being led away by confident assertion from the 
examination of facts." (p. 283.) 

To employ the language of Mr Gibbon, ' 6 the 
descent of iEneas and the Sybil to the infernal 



WARBURTON. 



313 



regions, to the world of spirits, expands an awful 
and boundless prospect, from the nocturnal gloom 
of the Cumaean grot, to the meridian brightness 
of the Elysian fields ; from the dreams of simple 
nature, to the dreams of Egyptian theology and 
the philosophy of the Greeks. But the final dis- 
mission of the hero through the ivory gate, 
whence 

Falsa ad ccelum mittunt insomnia manes, 

seems to dissolve the whole enchantment, and 
leaves the reader in a state of cold and anxious 
scepticism." The circumstance indeed, just men- 
tioned, had perplexed the commentators, and mor- 
tified the admirers of Virgil. It had been ac- 
counted an oversight in a work not completely 
revised, or a proof of the author's Epicurean 
disbelief of a future state. Warburton's inter- 
pretation, mentioned by Lord Brougham, tended 
at least to lessen the difficulty, if not entirely 
to remove it. " The hypothesis," as Mr Gibbon 
informs us, " had been admitted by many as 
true ; it was praised by all as ingenious ; nor 
had it been exposed, in a space of thirty years, 
to a fair and critical discussion." And thus, the 
future historian, being " ambitious of breaking a 
lance against the giant's shield," published ano- 



314 



SECTION VII. 



nymously (1770) his 4 Critical Observations on 
the design of the sixth book of the iEneid;'' in 
which " he aimed his strokes against the person 
and the hypothesis of Bishop Warburton." Heyne, 
the editor of Virgil, praised the learning dis- 
played in the 6 Observations', but condemned the 
severity. Mr Hayley, whom I need not describe, 
was disposed to justify even the acrimony of 
the style. But Mr Gibbon, when reviewing the 
events of his life, saw the matter in a different 
light. " I cannot," he writes, " forgive myself 
the contemptuous treatment of a man who, with 
all his faults, was entitled to my esteem; and 
I can less forgive, in a personal attack, the 
cowardly concealment of my name and character." 
There is indescribable satisfaction in pointing 
attention to an acknowledgement of error, so 
creditable to the "name and character" of Mr 
Gibbon ; and I am inclined to hope that the 
statements contained in this paragraph may have 
the effect of showing that Warburton's specu- 
lations are not quite so visionary, as Lord 
Brougham's expressions would lead his readers 
to suppose*. 

* See Gibbon's Memoirs of his Life and Writings, pp. 208 — 
212. 8vo. ed. 1814. 



WARBURTON. 



315 



After all, WarburtorTs position — thai the an- 
cient philosophers had no belief in a future state 
of retribution — was, as the Noble Author ob- 
serves, not necessary to the proof of his general 
theory; which, however, would certainly be 
strengthened, if it should appear that, from a con- 
viction of the absolute necessity of the belief of a 
future state to the well being of society, the very 
same persons enforced in public what they re- 
jected in private. Of the fact, indeed, of doctrines 
exoteric, distinct from doctrines esoteric, in that 
respect, having been held by those old philoso- 
phers, Lord Brougham has no doubt. According 
to His Lordship, the first notions of religion, 
having originated in fear and ignorance, were 
first embellished and recommended by the fancy 
of poets, and then sanctioned and enforced by 
the power and authority of Rulers. Hence phi- 
losophers themselves, having neither the inclina- 
tion nor the liberty, " to expose the errors of 
the popular faith" — "taught one doctrine in pri- 
vate, while in public they conformed to the pre- 
vailing creed."*. So far, then, there appears to 
be no essential difference of opinion between 



* Discourse, p. 284, 



316 



SECTION VII. 



Warburton and Lord Brougham. His Lord- 
ship's complaint, immediately afterwards, is that 
Warburton makes "the tenor of the doctrine the 
criterion of esoteric or exoteric;" and he thus 
enlarges upon the mode of proceeding: 

" It seems hardly credible that so acute and practised 
a controversialist should so conduct an argument, but it 
is quite true. As often as anything occurs in favour of 
a future state, he says it was said exoterically; and 
whenever he can find anything on the opposite side, or 
leaning towards it (which is really hardly at all in the 
Platonic or Ciceronian writings) he sets this down for 
the esoteric sentiments of the writer. But surely, if there 
be any meaning at all in the double doctrine, whatever 
may have been its origin, the occasion is every thing; 
and there can be no difficulty in telling whether any 
given opinion was maintained exoterically or not, by the 
circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, it 
was propounded." (p. 285.) 

Now, to myself, I confess, it does not ap- 
pear so easy, as to His Lordship, to distinguish 
between writings exoteric and writings esoteric; 
but that is, on either side, a mere opinion, from 
which it would not be safe to draw any con- 
clusion .... With regard to the assertion, that 
Warburton made the mention of a future life, 
or the omission, the immediate reason for desig- 



WARBURTON, 



317 



nating a treatise as exoteric or esoteric — I must 
refer the reader to some circumstances, which 
yet remain to be developed, in the present sec- 
tion .... On a similar account, I must also request 
a suspense of judgement, in relation to Plato 
and Cicero, as mentioned by His Lordship ...» 
Furthermore, I observe that Lord Brougham is 
of opinion, as well as Warburton, that a double 
doctrine was held by the philosophers. If, then, 
Warburton is pressed by a difficulty, when a 
future state appears to be admitted, in writings 
which may not unreasonably be thought esoteric 
— is not Lord Brougham equally pressed by a 
difficulty, when a future state is denied in writings 
which may as reasonably be thought exoteric? 
Suppose a book were published in England — one 
part of it denying a future state, or arguing 
against it, or ridiculing the notion, and another 
part admitting the popular creed, what should 
we consider the author to be — an infidel or a 

believer? But enough of generals: we now 

proceed to particulars; to which we are intro- 
duced by the Noble Author in the following 
manner : 

" The argument, on which Warburton dwells most, 
is drawn from the allusion made by Caesar in the dis- 



318 



SECTION VII. 



cussion upon the punishment of the conspirators, as re- 
lated by Sallust : 'Ultra (mortem) neque curse neque 
gaudio locum esse:' and from the way in which Cato 
and Cicero evade, he says, rather than answer him, 
appealing to the traditions of antiquity, and the authority 
of their ancestors, instead of arguing the point. (Div. 
Leg. in. 2. 5.) Can any thing be more inconclusive than 
this? Granting that Sallust, in making speeches for 
Caesar and Cato (whom, by the way, he makes speak in 
the selfsame style, that is, in his own Sallustian style) 
adhered to the sentiments each delivered ; and further, 
that Caesar used this strange topic, not as a mere rhe- 
torical figure, but as a serious reason against capital 
punishment, and as showing that there is mercy and 
not severity in such inflictions (a very strong supposition 
to make respecting so practised and practical a reasoner 
as Caius Caesar) ; surely so bold a position as practical 
atheism brought forward in the Roman Senate was far 
more likely to be met, whether by the decorum of Cato 
or the skill of Cicero, with a general appeal to the 
prevalence of the contrary belief, and its resting on an- 
cient tradition, than with a metaphysical or theological 
discourse, singularly out of season in such a debate. 
To make the case our own: let us suppose some mem- 
ber of Parliament, or of the Chamber of Deputies, so 
ill-judged as to denounce in short but plain terms the 
religion of the country, would any person advert fur- 
ther to so extravagant a speech, than to blame it, and 
in general expressions signify the indignation it had ex- 
cited? Would not an answer out of Lardner, or Paley, 
or Pascal be deemed almost as ill-timed as the attack? 



WARBU RTON, 



319 



To be sure, neither Cato nor Caesar are represented as 
testifying any great disgust at the language of CsBsar ; 
but this, as well indeed as the topic being introduced 
at all by the latter, only shows that the doctrine of a 
future state was not one of the tenets much diffused 
among the people, or held peculiarly sacred by them."— 
(pp. 285—287.) 

Near the beginning of the foregoing para- 
graph, Lord Brougham seems rather to have ad- 
mitted for the sake of argument, than to have 
acknowledged as an historical fact — that Caesar 
opposed tke capital punishment of the conspi- 
rators, on the ground that death would at once 
put an end to sufferings, the continuance of 
which was demanded by the enormity of their 
crimes. When, indeed, His Lordship observed 
upon " the selfsame Sallustian style," in which 
Cato and Caesar are made to speak — and still 
more, when he denominated the notion of such 
a reason against capital punishment being seri- 
ously employed by "so practised and practical 
a reasoner as Caius Csesar" — "a strong suppo- 
sition " — he certainly must have intended to 
throw some portion of doubt upon the whole 
matter. Now, in the first place, if we had re- 
ceived the account on the sole authority of 



320 



SECTION VII. 



Sallust, it would be difficult to assign a cause 
for misrepresentation on the part of the histo- 
rian, or incredulity on our own part. But in 
the second place, we have an independent tes- 
timony, to the accuracy of the statement, in the 
writings of an illustrious individual, who was 
actively engaged in the proceedings on that oc- 
casion. In short, we have in our possession 
Cicero's fourth oration against Catiline, which 
was drawn forth by the very subject under 
consideration. I will state, as briefly as possi- 
ble, the circumstances of the case The question 

proposed to the Senate was — What should be 
done, with regard to those of the agents in 
Catiline's conspiracy, who were in custody ? * 
Julius Silanus, as Consul Elect, spoke first, and 
was of opinion that they should be put to 
death. Caesar, who, it will be recollected, was 
an Epicurean, dwelt upon their deeds, as crimes 
to which no sufferings that could be devised 
would be adequate ; represented death as, in 
cases of grief and wretchedness, the termination 
of sorrows, not the exacerbation — all the ills of 

* Quid de his fieri placeat, qui in custodiam traditi erant. Sal- 
lust. Bell. Cat. c. 50. 



WARBURTON, 



321 



life being dissipated by that event, beyond which 
there was neither trouble nor joy ; * and recom- 
mended the severest punishment that was con- 
sistent with the continuance of life. Cato, a 
Stoic — in a speech also given by Sallust — men- 
tioned, with commendation of the manner and 
no dislike of the matter, Caesar's dissertation on 
life and death ; slightly observing that he sup- 
posed Csesar to consider as false the things that 
were reported of the infernal regions ; namely, 
the separation of the good from the bad, who 
were consigned to places abounding in every 
thing disagreeable and horrible, t So far we 
have depended upon the authority of Sallust; 
and notwithstanding the " Sallustian style," in 
which he has reported the speeches of Caesar 
and of Cato, there is ample reason to believe 
that he has accurately given the substance of 

* Equidem ego sic existurao, Patres Conscripti, omnis cruciatus 
rninores quam facinora illorum esse . . . .De poena possumus equi- 
dem dicere id quod res habet: in luctu atque miseriis mortem 
serumnarum requiem non cruciatum esse : earn cuncta mortalium 

mala dissolvere : ultra neque curas neque gaudii locum esse. 

Bell. Cat. c. 51. 

t Bene et composite C. Caesar paullo ante in hoc ordine de 
vita et morte disseruit; falso, credo, existumans, quae de inferis 
memoiantur : diverso itinere malos a bonis ioca tetra, inculta, 
faeda atque formidolosa habere, c. 52. 

X 



322 



SECTION VII. 



what was spoken. Let us now turn to the 
orations of Cicero; and see what information 
can be gathered, from that great master of the 
Academic school, in his own style. In the course 
of his address, he mentions the two opinions 
which had been delivered : the one enforcing 
death — the other the severest punishment in this 
life : the former, as demanded by the danger to 
which the Roman people had been exposed — 
the latter, as being more efficacious than death, 
which was not ordained for punishment at all. 
He goes on to describe Csesar's plan, as subject- 
ing those miscreants to chains and imprisonment 
and poverty and despair ; as leaving them nothing 
but life- — which being taken away, they would 
be freed from the punishment of their wicked- 
ness. So that, by way of terror to the evil, the 
ancients were of opinion that some punishments 
should be assigned to the impious in the infernal 
regions, conceiving that, without such punish- 
ments, death would not be an object of dread.* 

* Video duas adhuc esse sententias : unam D, Silani, qui censet, 
eos, qui haec delere conati sunt, morte esse multandos : alteram 
C. Caesaris, qui mortis pcenam removet, caeterorum suppliciorum 
omnes acerbitates amplectitur. Uterque et pro sua dignitate et 
pro rerum magnitudine in summa severitate versatur. Alter eos, 

qui 



WARBURTON. 



323 



, We see, then, how completely Sallusfs 

account of the debate is confirmed by Cicero^ 
oration, as preserved in his own works ; and in 
consequence, how needless is Lord Brougham's 
hesitating language, respecting the accuracy of 
the historian. We see, also, with what indiffer- 
ence the avowal, of Caesar's Epicurean disbelief 
of a future retribution, was treated in the Roman 
Senate. Considered simply as a matter of Reli- 
gion, it seems not to have been deemed worthy 
of a remark. There certainly was no " meta- 
physical or theological discourse" on the subject; 
and as to the "appeal to the prevalence of the 

qui nos omnes, qui populum Romanum vita privare conati sunt, 
qui delere imperium, qui populi Romani nomen extinguere, punc- 
tum temporis frui vita et hoc communi spiritu non putat oppor- 
tere... .alter intelligit mortem a diis immortalibus non esse supplicii 
causa constitutam ; sed aut necessitatem naturae, aut laborum ac 

miseriarum quietem esse Axljungit gravem pcenam municipi- 

bus, si quis eorum vincula ruperit : horribiles custodias circumdat, 
et digna scelere hominum perditorum sancit — ne quis eorum pce- 
nam, quos condemnat, aut per senatum aut per populum levare 
possit. eripit etiam spem, qua? sola hominibus in miseriis consolari 
solet. bona preeterea publica publicari jubet: vitam solam relin- 
quit nefariis hominibus : quam si eripuisset, multas uno dolore 
animi atque corporis, et omnes scelerum pcenas ademisset. Itaque 
ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset posita, apud inferos ejus- 
modi quaedam illi antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt, 
quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis non esse mortem ipsam 
peitimescendam . In Catal. rv. 4, 5. 



SECTION VII. 



contrary belief and its resting on ancient tradi- 
tion," we are now aware how little the most 
eloquent man that Rome ever produced was dis- 
posed to avail himself of the topic The fair 

conclusion seems to be that Warburton was com- 
pletely warranted in arguing from so remarkable a 
manifestation of the sentiments of philosophers, 
on that most important article of religious faith. 
.... While looking through Cicero's fourth oration 
against Catiline, in the edition of Grsevius, my 
eye caught a note of Muretus, in which he 
states his opinion — and no man was more capa- 
ble of forming a just opinion — of the ancient 
notions, respecting a future state. He is, of 
course, writing of the philosophers ; of whose 
disbelief, he seems to have no doubt — as will be 
clear from the following extract : 

" Plerique veteuum in ea sententia fuerunt, ut crede- 
rent ea quse de inferis dicerentur nihil esse aliud quam 
fabulas ad territandos imperitomm amimos confictas; ip- 
sumque ita sensisse Ciceronem demonstravimus in anno- 
tationibus Horatianis." 

Lord Brougham's parallel, between the English 
Parliament and the Roman Senate, appears to 
fail ; for it is supposed by His Lordship that ? 



WARBURTON. 



325 



in the English Parliament, a disavowal of the 
Religion of the Country would be met with ex- 
pressions of blame and indignation — whereas there 
were in the Roman Senate no expressions of 
the kind. Allowing, moreover, that an answer 
out of Lardner or Paley would be ill timed, 
where would be the impropriety of reminding a 
Member, who should in that manner shock the 
feelings of those around him, of the many, far 
greater men than himself, who had sat in that 
house, and reverenced the Religion of which he 
had ventured to speak in terms of contempt ? 
In short, every new light thrown upon the sub- 
ject has the effect of showing more distinctly the 
sceptical opinions of the Roman philosophers. 
From the fact, however — that sceptical opinions 
were divulged in the Roman Senate — the Noble 
Author infers "that the doctrine of retribution 
was rather more esoteric than exoteric among the 
ancients." There is something in this notion — 
if I have not undesignedly mis-stated it — which 
I do not comprehend ; and therefore as it ap- 
pears, from what follows, to be connected with 
Warburton's view of the Eleusinian Mysteries, 
I will first present His Lordship's subsequent 
observations, and then consider them : 



326 



SECTION VII. 



"The elaborate dissertation of Bishop Warburton upon 
the Mysteries proves this effectually, and clearly refutes 
his whole argument. For to prove that the doctrine of 
future retribution was used at all as an engine of state, 
he is forced to allege that it was the secret disclosed to 
the initiated in the Sacred Mysteries; which, according 
to Cicero, were not to be viewed by the imprudent eye. 
(Ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est. De 
Legg. 11. 14.) Surely this would rather indicate that such 
doctrines were not inculcated indiscriminately, and that at 
all events, when a philosopher gives them a place in 
his works, it cannot be in pursuance of a plan for de- 
ceiving the multitude into a belief different from his 
own." (p. 287.) 

From the mode of expression adopted in the 
preceding extract, it seems probable that Lord 
Brougham does not object to Warburton's ac- 
count of the purposes of the Mysteries. At all 
events, His Lordship reasons from that account ; 
which therefore must here be distinctly explained. 
First, then, with regard to the lesser Mysteries, 
which were by no means difficult of access: "To 
support the doctrine of a Providence, 1 ' says 
Warburton, "which, they taught, governed the 
world, they e?ifbrced the belief of a euture 
state of rewards and punishments, by every 
sort of contrivance. 11 *- And here, let Warburton's 

* Divine Legation, B. 11. s. 4. 



WARBURTON. 



327 



words be duly noticed. He does not affirm that 
the Mysteries revealed the doctrine, but that they 
enforced the belief, of a future state. The ini- 
tiated in the lesser Mysteries had their previous 
belief recommended to them by interesting re- 
presentations and impressed by solemn sanctions. 
This is Warburton's real position, which he main- 
tains with every variety of argument. How 
different is this, from the Noble Author's account 
of Warburton 1 s hypothesis, where he says — in 
the extract just given — that "to prove that the 
doctrine of future retribution was used at all as 
an engine of state, Warburton is forced to allege 
that it was the secret disclosed to the initiated ! ' 
In fact, two accounts of the same thing cannot 
possibly be imagined more directly opposed to 
each other than those of Warburton and Lord 
Brougham. When Warburton goes on, to un- 
fold the purpose of the greater Mysteries, he 
observes — "the secret in the lesser Mysteries 
was principally contained in some hidden rites 
and shows to be kept from the open view of 
the people, only to invite their curiosity ; and 
the secret in the greater, some hidden doctrines 
to be kept from the people's knowledge,, from 



328 



SECTION VII. 



the very contrary purpose — and afterwards, 
when declaring what the doctrines of the greater 
Mysteries were not, he says — "they were not 
the common doctrines of a Providence and future 
state ; for ancient testimony is express that these 
doctrines were taught promiscuously to all the 
initiated, and were of the very essence of these 
Rites — These doctrines were not capable of being 
hid and secreted, because they were of universal 
credit amongst the civilized part of mankind — 
There was no need to hide them, because the 
common knowledge of them was so far from being 
detrimental to society, that, as we have shown, 
society could not even subsist without their being 
generally known and believed." — Warburton finally 
makes out the secret of the greater Mysteries 
to have been — that the Gods of the vulgar creed 
were only dead mortals ; and that there was, 
in reality, but one God, the creator of the uni- 
verse ; and gives reasons why this doctrine was 
reserved for the greater Mysteries. So much 
for Warburton's explanation of the Mysteries of 
ancient times. To say the truth, Lord Broug- 
ham is here in a dilemma, from which he can 
never be extricated, either by learning or by 



WARBURTON. 



329 



talent *.... On the assumption, however, of what 
is quite contrary to the truth, that Warburton 
held the notion of the doctrine of a future state 
being revealed in the Mysteries, as something 
new — and not enforced as something well known 
— the Noble Author indulges in what looks very 
like an invective against that learned person — if 
I do not mistake the character of the following 
remarks : 

"Among the many notable inadvertencies of his ar- 
gument, concealed from himself by an exuberant learn- 
ing and a dogmatism hardly to be paralleled, is the 
neglecting to observe how difficultly the appearance of the 
doctrine in the places where we find it is reconciled with 
the notion of its having formed the subject of the Mys- 
teries. What part in those Mysteries did Cicero's and 
Plato's and Seneca's and Xenophon's writings bear? 
There we have the doctrine plainly stated; possibly to 
the world at large — possibly, far more probably, to the 
learned reader only — but assuredly not by the Hierophant 
or the Mystagogue to the initiated. This is wholly incon- 
sistent with the notion of its being reserved for these 
alone." (p. 288.) 

* I will observe, in a note, that Lord Brougham seems to have 
mistaken the import of the expression — " Ne imprudentiam qui- 
dem oculorum adjici fas est." The meaning will be understood 
from the context : " Quid autem mihi displiceat in nocturnis, poetaR 
indicant Comici. Qua licentia Rom® data, quidnam egisset ille, 
qui in sacrificium cogitatatn libidinem intulit, quo ne imprudentiam 
quidem oculorum adjici fas est." 



330 



SECTION VII. 



Such is the commencement of a long para- 
graph ; the consistency of which is maintained 
to the end. As the paragraph has nothing what- 
ever to rest upon except His Lordship's strange 
misrepresentation of Warbur ton's opinion, I will 
only observe that, in my own judgement, it did 
not present the happiest opportunity for denounc- 
ing " the dogmatism hardly to be paralleled " of 
the man, or " the many notable inadvertencies" 
of his argument. 

The next paragraph (pp.289 — 29 1) relates to 
the circumstance of opinions exoteric and esoteric — - 
or in other words, some passages favourable to the 
doctrine of a future state, and others adverse to it 
- — being found in the same treatise — of Plato, for 
instance, or Cicero. Now, I cannot discover the 
great absurdity into which Warburton is supposed 
to be driven, when Lord Brougham describes him 
as maintaining " that Plato and Cicero pretend 
to believe a future state in order to deceive the 
multitude, by stating it in the same writings in 
which they betrayed their real sentiments to be 
the very reverse." They might in this manner 
consult their own safety. Some concessions, 
they might imagine, were due from them, as 



WARBURTON. 



331 



citizens, to the popular feeling— so long as they 
could at the same time convey, to the intelligent, 
their opinions as philosophers. Are there not, in 
the writings of Mr Hume, traces of a similar 
proceeding? But not to persevere in these gene- 
ral speculations, which can seldom lead to any 
satisfactory conclusion, I will now take, in their 
order, the particular cases, which Lord Brougham 
has proposed for consideration. 

"i. There can be no doubt that both the Greek and 
Roman philosophers disbelieved part of the popular doc- 
trine as to future retribution ; those punishments, to wit, 
which are of a gross and corporeal nature; and accord- 
ingly what Timseus the Locrian and others have said of 
the Tifxwpiai ^evai proves nothing ; for it applies to those 
only. Strabo plainly speaks of these only in the passage 
where he observes that women and the vulgar are not 
to be kept pious and virtuous by the lessons of philosophy, 
but by superstition, which cannot be maintained without 
mythology (fable-making) and prodigies {lid ceiailaiyio- 
i//as* tovto h* ovk avev fxvB otto uas kcu TepctTe'ias), for 
he gives as examples of these, Jupiter's thunder, the 
snakes of the Furies, &c." (p. 291.) 

Warburton, in the first section of his third 
book, adduces some " testimonies of ancient sages 
and philosophers, concerning the necessity of the 
doctrine of a future state, to civil society." The 



332 



SECTION VII. 



first is that of Timaeus the Locrian, a very early 
Pythagorean ; who having mentioned the use of 
philosophy, in promoting the virtue and happi- 
ness of well-disposed minds, enforces the necessity 
of religious terrors, and the apprehension of pun- 
ishments after this life, to restrain the perverse 
and evil. The next is that of Polybius, much 
to the same effect. The third is that of Strabo, 
referred to by Lord Brougham; and the last that 
of Pliny the elder, who, although an Epicurean, 
held the importance of the fear of the Gods to 
the interests of society. In the second section, 
Warburton mentions the quotations, before ad- 
duced from Timseus, Polybius and Strabo, as 
conducive to the proof of his next proposition — 
that while the aforesaid sages and philosophers, 
with a view to the public good, enforced the 
necessity of a general belief of a future retribu- 
tion, such retribution did not form a part of 
their own creed. His Lordship affirms that the 
old philosophers rejected only those future pun- 
ishments which were of a gross and corporeal 
nature ; meaning to say that they still held the 
doctrine of a future retribution. To this account 
of the matter, there are two objections:- — 1. No 



WARBURTON. 



333 



witness is produced specifically to show, that 
any one, who eschewed the vulgar notion of re- 
wards and punishments, adhered to the principle 
which the notion involved; — 2. On His Lord- 
ship's own representation, the passage of Strabo 
leads to a contrary conclusion ; for the points 
under consideration are — not modes of future 
punishment, more or less gross and corporeal — 
but "the lessons of philosophy ?' on the one hand, 

and "the popular doctrine " on the other With 

respect to the Ti^coplai ^evai of Timseus the 
Locrian, Lord Brougham is not quite correct in 
thinking that they apply to the foregoing vulgar 
apprehensions only. They, in fact, immediately 
refer to the ancient Pythagorean doctrine of the 
transmigration of souls ; and from the entire pas- 
sage there is reason to suppose that those who 
inculcated even that doctrine in public, did not 
in secret believe it.* .... I now proceed to the 
next paragraph : 

* See the passage, in Divine Legation, B. in. Sec. 3. The fol- 
lowing extract may here suffice : tocs ^uxas d7reipyop.e<3 \fsevdecri 
\6yois, e'lKa fir] ayrjTcu dXadeai.' XeyoiUTO o' ai/ay/catcos /ecu ti- 
[Mwpiai %evcu, cos p.eTevdvofxevav tolv xj/ux^u, twv /xhv SeiXcou es 
yvvainea tTKCtvea 7rod' vfipiv eKSiSo/meva' twv f)e fiiaityovwv, ei 
6iip'iu)i/ (ruijuara toti KoXarnu. k. t. e. 



384 



SECTION VII. 



"2. Nothing can be more vague than the inference 
drawn from such passages as those in Cicero and Seneca, 
where a doubt is expressed on the subject of a future 
state, and a wish of more cogent proofs seems betrayed — 
as where Cicero makes one of his prolocutors, in the 
Tusculan Questions, say, that when he lays down the 
Phsedo which had persuaded him, 'Assensio omnis ilia 
elabitur' (i. 11.), and when Seneca speaks of the philoso- 
phers as 'rem gratissimam promittentes magis quam pro- 
bantes,' and calls it 'bellum somnium." Epist. 102. No 
one pretends that the ancients had a firm and abiding 
opinion, founded on very cogent reasons, respecting a 
future state ; and with far sounder theologians than they 
were, the anxiety naturally incident to so momentous an 
inquiry may well excite occasional doubts, and even ap- 
prehensions." (pp. 291, 292.) 

The turn of sentiment, through the whole of 
this paragraph, is not only founded on the know- 
ledge of human nature, but indicates the most 
becoming feeling for human weakness, with re- 
gard to the concerns of a future life. To my 
mind, there is something so pleasing in the view 
which Lord Brougham has taken of this matter, 
that I wish to retain the impression unimpaired. 
Whether in this instance, as in some other cases, 
Warburton went rudely to work — I do not re- 
collect, and will not examine. I am ready, with- 



WAR BURT ON, 



335 



out farther inquiry, to acquiesce in the justness 

of the Noble Author's animadversions The 

next paragraph now demands attention: 

" 3. When Strabo speaks of the Brahmins having in- 
vented fables, like Plato, upon future judgement, it is 
plain that he alludes to those speculations in the Phsedo, 
which are avowedly and purposely given as imaginary, 
respecting the details of another world. To no other 
part of the Platonic doctrine can the Brahminical my- 
thology be likened; nor would there be any accuracy of 
speech at all in comparing those fables to the more ab- 
stract doctrines of the immortality of the soul as the 
words literally do — uxnrep na\ WXarav ire pi re d(pdap- 
<T('ct<? xjyv^tj^" (p. 292.) 

Having already mentioned the object of the 
first and second sections of the third book of 
the Divine Legation, this may not be an impro- 
per place to observe, that the third section of 
the same book is mainly occupied by an exami- 
nation of the character and genius of the Pytha- 
gorean, the Platonic, the Peripatetic and the 
Stoic Sects ; with a view of showing that not 
one of them believed the doctrine of a future 
retribution. From the remarks of antiquity re- 
specting the public and private instructions given 
by Pythagoras, and his principle of a transmi- 
gration of souls without any moral purpose — 



336 



SECTION VII. 



from the double doctrine of Plato and his prin- 
ciple of transmigrations and purgations, by which 
the soul was prepared for absorption into the 
divine substance, whence it was taken — from the 
sceptical intimations of Aristotle and the Peripa- 
tetics — and the decided language of the Stoics — 
Warburton inferred that a state of rewards and 
punishments hereafter could not be an article of 
faith amongst those philosophers. The Noble 
Lord's last-quoted paragraph relates to a passage 
from Strabo, tending to prove a long existing 
persuasion, that Plato's descriptions of future re- 
wards and punishments were rather put forth 
with popular views, than as conveying his own 
sentiments. This, indeed, appears to be His 
Lordship's opinion ; although he does not, on 
that account, admit Plato's infidelity on the sub- 
ject. With regard to the similarity between the 
Brahminical and Platonic speculations on the 
origin, nature and destination of the soul, as 
mentioned by Strabo, there appears to be a 
greater degree of it than his Lordship supposes. 
But this point is of so little consequence to our 
present inquiry, that I pass on to the subsequent 
paragraph : 



Vv ARBURTON. 



337 



*'• 4. The quotation from Aristotle may refer to this 
world merely ; but it is certainly made a good deal stronger 
in Bishop Warburtons translation — (pofiepiaraTov S' 6 
Odvaros' irepa^ 'yap, «a! ouhev en tw Tedveoori doKel, 
ovt€ dyadov ovre kcikov elvai. 'Death is of all things 
the most terrible; for it is the final period of existence; 
and beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor 
evil for the dead man to dread or hope.' This is at best 
a mere paraphrase. Aristotle says — Death is most ter- 
rible, for it is an end {of us) and there appears to be 
nothing further, good or bad, for the dead. Even were 
we to take this as an avowal of the Stagyrite's opinion 
in the sense given it by Bishop Warburton, it proves 
nothing as to Plato." (p. 292.) 

Lord Brougham's version appears to be very 
nearly as adverse as Bishop Warburton , s, to 
the idea of any credit being given, by Aristotle, 
to the existence of good or evil, after this life. 
The commentators indeed are unwilling to think 
that Aristotle is there expressing his own sen- 
timents ; and Dr Gillies, in his translation, dexter- 
ously introduces a parenthesis, which removes 
the opprobrium from the philosopher and fastens 
it upon the people — " death seems of all things 
the most formidable; because, in common opi- 
nion, it is the ultimate limit of all our pains 
and pleasures, beyond which there is neither 

Y 



338 



SECTION VII. 



good nor evil." On this interpretation I shall 
merely remark, that, when the translator ven- 
tured upon it, he ought to have given his readers 

some reasons for the step he had taken.* 

However, what only concerns Aristotle, Lord 
Brougham truly observes, "proves nothing as to 
Plato'" — or indeed the other philosophers; and 
therefore this being probably the only remaining 
occasion of referring to their religious tenets, 
I will here put down what will at least evince 
that Warburton is not singular in his notions, 
respecting the ancient opinions of a future state. 
The following is the testimony of Grotius — and 
a more competent, and in every way more un- 
exceptionable witness cannot be named — to the 
general unbelief, or utter uncertainty, prevailing 
upon the subject, in those remote ages : 

"Gentes nullam habebant de ea re [sc. de resurrec- 
tione et vita seterna] Divinam revelationem. Epicurus et 
Aristoteles nihil ejus credebant. Stoici animas putabant 
manere, sed non ultra quam ad tempus 6Kirvpu><r6<a<;. 
Platonici animas perpetuis vicibus nunc beatas nunc ver6 
miseras fieri. Quicquid dicebant, conjecturse erant m- 
certsB, vagge, fragiles."f 

* See Arist. Eth. Nic. in. 6. Also Gillies' Translation, Vol. * 
p. 309. 

t Grotii Annotata in Ep. ad Ephesios ii. 12. 



WAR BURTON, 



339 



When Warburton published the third book 
of his Divine Legation of Moses, he might with 
great propriety have formally announced that the 
preceding passage was the text on which he was 
about to enlarge. What Grotius had affirmed, 
as the result of his own reading — that War- 
burton undertook to establish, by proofs from 
the writings of the philosophers themselves. I am 
well aware of the difficulty of the subject; and 
by no means disposed to assert that Warburton 
always placed every thing he discussed in the 
precise point of view in which it ought to be 
seen ; but justice requires that he should be cleared 
of what Lord Brougham's animadversions tend to 
fix upon him — the suspicion of having availed 
himself of an unheard of paradox, for the pur- 
pose of supporting a favourite hypothesis Of 

all the ancient Grecian sages, Socrates is univer- 
sally allowed to be the one who had the clearest 
conceptions and the firmest conviction of a fu- 
ture state ; and yet, at the very close of his life, 
in what terms of hesitation and doubt, according 
to Plato, he expressed his sentiments on the 
subject ! At the end of the Apology, he is made 

to say — But it is now time to depart ; I indeed 
y2 



340 



SECTION VII, 



to die, but you to live. To winch of us is as- 
signed the happier lot, is known to God only; 
and in the Phado he again and again speaks 
dubiously of the future — not without hope, but 
with great uncertainty.* On these passages the 
learned Gataker has written so fairly, that I am 

tempted to extract his remarks: 

Mm ypnt^jt t 6dw s&Qfu iq\ yjsmlq-ioq odi mod 

" Dissertationem denique de argumento hoc suam his 
tandem verbis concludit [Socrates] Harum sententiarum 
quce vera sit, Deus aliquis videiit : quid sunt autem hsec 
omnia, nisi ignorantise hac in re proprise ingenua con- 
fessio, claram satis et illorum perstrictionem in se con- 

tinens, qui certi aliquid de ea statuerent ?" " Sunt 

enim utique et hsec, prout priora ilia, optantis sperantis- 
que potius quam spondentis statuentisve vera esse qusD 
opinatur; et in minore damno ponentis, etiamsi falsa 
autumet. Scite proinde Tertullianus de anima c. 1. Adeo 
omnis ilia tunc sapientia Soc?'atis de industria venerat con- 
sulted cequanimitatis, non de fiducia compertce veritatis. 
Ita summi illi philosophi, sapientise nomine turgidi, ani- 
mse seternitatim vitamque futuram, fide dimidiata, ut 

* ' AWd yap tjSt} wpa aTrievai, c/ulol fxeu aTrodavovpevu) , vp.1v 
$e (3i<»)arop,e'i/OL9. biroTepoi 8e i)p.<Zv epyovrai kicl apeivov Trpdyp.a, 

a$r]\ov iravTL TrXrjv rj to deal. Apol Nui/ de ev ictc, otl 

irap' avdpas re eXirL^a) d<fi't,£e(rdai dyadous. Kal tovto /nev ovk 
dv trdw di'iarxvptcrai^v, K.T.k. Phcedo. There is, moreover, some- 
thing mortifying in the concluding scene : T Q KpiTwv, e<ptj, to 
' A<TKXiymu) ocpetXopev dXeKTpvova' dWd diroboTc Kal pi) dp.c- 
XtfcrtjTe. 



W A KB UK TON. 



341 



.Minutius loquitur, credebant, et quasi per nebulam ista 
intuebantur, conjecturis meris atque humanis suspicioni- 
bus nitentes/'* 

If such was the uncertainty of Socrates, who 
relied, far more than the other philosophers 
were accustomed to do, upon the natural feelings 
and apprehensions of the mind — what must have 
been the perplexity of those who, if they held 
a future state at all, had to reconcile the no- 
tion to the transmigrations and purifications and 
revolutions and diffusions and absorptions, to 
which they deemed human souls to be destined? 
There are some verses of Milton, descriptive of 
those ancient sages; and when we consider to 
whom the sentiments are assigned, we cannot 
doubt the sincerity with which they were enter- 
tained by the Poet himself — 

"Much of the soul they talk, but all awry, 
And in themselves seek virtue, and to themselves 
All glory arrogate, to God give none ; 
Rather accuse him under usual names, 
-Fortune and Fate, as one regardless quite 
Of mortal things." t 

Lord Brougham's next paragraph refers to 
the Stoics, of whose opinions, respecting a future 

t Gataker, Annot. in Marc. Ant. dc rebus suis, iv. 21. 
? Paradise Regained, iv. 313. 



342 



SECTION VII. 



retribution, His Lordship is too wise to under- 
take the defence. Nothing, therefore, now re- 
mains, but proceed to the case of Cicero: 

" The authority of Cicero presses our author the 
most closely; and accordingly he makes great efforts to 
escape from it. After shewing some circumstances, ra- 
ther of expression than anything else, in his philoso- 
phical treatises, he cites the oration Pro Cluentio, where, 
speaking of the vulgar superstition, he says it is gene- 
rally disbelieved; and then asks, 'Quid aliud mors eri- 
puit prseter sensum doloris ? ' But this at best is a rhe- 
torical flourish; and being delivered in public (though 
before the judges) never could be seriously meant as an 
esoteric attack on the doctrine." (p. 293.) 

Let us examine the case somewhat more par- 
ticularly. The charge under consideration was 7 
that Oppianicus, a man living in exile and wretch- 
edness, had been destroyed by poison, under the 
direction of his enemy Avitus. Cicero contends 
that the enmity of Avitus, instead of prompting 
him to compass the death of Oppianicus, would 
have been exerted in prolonging, to the utter- 
most, a life so miserable and ignominious. " For 
what evil," he asks, " has death inflicted upon 
him — unless, indeed, we are induced by silly 
fables to imagine that he is enduring the punish= 



WARBURTON. 



34,3 



merits of the wicked in the infernal regions ? 
But if these things be fictions, as all under- 
stand, of what has death deprived him beyond 
the sense of pain? 1 '* Here, then, we have again 
presented to us the very argument . which was 
employed by Caesar, in the case of Catiline's con- 
spirators ; without more appearance of " rhetorical 
flourish" in the one instance than in the other. 
The argument, as employed by Cicero, distinctly 
proves two points: 1. the slight degree of credit 
given, to a future retribution, by the higher ranks 
of the Roman people at that time ; and 2. the 
absolute rejection of a future retribution, by those 
who rejected the vulgar notions on the subject. 
It is on the vulgar notions that the idea of such 
a state is made entirely to depend .... There is 
far greater difficulty in the matter than is ad- 
mitted by Lord Brougham. But I now proceed 
with his Lordship's animadversions: 

"The doctrines in the De Officii s relate only to the 
Deity's being incapable of anger or malevolence, on which 

* Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulitl nisi 
forte ineptiis et fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus ilium apud in- 
feros impiorum supplicia perferre quae si falsa sunt, id 

quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit, prae- 
tor sensum dolorisV Pro Cluentio, 61. 



344 



SECTION VII. 



account he praises Regulus the more for keeping his oatfe,. 
when all philosophers knew nec irasci Deum nec nocere ; 
which shows, according to our author, that Cicero could not 
believe in a future retribution. But this is said by Cicero 
only in reference to immediate punishments, or judg- 
ments, as the vulgar term them. At any rate, the pas- 
sage is quite capable of that sense We may here 

observe, in passing, the gratuitous manner in which 
works are held esoteric and exoteric, just as suits the 
purposes of the argument. The Offices contain the above 
passage; and therefore, Bishop Warburton says it is the 
work which 'bids the fairest of any to be spoken from 
the heart':' (p. 294.) 

Punishment can proceed only from anger: 
the Deity is not susceptible of anger: therefore 

the Deity will not punish Such appears to 

have been the reasoning of ancient times ; and 
that reasoning was one of the difficulties which 
the Christian doctrine, of future punishments for 
evil-doers, had to contend with. Cicero declares 
the belief, that the Deity could not be angry, 
to belong to philosophers of every sect. His 
words are remarkable: " At hoc quidem com- 
mune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum 
modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii 
dicunt, et nihil exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam 
qui Deum semper agere aliquid et moliri yoking 



WARB U R TON. 



345 



NUNQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM NEC NOCERE.* 

With the validity of the reasoning we have no 
concern. We are sure, however, that the rea- 
soning was understood to be universal ; and so ? 
according to the views then entertained, would 
hold good for a future life as well as the present. 
This is another indication of the broad line of 
distinction between the philosophical and the po- 
pular creed Let me here intimate a reason, 

which may have moved Warburton to think the 
work de Officiis to be the one which "bids the 
fairest of any to be spoken from the heart." 
It is a better reason than Lord Brougham has 
given ; and, I venture to predict, will be re- 
ceived without a dissentient voice. Cicero wrote 

THE TREATISE BE OFFICIIS FOR THE INSTRUCTION 

of his own son To the passage from the 

Somnium Scipionis, subsequently quoted by the 
Noble Author — "Omnibus qui patriam conser- 
varint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in ccelo 
definitum locum ubi beati aevo sempiterno fru- 
antur" — similar passages might be added, from 

* De Officiis, iii. 28. My limits do not now allow me to dwell 
on subjects. I can only suggest hints. The reader will find this 
reasoning of the ancients very ably discussed by Warburton, Divine 
Legation, iu. 4. 



34,6 



SECTION VII. 



the works of Cicero, representing the future feli- 
city of great men. Whether Warburton's ex- 
planation of the existence of such passages be 
correct I will not affirm. The difficulty is, to 
account for them in a manner which shall not 
be entirely at variance with the philosophical 
principles avowed on other occasions; on the 
occasions, for instance, alluded to by Lord 
Brougham, in this last quotation from the ' Dis- 
course 1 which will require attention : 

"The main proof, however, against Cicero's belief is 
drawn from the Epistles, where alone, says our author, 
we can be sure of his speaking his real sentiments. Yet 
never did proof more completely fail. Writing to Tor- 
quatus, he says, ' Nec enim dum ero, angar ulla re, cum 
omni vacem culpa — et si non ero, sensu omni carebo', 
(vi. 41); and to Toranius, 'Ima ratio videtur, ferre mo- 
derate, prsesertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum 
(vi. 21). And this which really means nothing more than 
a common remark on death ending all our pains and 
troubles, the learned author calls * professing his disbelief 
in a future state of retribution in the frankest manner.' 
(p. 295.) 

Now, the Noble Author having first stated 
that Warburton's " main proof is drawn from 
the Epistles", and having then proceeded to par- 
ticulars, the natural inference is, that the whole 



WARBURTON. 



347 



of the proof — or, at the least, the principal part 
of it — is given. His Lordship, however, has con- 
tented himself with a selection; and, as it ap- 
pears to me, not without an eye to the maxim 
of Horace — 

Et qua? 

Desperat tractata nitescere posse relinquit. 

The first passage adduced by Warburton, and 
left by Lord Brougham without notice, is from 
an epistle to L. Mescinius : " Sed ut ilia se- 
cunda moderate tulimus, sic hanc non solum ad- 
versam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter 
ferre debemus ; ut hoc saltern in maximis malis 
boni consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati 
contemnere debeamus, propterea quod nullum 
sensum esset habitura, nunc sic affecti non modo 
contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare." Now 
if, in this passage, Cicero has not expressed his 
belief, that the consciousness of good and evil 
is terminated by death, I am at a loss to ima- 
gine in what manner that belief could have been 
expressed, in the Latin language .... The next 
passage is that, from the epistle to Torquatus, 
given by Lord Brougham — " Nec enim dum 
ero, angar ulla re y cum omni vacem culpa — et 



SECTION VII. 



si non ero, sensu omni carebo the import of 
which Warburton illustrated, by adducing the 
similar language of the Epicureans, from Lu- 
cretius : 

"Scilicet haud nobis quidquam, qui non erimus turn, 
Accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere." 

From another epistle to Torquatus, Warburton 
quotes what Lord Brougham has not quoted : 
"Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune 
tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitse, non 
ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse do- 
leam, presertim cum id sine ullo sensu futurum 
sit." And then finally appears the passage in- 
dicating that death is " omnium rerum extre- 
mum. r> So that many proofs might be mentioned 
which "more completely fail" than the proof 
here drawn out by the author of the Divine Le- 
gation. For the purpose of more distinctly per- 
ceiving the effect of such declarations, expressed 
under such circumstances, in deciding the cha- 
racter of the writer, let us consider what would 
be our feelings if it should appear that our own 
Locke, for instance — or our own Johnson — had, 
in their confidential letters, avowed the same 
Ciceronian views of human destiny. Could we 



WARBURTON. 



any longer place reliance upon that regard for 
a life to come, which is manifested in their 
published works ? Are we not, indeed, the more 
strongly affected by the religious tendency of 
their writings, because we know that they really 
have availed themselves of the unreserved inter- 
course of friendship, to impress the very senti- 
ments they have enforced as the instructors of 
the world ? How striking is the language of 
Locke, in the Letter written, to be delivered 
after his own decease, to his friend, Collins: 
" I know you loved me living, and will pre- 
serve my memory now I am dead. All the use 
to be made of it is, that this life is a scene of 
vanity, that soon passes away; and affords no 
solid satisfaction, but in the consciousness of 
doing well, and in the hopes of another life. 
This is what I can say, upon experience; and 
what you will find to be true, when you come 
to make up the account.'" Let it not, however, 
be supposed that I would measure the faith of 
Cicero and of Locke, as to a future state, by the 
same standard. My only wish is that every thing, 
appertaining to the subject under review, should 
be fairly estimated. Passages, indicating a per- 



350 



SECTION VII. 



suasion that death brings with it a total and 
eternal extinction of consciousness, have been pro- 
duced from the familiar letters of the great 
Roman Orator. Now, the most effectual method 
of averting the conclusion, to which that cir- 
cumstance naturally leads, would be the produc- 
tion of passages of a different character, from 
the Epistles. That passages, from the Epistles, 
expressing hopes as to the future, cannot be 
cited, I will not assert — not having gone through 
them, for the purpose of ascertaining the point; 
but there is to myself a strong presumption 
against the existence of such passages, arising 
from the recollection that Dr Middleton — with 
all his zeal, and it was great, to establish the 
opinion of Cicero^s belief — has not availed himself 
of a single passage from the Epistles. Dr Mid- 
dleton seems reluctantly to admit that Warbur- 
ton's quotations relate to an utter extinction of 
our being; and entreats his readers to bear in 
mind that Cicero was an Academic — that he 
might probably be writing to Epicureans — or 
that he might be stating the impression of a 
melancholy hour* But, as I have already ob- 

* Middleton's Life of Cicero, Vol. n, p. 561. 4to 1741. 



WARBURTON. 



351 



served, a more convincing argument would have 
been that, when writing to those who were not 
Epicureans or when writing altogether under 
happier auspices, he had adopted a loftier strain 
of sentiment. I should be glad to see the case 
of Cicero in a more favourable light than is 
permitted by the facts by which it is encom- 
passed. My own notion is, that there was some- 
thing, in the nature and genius of the old phi- 
losophy, which withdrew the minds of its adhe- 
rents from those simpler considerations which 
would have led them to the truth. 

Enough, I trust, has now been adduced — as 
well with regard to what Lord Brougham has 
called Bishop Warburton's "grand paradox," as 
to "the minor paradox'" concerning "the real 
opinions of the ancients " — to show that the great 
prelate had far stronger grounds, for his opinions, 
than His Lordship appears to have suspected. I 
cannot, however, take leave of the subject, with- 
out recommending to the Noble Author's atten- 
tion — if he should do me the honour to glance 
his eye over these pages — a short treatise on 
the opinions of the ancients, respecting the Deity, 
human duty and a future life, by a Bishop, of 



352 



SECTION VII. 



the English Church, still living — and, if I mis- 
take not, one of his Lordship's most intimate 
friends— I mean, Dr Maltby. The treatise in 
question will be found in that learned person's 
* Illustrations of the truth of the Christian Reli- 
gion. 1 It is, in fact, a Thesis maintained in the 
Divinity Schools of this University, as an exercise 
for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity. In that 
Thesis, Lord Brougham will find precisely the 
same views, of "the opinions of the ancients," 
as those which pervade the Divine Legation — 
presented too in the purest Latinity. It would 
be an injury to the reader not to extract a few 
sentences. 

"Scite et composite, dum in exercitatione umbratili 
versabatur, Cicero de hac qusestione [sc. de animi immor- 
talitate] diseruit. At vero, cum ad verum ei ventum est, 
languescere ccepit et infringi, qualiscunque demum esset,' 
ejus persuasio. — Nullum ei attulit doloris Tevamentum, 
nullum segritudinis remedium, nullum contra mortis ti- 
morem solatium. Tulliola ilia tantopere amata cum ei 
erepta esset, neque in patris mcestissimi, neque in amici, 
qui eum consolabatur, argumentis locus est datus ei 
opinioni, quae mortem statuit, 'non interitum esse omnia 
tollentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migratio- 
nem commutationemque vitse.' Nse in oratione coram 
populo habitS Cicero ipse, quae viri inconstantia fuit, nulla 



WARBURTON. 



353 



omnino poena apud inferos sceleratissimum hominem affici 
contendit .... Verba heed a sapientissimorum virorum sen- 
tentiis minime fuerunt aliena. Fuit enim plerisque eorum 
persuasissimum, animam, etsi post mortem durasset, nullis 
esse suppliciis obnoxiam : omnia ea quae de Oreo diceren- 
tur, poetarum esse portenta ad plebeculam minaciter et 
inaniter terrendam aptissima : Deos, si qui essent, ab ira 
esse vacuos; — homines igitur, si revivescerent, omnino 
omnes futuros esse felices."* 

Those sentiments, therefore, of the author of 
the Divine Legation, which, in Lord Brougham's 
judgement, could be entertained only by a man 
who, having, with "preposterous and perverted 
ingenuity,"" discovered one paradox in the Law of 
Moses, went forth into the regions of ancient 
philosophy, resolved to find another paradox to 
uphold the first — those very sentiments have 
been publicly avowed and defended by a person- 
age still living amongst us — of the greatest 
eminence for learning — not because he had any 
hypothesis to support, but simply because he 
believed them to express the truth of the case. 

* Illustrations, &c, pp. 396— 398. ed. 1802. 

- 



Z 



354 



SECTION VII. 



Lord Brougham's great object appears to have 
been, to give stability to Natural Theology, by 
connecting it with such departments of human 
knowledge as are the most remarkable for truth 
and certainty. In the attainment of that object, 
His Lordship has, in numerous instances, mani- 
fested those extraordinary powers, by which he 
is distinguished. While, indeed, the leading prin- 
ciples of his volume are generally entitled to 
commendation, their developement and application 
too often call for animadversion. That, in the 
preceding pages, many serious mistakes — some of 
them highly injurious to the characters of de- 
servedly-celebrated individuals — have been pointed 
out, is beyond controversy. Yet it must be con- 
sidered, that Natural Theology, as viewed by 
Lord Brougham, is a science of vast extent; and 
that, in discussing such a subject, no talents, 
however splendid, can supply the place of long- 
continued study and reflection. 



THE END, 



